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Abstract
In this thesis we study three problems related to financial modeling.
First, we study the problem of pricing Employee Stock Options (ESOs) from the
point of view of the issuing company. Since an employee cannot trade or effectively
hedge ESOs, she exercises them to maximize a subjective criterion of value. Modeling
this exercise behavior is key to pricing ESOs. We argue that ESO exercises should
not be modeled on a one by one basis, as is commonly done, but at a portfolio
level because exercises related to different ESOs that an employee holds would be
coupled. Using utility based models we also show that such coupled exercise behavior
leads to lower average ESO costs for the commonly used utility functions such as
power and exponential utilities. Unfortunately, utility based models do not lead
to tractable solutions for finding costs associated with ESOs. We propose a new
risk management based approach to model exercise behavior based on mean-variance
portfolio maximization. The resulting exercise behavior is both intuitive and leads
to a computationally tractable model for finding ESO exercises and pricing ESOs as
a portfolio. We also study a special variant of this risk-management based exercise
model, which leads to a decoupling of the ESO exercises and then obtain analytical
bounds on the implied cost of an ESO for the employer in this case.
Next, we study Guaranteed Withdrawal Benefits (GWB) for life, a recent and
popular product that many insurance companies have offered for retirement plan-
ning. The GWB feature promises to the investor increasing withdrawals over her
lifetime and is an exotic option that bears financial and mortality related risks for
the insurance company. We first analyze a continuous time version of this product
in a Black Scholes economy with simplifying assumptions on population mortality
and obtain an analytical solution for the product value. This simple analysis reveals
the high sensitivity the product bears to several risk factors. We then further in-
vestigate the pricing of GWB in a more realistic setting using different asset pricing
models, including those that allow the interest rates and the volatility of returns to be
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stochastic. Our analysis reveals that 1) GWB has insufficient price discrimination and
is susceptible to adverse selection and 2) valuations can vary substantially depending
on which class of models is used for accounting. We believe that the ambiguity in
value and the presence of significant risks, which can be challenging to hedge, should
create concerns to the GWB underwriters, their clients as well as the regulators.
Finally, many problems in finance are Sequential Decision Problems (SDPs) under
uncertainty. We find that SDP formulations using commonly used financial metrics
or acceptability criteria can lead to dynamically inconsistent strategies. We study
the link between objective functions used in SDPs, dynamic consistency and dynamic
programming. We then propose ways to create dynamically consistent formulations.
Thesis Supervisor: Dimitris J. Bertsimas
Title: Boeing Professor of Operations Research
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Much of quantitative finance is based on models of market variates - how prices
of securities traded in the markets evolve, how market participants behave and the
interaction between the two.
In a landmark paper, Black and Scholes [18] proposed a model to price a stock-
option based on the price of the underlying stock. They provided not only a way
to unambiguously price an option, but also a method to “hedge” out and in theory,
eliminate the risk of holding or underwriting this option. This spawned an entire
new field of financial engineering and a fresh body of work based on the concept of
risk-neutral pricing and hedging was created and is still being pursued very actively.
Simultaneously, in industry, a plethora of complex financial derivatives are being
created, marketed and sold to institutions and households.
The assumptions underlying the risk neutral pricing theory are that the markets
are complete and that the market players do not face constraints in buying and sell-
ing the various instruments traded in the market. In this ideal setting, all derivative
securities are redundant and can not only be priced unambiguously but also hedged
perfectly from the prices of other traded instruments. The quantitative link between
various traded instruments in the market is established by using a parametric model
for price process of the underlying(s) on which the derivative instruments are writ-
ten. This method works fairly well for pricing standard instruments that are heavily
traded. But as the derivative instrument to be priced becomes more intricate in its
dependence on the underlying(s) and the market for it more constrained, the finan-
cial engineering methodology becomes less precise and more subjective. The model
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that is used to link together prices of different securities then itself becomes a key
factor in valuation. Due care must then be taken in creating models to price such
an instrument as well as interpreting results from the so called no-arbitrage pricing
models.
In this thesis, we examine two problems in pricing derivatives in “incomplete”
markets and show how even reasonable models can sometimes leave out significant
determinants of value.
Models for behavior of market participants such as investment managers or con-
sumers are in general decision and control problems. Again here, we observe in a
dynamic setting, an ad-hoc formulation of an investment manager’s problem that
employs the commonly used financial metrics can lead to a model where the man-
ager takes conflicting decisions over time. We also examine in this thesis, general
properties of a dynamic decision framework for “consistency” in decisions.
1.2 Contributions
Modeling Exercise Behavior for pricing Employee Stock Op-
tions
We consider the problem of pricing Employee Stock Options (ESOs) from the point
of view of the companies that issue them. Although, off late, ESOs have been losing
popularity due to scandals and less favorable accounting regulations, they still con-
stitute a sizeable chunk of many companies’ compensation costs. Since employees are
constrained in both trading as well hedging ESOs, the standard risk-neutral pricing
framework cannot be directly applied to ESOs. Employees, would exercise ESOs to
maximize a personal measure of value or utility. Pricing ESOs then encompasses twin
problems - we first need to model employee exercises, which can be sub-optimal from
a risk neutral perspective, while being subjectively optimal; and then compute the
risk-neutral cost of the ESOs under these exercise policies. The choice of model for
exercise behavior, will have a big impact on the valuation of ESO costs.
Most ESO exercises are driven by the need of a risk-averse employee to limit the
uncertainty of an option payoff that she cannot hedge. The basic financial tenet of
diversification would suggest that as all ESOs are exposed to common risk sources,
they have diminishing marginal value to the employee. It is then plausible that
incremental option grants will, in general, be exercised differently. This, in turn,
would lead to a different incremental cost for an ESO grant to the employer. The
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models that have been proposed in literature, typically price ESOs on an individual
basis and in isolation and would not take this effect into consideration. We propose a
new approach - to explicitly take into account the employee’s need for diversification
with respect to the entire portfolio of ESOs that she holds while modeling her exercise
behavior. Thus we propose to price ESOs at a portfolio level rather than at individual
level.
We first augment the conventional utility based framework that leads to an en-
dogenous exercise model for ESOs and show that in general bundling together of
ESOs affects exercise behavior and tends to cause an employee to exercise her ESOs
earlier on average. This makes her forgo a larger part of the option value of the port-
folio, thereby reducing its cost for the employer. Also, an immediate consequence of
taking these portfolio effects into account is that the cost of an option portfolio is no
longer linear or equal to the sum of its parts. Further, issuance of new options can
have a retrospective effect on the cost of already issued options.
We then use the concept of risk management and ideas in portfolio optimization
to motivate a model, where the employee exercises options so as to optimize a risk-
adjusted value of the entire portfolio at each time step. This causes the employee to
exercise options in decreasing order of a barrier function that can be interpreted as a
pseudo Sharpe-ratio for the option. The advantage of this model is that it leads to a
computationally simple framework to both price the ESO portfolio and also allocate
its costs amongst its components. For a special risk-management based exercise model
we show that option exercises decouple and one can think of applying the “pseudo
Sharpe-ratio” criterion to options on a one-by-one basis. In this case, we recover a
linear pricing rule for ESOs and also derive tight analytical bounds on the cost of an
ESO.
Pricing Guaranteed Withdrawal Benefits for Life
Complex financial derivatives are often embedded in retail investment products. We
consider one such recent and extremely popular innovation in the private pension
product space - the Guaranteed Withdrawal Benefits (GWB) for life. The GWB
for life option, which is usually available as an add-on to a Variable Annuity (VA)
investment fund, guarantees an investor a non-decreasing stream of payments in her
retirement until death, with her funds always staying invested in the VA. In return,
the investor pays a small fee indexed to the quantum of the guarantee, every year.
While prima-facie, GWB for life appears to be just another, somewhat exotic, financial
17
option, pricing it poses many challenges. Due to its exposure to population longevities
and dependence on investor behavior over time and complex dependence on various
financial market factors, the complete markets hypothesis does not hold for the GWB.
We first undertake an analysis of GWB for life in a simplified setting using the
Black-Scholes model for asset prices. This allows us to get an almost closed form
solution for the value of GWB. We use this solution to draw insights and investigate
the impact of potential risk factors and find almost all of them to be quite significant.
We then price GWB in a more realistic setting using models that allow interest
rates and equity-market volatilities to be stochastic. We find that accounting for these
additional risks can alter valuations significantly. In addition, GWB has considerable
exposure to realized investor population longevity. These facts suggest that hedging
GWB is likely to be only partially successful in practice. We also find that the typical
GWB for life offering with its uniform pricing across fund classes and investor ages is
susceptible to adverse selection in its customer profile and needs price discrimination.
Dynamic Consistency For Sequential Decision Problems
Portfolio Optimization and Risk Management are standard problems in finance. In a
dynamic setting, these can be viewed as instances of a much broader class of problems
- Sequential Decision Problem (SDP)s. We study SDPs in context of an important
normative criterion for a good SDP model - that it should lead to dynamically con-
sistent planning. A lack of dynamic consistency would mean that the decision maker
would make plans, while being fully aware that she will not carry them through.
While SDPs arise in several decision and control settings, we show that tendency to
be dynamically inconsistent is particularly severe for financial applications. This is
because SDPs based on many of the performance metrics such as Sharpe-ratio, vari-
ance adjusted mean, Value at Risk etc as well as acceptability criteria based on so
called dynamic risk measures turn out to be dynamically inconsistent.
We explore the connection between dynamic consistency and the algorithmic no-
tion of dynamic programming or Bellman’s principle and find them to be closely
related, though not identical. We show that most dynamically consistent strategies
can be considered to be arising from SDPs that have a sum decomposable represen-
tation across time and event space. We then examine how “conflicts” due to dynamic
inconsistency can be resolved for specific applications. We also propose a new class
of dynamically consistent performance metrics that are essentially expectations with
respect to probability measures distorted in a specific way.
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1.3 Thesis Overview
The thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we introduce the problem of ESO
pricing for the company that issues them. We examine how the presence of other
ESOs in an employee’s portfolio can affect the exercise decisions concerning ESOs and
thereby their cost to the company. In Chapter 3, we then propose risk management
based models for exercise behavior, and through them, a tractable way to price ESO
portfolios. In Chapter 4, we then turn to the problem of pricing GWB for life.
In this chapter, we propose an analytical framework to price GWB for life for a
continuous time counterpart of the product. In Chapter 5, we price GWB for life using
realistic models and investigate the impact of modeling interest rates and volatilities
as stochastic processes on pricing. In Chapter 6, we look into the issue of dynamic
consistency for SDPs, especially in the context of some standard problems in finance.
We summarize the findings and some interesting research directions in Chapter 7.
19
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Chapter 2
Pricing Employee Stock Options
2.1 Introduction
Employee Stock Options (ESOs) are commonly used by corporations as an effective,
but often controversial, form of compensation for mid and high level employees. An
ESO is typically an American Call Option that the employee can exercise between
two pre-specified dates, the earlier date called the Vesting Date and the later the
Expiration Date. By its very structure, an ESO acts like a performance - linked
compensation for higher echelon executives. Moreover, the employing company would
realize the cost of this pay only in the event of its stock performing well.
The popularity of ESOs as a means of compensation for employers can be at-
tributed to three important reasons:
• They directly link pay to performance and serve to align, at least partially, the
management’s interests with those of the shareholders, thereby mitigating some
of the “agency problems”1.
• Long-term options create an incentive for the employee to stay with the company
and thus options with vesting schedules can be used to retain talent.
• Most ESOs are at the money (ATM) call options. Until recently, under Fi-
nancial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)’s alternate accounting provisions,
companies could expense stock option grants to employees at their intrinsic
value, i.e., zero costs for the ATM options. Thus this form of compensation,
1Agency problems arise because in general the goals and objectives of a company’s management
do not coincide with those of its share-holders.
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at grant, would not add to company’s expenses or show up in its profit and
loss/earnings statements.
On the negative side, ESOs issued to executives can also create a conflict of in-
terest between management and shareholders, as the asymmetric option payoff can
incentivize managers to undertake projects with unduly high risk. More important,
perhaps, is the fact that ESOs actually amount to a significant liability on a com-
pany’s balance-sheet that often goes under-expensed. For example, when ESOs issued
by technology companies were exercised by the employees during the dot-com boom,
there were payoffs amounting to tens and sometimes hundreds of millions of dollars.
These were effectively a transfer of value from the shareholders to the employees,
mainly executives.
2.1.1 Motivation
Empirical surveys show high-level executives receive a bulk of their compensation
as stock options, a trend which has recently started to somewhat reverse because of
scandals and controversies. For example, according to the data compiled by Hender-
son [67], in 2002, 58% of the net CEO pay in the US and 24% in the UK was options
related. In terms of balance-sheet liabilities, Hall and Murphy, [63] report that in
1992, firms in the Standard & Poor’s 500 granted their employees options worth a
total of 1.1 billion at the time of grant. This figure reached 119 billion in 2000 before
dropping down to 71 Billion in 2002, still a sizeable figure. Because ESO related costs
can amount to a substantial fraction of the firms’s balance-sheet, evaluating this cost
is important for investors and regulators.
Pricing ESOs is however made difficult because of the fact that they are not
tradeable and hence do not have a directly observable market price. We also cannot
price these options using standard models such as the Black-Scholes framework [18],
because the option bearer faces constraints that would not allow her to hedge these
options effectively2. This coupled with risk-averseness causes a typical employee to
exercise an ESO in a way that would substantially reduce its cost below its Black-
Scholes or risk-neutral price.
More specifically, the employing company realizes the ESO cost if and when the
employee exercises the option. Unlike a regular call option which typically gets ex-
2To hedge a call option, the employee should be able to short the employing company’s stock.
This is usually prohibited by regulatory bodies. Also if the employee were able to hedge out the
options, then many of the objectives of issuing the options as a means of incentive and retentive
compensation will be lost.
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ercised at or close to expiry3, an ESO is typically exercised much earlier, see Hall
and Murphy [63]. ESOs follow subjective exercise patterns that are difficult to pre-
dict because the employee exercise ESOs to realize a measure of personal value. The
clauses related to vesting and forfeiture of options (in the event of employee quitting
or being terminated) further complicate the problem of pricing ESOs.
Unfortunately, but perhaps also unsurprisingly, there is no consensus in literature
or in practice about what the fair cost of ESOs is. After some accounting contro-
versies and several debates, the FASB issued a revision to Statement 123 that deals
with accounting principles for stock related compensation in 2004 [54]. This made it
mandatory for publicly traded corporations to expense ESOs at their “fair value” (or
levels more representative of the cost incurred than the intrinsic value accounting),
effective 2005. The European counterpart, International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB), had laid down similar stipulations earlier through [74]. However FASB, IASB
and other regulatory bodies have only laid down broad guidelines when it comes to
methods and models to estimate a “fair cost” of ESOs, going only so far as indicating
preferences for some models - such as the lattice model. For example, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) Bulletin guidelines [108], state that the accounting
practice used to price an ESO must be based on sound financial economic theory and
be generally accepted in the field but stops short of laying down a specific accounting
rule, see Cvitanic and Zapatero [47]. While it is broadly agreed that the true cost of
an ESO lies between its intrinsic value and the Black-Scholes value, there continues
to be an active debate about what exactly the “fair cost” of an ESO is.
In this chapter, and Chapter 3, we seek to develop a framework to model ESO
exercises so as to estimate the cost of the outstanding ESOs on a company’s balance-
sheet. Our focus in this chapter will be to understand the functional nature of ESO
costs. In Chapter 3, we seek practical methods to expense ESOs that are driven by
economic reasoning and at the same time are simple to implement in practice.
While not considered in this thesis, an interesting problem related to costing
ESOs is estimating the value of ESOs to the employee. This has been studied well
e.g. Lambert, Larcker and Verrechia in [83], Ingersoll in [73]. Understanding how an
employee would value the options grant is useful in designing compensation packages
to incentivize desired management or employee actions. How an employee would
value an option grant though will not be the same as the cost it represents to the
company. In this context, it is worth mentioning a generally accepted conclusion that
3It is well-known that an American Call Option on the stock of a company that does not pay
dividends is optimally exercised at expiry.
23
the option’s value to the employee is less than the cost of issue to the employer as has
been discussed by Hall and Murphy in [62] and [63]. The difference, a “deadweight
loss”, may also be seen as a price that the company pays to solve its agency problems
and retain talent, see Kadam [77].
2.1.2 Related Work
ESOs have been an active topic of research and debate and there is a vast body of work
that deals with pricing of ESOs and other issues related to them. As the topic touches
so many fields, the contributions also come from diverse areas including Accounting,
Econometrics, Asset Pricing and Mathematical Finance. Chance [32] provides a de-
tailed analysis of the issues related to ESOs from many different perspectives as well
as a sound critique of the approaches that have been proposed to address these issues
in the literature. Hall and Murphy [63] analyze historical trends in issuance of ESOs
by corporations to executives and lower level employees and the possible attractions
and pitfalls of using them as incentive - pay. Another paper by the same authors,
[62], provides a good understanding of the role of ESOs in incentivizing executives
and how risk-averseness and other idiosyncratic investor characteristics might affect
exercise behavior using a stylized model. The authors propose a simple utility based
framework and give numerical examples to illustrate the effects of risk-averseness and
trading restrictions on employee’s exercise behavior and cost of ESOs to the issuers.
Huddart and Lang [71] present an empirical analysis of how employees tend to ex-
ercise their ESOs using over 10 years of data. Bettis, Bizjak and Lemmon [15] provide
an analysis of exercise behavior and incentive effects of ESOs using an empirically
calibrated utility model.
The employee’s decision-process remains fundamental to pricing an ESO4. Hence,
even though we do not seek to value ESOs from an employee’s perspective, we still
need to have a model of the employee’s exercise behavior.
In general, for modeling exercise behavior, two broad approaches have been used,
as observed in Carr and Linetsky [31]. The first approach treats ESO exercise as
an endogenous process and models it as a decision triggering from typically a utility
optimization consideration. There are several factors that can potentially influence
4However, approaches to pricing, that circumvent this have also been proposed. For example,
Bulow and Shoven [27] suggest an alternate way of accounting for ESO costs, in which the ESOs
are expensed as rolling options of quarterly maturity until they are exercised or lapse. In another
strikingly different approach to pricing, Core and Guay [43] suggest an empirically calibrated model
that uses data available in a company’s proxy statement to price ESOs.
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exercise decisions:
• Employee’s Risk Averseness - Employees are typically over-exposed to their
employers. The option-bearer might want to oﬄoad some of this by exposure
by cashing the ESOs.
• Tax Implications.
• Career related moves can cause early ESO exercises or forfeitures.
• Liquidity crunches may force an early exercise of the option.
• ESO terms and company policies - Companies tend to reset strikes of options
in the event the stock price goes significantly below the strike and also issue
new ESO grants (termed as “reload”) on exercises. Sometimes these features
are explicitly embedded in the ESOs and can impact exercise related decisions.
To retain tractability, endogenous exercise models often retain focus on one or few
of the several possible factors that can influence exercise decisions. For example, for
Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utilities, Ingersoll [73] derives the subjec-
tive and objective value of ESOs when the employee is constrained to hold a certain
fixed proportion of her wealth in the stock of the employing company. Detemple and
Sundaresan [49] analyze the value of a non-tradeable option using dynamic program-
ming methods under a binomial stock price model for CRRA utilities - that is directly
applicable to pricing an ESO. Using a simple 2-period binomial model Kulatilaka and
Marcus [82] show how liquidity constraints and other idiosyncratic factors related
to an employee can influence the exercise behavior. The authors remark that FASB
recommended methods miss out on or inaccurately estimate the effect of such factors.
The second approach is to model exercise behavior as an exogenous process. A jus-
tification for this is provided by Carpenter [29] who showed that empirically calibrated
utility based models do a no better job of predicting exercises when compared to a
model that uses random exogenous exercises and forfeits. This motivated researchers
to look at intensity based models where exercise is modeled as an independent random
process. An example is the model in Carr and Linetsy [31], where exercise occurs as
an arrival in a Poisson process whose intensity is albeit modulated by the stock price.
This model gives an analytical expression for the ESO cost. In a similar spirit, Hull
and White [72], while pointing out drawbacks of the methods proposed by FASB to
expense options, suggest an “Enhanced FASB 123” method to expense options. Their
approach is to use a binomial stock price process and an employee behavior model
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in which exercise is triggered whenever the stock price hits a certain multiple of the
strike. Cvitanic and Zapatero [47] use a similar framework, but in continuous time,
which is solvable analytically. They also employ a fictitious barrier based exercise
policy for the employee, in this case the employee would exercise her option when the
stock price hits a barrier that decreases exponentially with time, and also allow for
exercises due to employee exiting the company.
Sircar and Xiong [109] propose an elaborate framework that takes into account
reload (wherein exercise of options leads to a new grant) and reset (underwater options
have their strikes reset) features of options, and gives analytical formulae for the
option price under the assumptions of no expiry and no hedging constraints. Dybvig
and Lowenstein in [52], Hemmer, Matsunaga and Shelvin in [66] and Acharya, John
and Sundaram in [3] also consider the impact of reload features on option prices.
Bodie, Ruffino and Treussard [21] propose a broad framework that an employee can
use to weigh ESO benefits while making career related decisions.
2.1.3 Contributions
Most of the proposed ESO costing methods implicitly assume that employees exercise
ESOs in an “all or none” fashion. While this assumption is appropriate for traded
options, the possibility of partial exercise must be considered while valuing ESOs,
as it is reasonable to expect employees to exercise options in batches to distribute
the risk over time. Notable exceptions that consider the effect of partial exercises of
options are Jain and Subramnaian [75] and Grasselli [61] which provide an analysis of
how allowing for partial exercises can impact values and cost of ESOs using primarily
a two-period binomial model. Grasselli [61] also considers the possibility of partial
hedging using correlated instruments on option prices. Recent work by Leung and
Sircar [86] and Rogers and Scheinkman [104] have also considered these effects and
solved for optimal exercises numerically using a utility based framework.
What we propose here is to take this reasoning a step further. ESOs are granted
in lots and batches and most employees at any given point of time will, in fact,
have a basket of unexercised ESOs with varying strikes, expiries and vesting dates.
Since, most researchers agree that risk-averseness and over-exposure to the employ-
ing company’s fortunes drives early exercise of the ESOs, the degree of this exposure,
accumulated primarily through the employee’s own ESO portfolio, will weigh on her
decision to exercise an option. Moreover, unlike many of the other quantities al-
luded to in ESO pricing models, unexercised ESO grants to an employee constitute
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information that should be readily available to the company and hence easy to use.
We therefore argue that unlike the usual approach taken in literature so far to price
ESOs, and unlike FASB recommended methods, ESOs perhaps need to be priced not
one by one but as an entire portfolio of options held by a particular employee. Thus,
ESO exercises can not only be “partial’ but also “coupled”. This would also mean
that ESO costs in general will not be linear. For example, the cost of a lot of ESOs
does not increase linearly with its size. More generally speaking, the cost of an ESO
portfolio will not be the same as the sum of its parts.
In this chapter, we examine the case for portfolio pricing of options by trying
to study the qualitative implications of a portfolio approach on ESO costing. We
use a standard expected utility maximizing framework as a basis for the employee’s
decision process. We begin with the case where employees have several ESOs with
the same terms. We find that even in this simple case, exercise policies and hence the
implied cost of the grant for the employing company can, in general, vary arbitrarily
depending on the nature of employee’s utility function and the stock price dynamics.
However, for commonly used utility functions such as the class of Constant Relative
Risk Aversion (CRRA) and Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) utilities, for
any stock price dynamics diversification needs would cause the employee to exercise
a proportionally larger component of her grant earlier. As a result, the cost of the
portfolio in these cases increases sub-linearly with the grant size for options with
similar terms. We find this effect interesting because it suggests that ESOs not only
have diminishing marginal utility for employees, as one would expect, but in some
sense also diminishing marginal costs (or more generally, diminishing average costs)
for employers issuing them. We then seek to extrapolate these findings to the case
where the employee has multiple types of ESOs in their portfolio. Surprisingly, even
for CARA utilities, cost of an option portfolio can turn out to be super-additive,
i.e., more than the sum of it parts for some stock price dynamics. However, with an
additional but reasonable assumption on stock price dynamics that can be linked to
diversification, the cost of the portfolio with multiple types of ESOs can be shown to
be sub-additive or less than the sum of its parts. Our analysis thus establishes that
a one-by-one costing of ESOs is likely over-estimating the cost of ESOs.
2.1.4 Chapter Layout
In Section 2.2, we briefly describe the model used in this chapter. In Section 2.3,
we discuss the simple two period case and conditions on utility functions that will
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make the average cost of an option grant decreasing in the size of the grant. Next,
in Section 2.4, we consider the multi-period case for a single option type and show
that the average cost under both CARA and CRRA utilities will be decreasing for
arbitrary stock price dynamics. In Section 2.5, we then consider the case of ESO
portfolios with multiple option types and show that there exists a partial order of
exercise between options of different types. In Section 2.6, we examine in detail
the problem of expensing multi-type multi-period option portfolios, particularly for
CARA utilities. Section 2.7 provides a summary of the results obtained.
2.2 Model
We work with a discrete time model, where the employee treats her ESO grants as
investment rather than consumption instruments. Further, the employee will never
require to exercise her ESOs for liquidity reasons. We do not consider the impact of
the employee quitting or being fired on option exercises or costs. We also do not take
into account the “reset” and “reload” tendencies/policies that companies sometimes
have in more exotic ESO grants as we would like to retain focus on the key goal of this
chapter i.e., the impact of a portfolio approach on exercise behavior and the implied
option cost.
The employee has a concave utility function U(·) and a planning horizon T and
seeks to maximize the expected utility of her wealth position WT at T .
In our model, the employee may have N different type of options in her portfolio
P. The type i option is characterized by a strike price, denoted by Ki, an expiry Ti
and a vesting date Vi. Also, the number of unexercised options of type i in P at time
t are denoted by αi,t, with αi
4
= αi,0. Restricted stock grants can be treated within
this framework as options with strike 0. We also impose the natural restrictions that
the employee can neither trade nor hedge against these options. We allow for partial
exercises and for mathematical convenience “fractional exercises” to avoid integrality
constraints.
We assume that all non-ESO wealth is invested in a well diversified portfolio,
whose returns are independent of the employing company’s stock. Any proceeds
from option exercise are also likewise invested. An assumption that helps us simplify
the analysis considerably is that the employee continues to measures her wealth at
time T in units of wealth indexed to some reference time, by discounting time t cash-
flows a subjective discounting factor βt. βt can be interpreted as an “opportunity
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cost of cash” for the employee5.
This approach is in similar spirit but slightly more general than the one used
in several utility based models for exercising ESOs, notably Kadam [77], Huddart
and Lang [70], Kulatilaka and Marcus [82] and more recently, the model discussed
in Rogers and Scheinkman [104]. In principle, upon exercise, the employee has the
freedom to invest the proceeds along with other non-option wealth in the markets, and
hence must jointly solve the problem of investing non-option wealth and exercising
ESOs. Such an approach has been taken for example in Leung and Sircar [86],
Grasselli [61]. Allowing for this additional flexibility usually requires making some
other restrictive assumptions in order to maintain analytical tractability. Both Leung
and Sircar [86] and Grasselli [61] assume that the employee has Constant Absolute
Risk Aversion (CARA) type utilities and also assume simple dynamics for stock price
processes. By using a model where the employee always uses her wealth at time 0 as a
numeraire and subjectively discounts future cash-flows, we can decouple the exercise
decision from the non-option wealth investment decision and simplify the analysis
considerably. We, in fact, assume no particular form of dynamics on the stock price
process except that it is a Markov process, to keep notation less cumbersome.
Under the model described above then, the employee’s decision problem can be
described by the following optimization problem. βt denotes the time t discount
factor for the employee, based on her opportunity cost of cash and W , the current
non-option wealth in the reference time units.
maxV = E[U(WT )] ;
s.t. WT = W +
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=s
xi,tβt(St −Ki)+ ,
xi,t is Ft −measurable. ,
T∑
t=0
xi,t = αi . . . 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
xi,t = 0 if t < Vi or t > Ti . (2.1)
The exercise problem in (2.1) is a dynamic programming problem.
The quantity xi,t denotes the number of options of type i to be exercised at time
t. The expectations in (2.1) are with respect to the employee’s belief about the
5The analysis presented carries through even when the subjective discount factor βt is taken to
be stochastic. We only require that βt is almost surely decreasing with time. For simplicity, we will
however consider βt to be non-stochastic.
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employing company’s stock price process. We will assume that there exists a unique
preferred solution to the problem in (2.1). To make this precise, if there are multiple
solutions to the problem, then the employee chooses for implementation at any given
time an exercise policy that has the smaller value of the ordered set {xi,t : 1 ≤ i ≤ N},
when comparisons are made in the lexicographic order. We denote the exercise policy
so obtained by x∗ and the optimal exercise for option i at time t by x∗i,t.
We assume, there is also a unique risk-neutral measure, Q, that prices securities,
and is absolutely continuous with respect to the real or believed stock price process.
Let Dt = exp(−
∫ t
0
rsds) denote the time t discount factor based on risk-free interest
rates rs. Then the cost of the grant to the employer is given by:
C(P ) = EQ
[
N∑
n=1
T∑
t=0
x∗i,tDt(St −Ki)+
]
. (2.2)
We also assume that the stock does not pay dividends. The quantity Dt(S0−K)+ is
a Q sub-martingale by Jensen’s inequality.
Most people, typically expect stocks to appreciate on average over time, i.e., be-
lieve the stock price process to be a sub-martingale. By Jensen’s inequality, the
expected value of an option’s payoff which is a convex function of the stock price, is
increasing in the time of exercise. However, the employee’s utility function is con-
cave and hence delaying exercise need not increase the expected utility of the payoffs
received for the employee. Thus, there is a trade-off between exercising immediately
and waiting, and the exercise decision will be impacted by several factors including
the nature of utility function, the time to expiry, assumed dynamics of stock prices,
the level of current non-option wealth and the number of unexercised options.
Our goal in this chapter is to analyze qualitatively the nature of an employee’s
exercise policy, as governed by (2.1) and thereby get some comparative statics on the
cost of issuance to the employer, as given by (2.2). We start with a simple case, where
N = 1, i.e., the employee has several options of a single type in the portfolio.
2.3 Nature of ESO Cost Functions
In this section, we show that even for concave utility functions, the cost of issuing
ESOs can become convex.
Let us take the simplest instance of (2.1), with the number of types N = 1 and
expiry time T = 2.
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We will assume that the options in question have already vested. The correspond-
ing exercise decision problem is then,
maxV = E[U(W + xβ0(S0 −K)+ + β1(α− x)(S1 −K)+)] ;
s.t. 0 ≤ x ≤ α . (2.3)
As there is only one type of option involved, we have dropped the sub-scripts ref-
erencing the option type. The quantity x denotes the only decision variable in this
problem - the number of options to be exercised at time 0. If the optimal value of
this decision variable is x∗, then the implied cost to the employing company is given
by
C(α,W0) = x
∗(S0 −K)+ +D1(S1 −K)+ .
We find that, even for this simple case, the employee exercise policy or the implied
cost for the employers cannot be generalized. The value of the option grant to the
employee, as measured in terms of her optimal attainable utility will always be concave
in the option grant, so long as the employees utility function is concave. As a function
of the grant-size, the cost can however become super-linear.
We now give a simple example where the cost of the option grant becomes convex.
Example 2.1. The employee has a utility function
U(y) = min
(
y,
1
3
y + 40
)
and an initial wealth W = 50. The employee’s utility function is concave (though not
differentiable). Assume the employee also has α ESOs with strike 90 expiring in one
period, i.e., T = 1. To keep things simple, we set both the opportunity cost of cash
as well as risk-free interest rates to zero. Suppose the current stock price S0 = 100
and the employee believes that at T = 1, S1 will be either 120 or 80, with equal
probability. The probability of these movements in the risk neutral measure can then
also be verified to be 1
2
. This implies that the fair value of an American call option
expiring at T = 1 is 15. It is relatively straightforward to verify that the optimal no.
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of options, x∗0, that the employee should exercise at time 0 is given by
x∗0 = min(1, α).
Thus the resulting cost C(α,W ) to the company is:
C(α,W ) = 10 ·min(1, α) + 15 · (α− 1)+ (2.4)
(2.4) shows that the cost of this grant to the employing company is convex in the
size of the grant in this case.
In Lemma 2.1 that follows, we characterize a class of utility functions for which
the cost function becomes sub-linear in grant-size. This shows that mere concavity
of the utility function, which is sufficient to infer diminishing marginal value to the
employee, is however not sufficient to draw any conclusions about the implied cost
functions.
Lemma 2.1. Consider the two-period, single ESO type, exercise problem in (2.3)
and the corresponding cost function (2.4). We assume that the employee’s utility
function U(·) is twice continuously differentiable. Then, the average cost of an ESO
i.e., C(α,W )
α
is decreasing in α, for all values of W > 0, irrespective of the believed
dynamics of S1, if the following condition on the utility function U(·) is satisfied:
−y·U ′′(x+y)
U ′(x+y) is increasing in y for all x > 0, y > 0.
Proof. We fix the non-option wealth W and treat it as a constant for this proof. We
first rewrite the problem (2.3) in terms of a different control variable y
4
= x
α
. Also for
ease of notation we let P0
4
= β0(S0−K)+, P1 4= β1(S1−K)+ and ∆ 4= P1−P0. Then
the employee’s problem is
max
0≤y≤1
V = E[U(W + αyP0 + α(1− y)P1)]
= E[U(W + α(P1 − y∆))]. (2.5)
Let us first assume that the optimal y in (2.5), say y∗, satisfies 0 < y∗ < 1. Then
(2.5) is a concave maximization problem. First order optimality conditions require
E[U ′(W + α(P1 − y∗∆)) ·∆] = 0 . (2.6)
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Differentiating (2.6) w.r.t. α, we get
E
[
U ′′ (W + α(P1 − y∗∆)) ∆
(
P1 − y∗∆ + α∂y
∗
∂α
∆
)]
= 0 ;
i.e., αE
[−U ′′(W + α(P1 − y∗∆))∆2] ∂y∗
∂α
= E[−U ′′(W + α(P1 − y∗∆))(P1 − y∗∆)∆] . (2.7)
Now, if the condition specified in the lemma is satisfied, as W > 0 and P1−y∗∆ =
y∗P0 + (1− y∗)P1 ≥ 0, we must have
−U ′′(W + α(P1 − y∗∆))α(P1 − y∗∆)
U ′(W + α(P1 − y∗∆)) ≥ αγ(W + αP0); if ∆ > 0 ,
−U ′′(W + α(P1 − y∗∆))α(P1 − y∗∆)
U ′(W + α(P1 − y∗∆)) ≤ αγ(W + αP0); if ∆ < 0 ;
where
γ(W + αP0)
4
=
−U ′′(W + αP0)P0
U ′(W + α(P1 − y∗∆)) .
Hence, we must have
−U ′′(W + α(P1 − y∗∆))(P1 − y∗∆)∆ ≥ γ(W + αP0)U ′(W + α(P1 − y∗∆))∆ .
Using this fact in (2.7), we get
αE
[−U ′′(W + α(P1 − y∗∆))∆2] ∂y∗
∂α
≥ γ(W + αP0)E[−U ′(W + α(P1 − y∗∆))∆]
= 0 .
Now as U(·) is concave, U ′′(·)∆2 < 0. This in turn implies
∂y∗
∂α
≥ 0 .
But,
C(α,W )
α
= C1 − y∗(C1 − C0) ,
where C1 is the fair value of the European call option with strike K maturing at
T = 1 and C0 = (S0−K)+. Since C1 ≥ C0, for non-dividend paying stocks, it follows
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that the average cost of a grant, i.e., C(α,W )
α
is decreasing in α in the region where
0 < y∗ < 1. Now consider an αˆ, such that y∗ = 0. Since y∗ must be continuous as
an implicit function of α, if y∗ > 0 for some α, then we must have y∗ = 0 for all
α < αˆ. Similarly, if y∗ = 1 ⇒ C(α¯,W )
α¯
= C0, for some α¯, then y
∗ = 1 for any α > α¯.
As C0 ≤ C1, this completes the proof.
Remark 2.1. The condition in Lemma 2.1 is satisfied by the two most commonly
used classes of utility functions. For CARA or exponential type utility functions,
where U(x) = −e−cx with c > 0,
−U ′′(W + y)y
U ′(W + y)
= cy ,
which is indeed increasing in y. For CRRA, or power utility functions, where
U(x) = x
1−a−1
1−a , a ≥ 1, we have
−U ′′(W + y)y
U ′(W + y)
= a
y
W + y
= a
(
1− W
W + y
)
,
which is again increasing in y.
Remark 2.2. Note that Lemma 2.1, shows that the average cost of an ESO grant
is decreasing in the size of the grant for certain utility functions. This is a weaker
condition than to say that the cost of the ESO grant is concave. The latter implies
decreasing marginal cost and consequently subsumes decreasing average costs.
In the next section, we examine the nature of ESO cost functions for CARA and
CRRA utilities for the case where the employee’s ESO portfolio consists of options
of a single type, but expiring after several periods.
2.4 The multi-period problem for one type of op-
tions and nature of cost function
In this section, we seek to characterize the ESO cost function, as in Lemma 2.1 for
the multi-period case. We continue to assume that the employee has only one type
of options, i.e., N = 1. Dropping the sub-scripts corresponding to the option type,
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the multi-period version of the single ESO type portfolio can be written as
maxV = E
[
U
(
W +
T∑
t=0
βtxt(St −K)+
)]
;
s.t.
T∑
t=0
xt = α ,
xt ≥ 0 . (2.8)
As before, we assume that there is a unique preferred optimal exercise policy6 denoted
by x∗. The corresponding cost function (2.4) is given by
C(α,W0) =
T∑
t=0
Dtx
∗
t (St −K)+ .
We next consider the CARA and CRRA utility cases separately and show that as in
the two-period case, the average ESO cost is decreasing in the size of the grant even
when the expiry is several periods away.
Exponential or CARA Utilities
The function U(·) in (2.8) in this case is given by U(y) = −e−cy, for some c > 0. We
first show that the optimal exercise policy for this class of utility functions assumes
a relatively simple form. In fact, it is independent of the non-option wealth level W .
Lemma 2.2. For CARA utilities, the optimal exercise policy x∗0 is independent of the
employee’s non-option wealth level W and has the form x∗0 = (α − η∗)+, where η∗ is
a quantity that is independent of α, and W .
Proof. Suppose an exercise policy, x∗ maximizes (2.8) for some α and W > 0 for the
CARA utility U(y) = −exp(−cy). This happens if and only if x∗ is a solution to the
6In case of multiple competing optimal policies, the employee chooses the one that requires
exercising the fewest number of options immediately. This policy should lead to a conservative
estimate of costs to the employer.
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problem
minV = E
[
exp
(
−c
T∑
t=0
βtxt(St −K)+
)]
;
s.t.
T∑
t=0
xt = α ,
xt ≥ 0 .
which has no dependence on W . It then follows that the optimal exercise policy is
independent of W .
Since we are only concerned with the dependence of exercise policy on α and W ,
we fix the other parameters, i.e., current stock price S0 and the discount factor β0
that should be applied to any payout received in current period to convert it to its
reference time equivalent and treat them as constants. The optimal number of options
to be exercised in the current period can be characterized as
x∗0(α,W ) = inf{x | 0 ≤ x ≤ α and x∗0(α− x,W + β0(S0 −K)+) = 0} .
Using the independence of optimal policy from non-option wealth, then we have
x∗0(α,W ) = inf{x | 0 ≤ x ≤ α and x∗0(α− x, 0) = 0} . (2.9)
Now, we define the set A0 and η
∗ as follows:
A0
4
= {α ≥ 0 | x∗0(α, 0) = 0}
η∗
4
= supA0 = sup{α > 0 | x∗0(α, 0) = 0} (2.10)
Suppose A0 is empty, then we simply set η
∗ =∞ and the lemma holds, as x∗0(α,W ) =
0 for all α,W . The proof is also trivial if x∗0(α,W ) = α for all α, in which case we set
η∗ = 0. Hence, we consider the case that A0 is not empty, i.e., x∗0(α,W ) = x
∗
0(α, 0) > 0
for some α > 0. We claim that in this case
• A0 is bounded above and η∗ is finite
• If α < η∗ then x∗0(α, 0) = 0
If either of the above is not true, then as x∗0(α, 0) must be continuous in α, there must
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exist α, α¯ such that α < α¯ and
x∗0(α, 0) = 0 and
x∗0(α¯, 0) = 0
but x∗0(α, 0) > 0 if α < α < α¯ .
Let x∗0(α¯− δ, 0) = y for some δ : α¯− α > δ > 0. Then, using (2.9),
y = α¯− α− δ .
But, this would mean
lim
α→α¯
x∗0(α, 0) = α¯− α > 0 ,
while x∗0(α¯, 0) = 0. The optimal exercise policy is then discontinuous in grant size,
which leads to a contradiction.
Hence η∗ is finite and
x∗0(α, 0) = 0 if α < η
∗ . (2.11)
It then follows from (2.9) and (2.11) that the optimal exercise policy is given by
x∗0(α,W ) = x
∗
0(α, 0) = (α− η∗)+ ,
which is of the desired form.
Corollary 2.1. For CARA utilities, the average cost of an ESO grant is decreasing
in the size of the grant.
Proof. We prove this by induction on the number of time periods to expiry. We
can actually prove a stronger result - the marginal cost of issuing an ESO in the
case of CARA utilities is decreasing, i.e., the cost function is concave in grant size.
The result holds trivially for T = 0, i.e., when the option is expiring immediately.
Suppose it holds for T = m. Let C(α,W,m) denote the cost of α ESO grants with
m periods to go, when the employee has non-option wealth W . (We fix the current
price of the underlying to S0 and the accumulated discount factor is β0.) We have
two possibilities:
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• x∗0 = 0: Then C(α,W,m + 1) = EQ[D1C(α,W,m)|F1], and the concavity of
cost property follows from induction hypothesis.
• x∗0 > 0: Then, from Lemma 2.2 it follows that the marginal cost of the ESO
grant is (S0 −K)+ for all α > η∗, with η∗ as defined in Lemma 2.9. Since the
stock does not pay dividends, by Jensen’s inequality the discounted European
call option payoff, i.e., Dt(St −K)+ is a sub-martingale under the risk neutral
measure Q. Then the marginal cost (S0−K)+ for grant size α > η∗ is less than
that for any size α′ < η∗, which is at least EQ[D1(S1 −K)+|F1].
Remark 2.3. For the exponential utility model, the asymptotic marginal cost of grant-
ing an in-the-money ESO, as the size of the total grant α→∞, turns out to be equal
to the options intrinsic value, i.e., (S0 −K). This is the same as the cost at which
companies used to expense ESOs prior to the FASB stipulations in 2005. However,
the intrinsic value for this model comes out as a marginal cost and not as the average
cost, as was used for cost accounting.
Power or CRRA Utilities
For CRRA or power utilities7 U(·) in (2.8) takes the form U(x) = x1−γ
1−γ , for some
γ > 1. In Section 2.4, for CARA utilities, the optimal exercise policy was shown
to be independent of non-option wealth W and to assume a very simple form. For
CRRA utilities, the non-option wealth W will impact exercise policy. Nevertheless,
as we show in the Lemma 2.3, the dependence of optimal exercise policy in grant size
and non-option wealth level is easily characterized in this case as well.
Lemma 2.3. For CRRA utilities, the optimal exercise policy has the form
x∗0(α,W ) =
(
θα− (1− θ) W
β0(S0 −K)+
)+
,
where θ is independent of α, W and 0 ≤ θ < 1. S0 denotes the current stock price
and β0 the accumulated discount factor.
Proof. For this proof, we again fix β, the subjective discount factor for current payoffs
and the current stock price S.
7This class also includes log utilities, i.e., U(x) = ln(x), which can also be considered as a power
utility in the limiting case γ → 1.
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We first note that the value function is homogeneous for CRRA utilities. If
Vd(x, α,W ) denotes the utility derived by following an exercise policy x given an
initial grant α and non-option wealth level W , then we must have
Vd(Mx,Mα,MW ) = M
1−γ · Vd(x, α,W0)
Also note that, if xx is a feasible exercise policy to follow for grant α, then Mx must
be a feasible policy for the grant Mα. This means that if x∗ is an optimal exercise
policy for a grant of size α and when non-option wealth is W
M
, then M · x∗, is the
optimal exercise policy for a grant of size α and non-option wealth W . Hence
x∗0(Mα,W0) = M · x∗0
(
α,
W
M
)
. (2.12)
Suppose the options have strike K and expiry T . The optimal exercise quantity
x∗0(α,W ) must satisfy the following condition:
x∗0(α,W ) = inf{x | 0 ≤ x ≤ α and x∗0(α− x,W + x · β0(S0 −K)+) = 0} .
Then, using (2.12) we get
x∗0(α,W ) = inf
{
x | 0 ≤ x ≤ α and x∗0
(
α− x
W + x · β0(S0 −K)+ , 1
)
= 0
}
.(2.13)
Suppose x∗0 = 0 for all combinations of α and W . Then the form specified in the
lemma trivially applies with θ = 0. If not, then we must have S > K. Consider then
a certain combination (α,W ), say (αA,WA) such that
x∗0(αA,WA)
4
= x∗A > 0
Using (2.13), then
x∗0
(
αA − xA
WA + xAβ0(S0 −K) , 1
)
= 0 (2.14)
Now, we define the set A0 and quantity κ as follows:
A0
4
= {α ≥ 0 | x∗0(α, 1) = 0}
κ
4
= supA0 = sup{α > 0 | x∗0(α, 1) = 0} . (2.15)
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(2.14) shows that the set A0 is non-empty. We now show that
• κ must be finite, i.e., A0 is bounded above and
• If α < κ, then x∗0(α, 1) = 0.
If either of these claims is not true then as the optimal exercise policy must be
continuous in grant size, there would exist α, α¯ such that α < α¯ and
x∗0(α, 1) = 0 and
x∗0(α¯, 1) = 0
but x∗0(α, 1) > 0 if α < α < α¯ .
Let x∗0(α¯− δ, 1) = y for some δ : α¯− α > δ > 0. Then, using (2.13)
α¯− δ − y
1 + yβ0(S0 −K) = α ,
i.e., y =
α¯− δ − α
1 + αβ0(S0 −K) .
But, this would mean that
lim
α→α¯+
x∗0(α, 1) =
α¯− α
1 + αβ0(S0 −K) > 0 ,
while x∗0(α¯, 1) = 0; i.e., the optimal exercise policy is discontinuous in grant size,
which cannot be the case as the value function is continuously differentiable. From
(2.13) and (2.15), it follows that if α
W
≥ κ, then
κ =
α− x∗0(α,W )
WA + x∗0(α,W ) · β0(S0 −K)
, (2.16)
i.e., x∗0(α,W ) =
1
κβ0(S0 −K) + 1α−
κβ0(S0 −K)
κβ0(S0 −K) + 1
WA
β0(S0 −K) . (2.17)
Since x∗0(α, 1) = 0 if α < κ, using (2.12), we conclude
x∗0(α,W ) = 0 if
α
W
< κ . (2.18)
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Combining (2.17) and (2.18), we get
x∗0(α,W ) =
(
α− κ ·W
1 + κ · β0(S0 −K)+
)+
.
which is of the form stated in the lemma, and the parameter θ = 1
1+κβ0(S0−K) is
independent of α and W . Note that the exercise quantity given by (2.19) always
satisfies the constraint x∗0 < α.
Lemma 2.3 can be used to show that average costs of an ESO portfolio with a
single type of options is decreasing when the employee has CRRA utility. We first
prove the following useful result, which formalizes the notion that early exercises tend
to reduce ESO costs. For this, the following definition will be helpful:
Definition 2.1. Consider two strategies xA and xB for exercising an option grant
of size α. Strategy xA is said to dominate strategy xB if it always leaves a greater
number of options unexercised i.e.,
α−
t∑
t=0
xAt ≥ α−
t∑
t=0
xBt , 0 ≤ t ≤ T
Next, we show that the cost of a grant associated with a dominant strategy is
always higher.
Lemma 2.4. If strategy xA to exercise an option grant of size α dominates another
strategy xB, then the option cost CA associated with strategy xA is higher than the
cost CB associated with xB.
Proof. For 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, recall
αAt
4
= α−
t∑
s=0
xAs ;
αBt
4
= α−
t∑
s=0
xBs .
αAt and α
B
t are Ft measureable. As xA dominates xB, we must have αAt ≥ αBt .
Also, let Pt
4
= Dt(St −K)+. Then Pt is a sub-martingale as the stock does not pay
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dividends. Now,
CA − CB = EQ
[
T−1∑
t=0
(xAt − xBt )Pt + (αAT−1 − αBT−1)PT
]
= EQ
[
T−1∑
t=0
(xAt − xBt )Pt + (αAT−1 − αBT−1)EQ[PT |FT−1]
]
≥ EQ
[
T−1∑
t=0
(xAt − xBt )Pt + (αAT−1 − αBT−1)PT−1
]
(2.19)
= EQ
[
T−2∑
t=0
(xAt − xBt )Pt + (αAT−2 − αBT−2)PT−1
]
(2.20)
. . .
= 0 .
In (2.19), we used the fact that αAT−1 ≥ αBT−1 and that Pt is a sub-martingale. In
(2.20), we substituted αAT−1 = α
A
T−2 − xAT−1 and αBT−1 = αBT−2 − xBT−1. Note that the
inequality is strict if the discounted option payoff process Dt(St−K)+ is a strict sub-
martingale and there is a non-zero probability of a positive difference in unexercised
option positions.
Remark 2.4. Option payoff process is guaranteed to be a Q sub-martingale if the
stock does not pay dividends. Lemma 2.4 also holds under a weaker condition - the
employee must exercise all her options, whenever the stock reaches a level at which
the payoff process no longer remains a sub-martingale under the Q measure.
We now use Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4 to show that ESO cost is sub-linear in grant size
for CRRA utilities.
Corollary 2.2. If the employee has CRRA utility, then the average cost of a batch
of ESOs, all with the same terms, is decreasing in the size of the grant.
Proof. Fixing, S0, T and β0, from the homogeneity of CRRA utilities, (2.12), it follows
that
C(α,W ) = αC
(
1,
W
α
)
.
Thus, to prove that average cost is decreasing in α, it suffices to show that cost of
the ESO grant is increasing in initial wealth i.e., W . For this, we appeal to Lemma
2.4 and demonstrate that the number of unexercised options associated with a higher
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non-option wealth level dominates the number of unexercised options with a lower
non-option wealth level on a path-by-path basis using finite induction.
Consider, for an option with strike K and expiry T , two different combinations of
grant sizes and non-option wealth (α0,W0) and (α¯0, W¯0) at time 0, such that α0 ≥ α¯0
and W0 ≥ W¯0. We will show that these inequalities are preserved throughout the
option’s life-time.
Suppose S0 ≤ K, then there are no exercises at t = 0, and the first combination
will continue to dominate the second at t = 1. If S0 > K, then using Lemma 2.3, the
difference in unexercised options after exercises at time 0 are accounted for will be
α1 − α¯1 = α0 −
(
θα0 − (1− θ) W0
β0(S0 −K)
)+
−
(
α¯0 −
(
θα¯0 − (1− θ) W¯0
β0(S0 −K)
)+)
≥ α0 − α¯0 −
(
θ(α0 − α¯0)− (1− θ) W0 − W¯0
β0(S0 −K)
)+
≥ (1− θ)(α0 − α¯0)
≥ 0 .
Also, the difference in subjectively discounted non-option wealth at t = 1 will be
W1 − W¯1 = W0 + β0
(
θα0 − (1− θ) W0
β0(S0 −K)
)+
(S0 −K)
−
(
W0 + β0
(
θα0 − (1− θ) W¯0
β0(S0 −K)
)+
(S0 −K)
)
≥ W0 − W¯0 −
(
−θ(α0 − α¯1) + (1− θ) W0 − W¯0
β0(S0 −K)
)+
β0(S0 −K)
≥ W0 − W¯0 −
(
(1− θ) W0 − W¯0
β0(S0 −K)
)+
β0(S0 −K)
≥ θ(W0 − W¯0)
≥ 0 .
Thus the first combination will always dominate the second at the beginning of the
period t = 1. By repeating this argument, we see that number of unexercised option
associated with the first grant will always dominate the ones associated with the
second. Moreover, the difference will become strict whenever there is an exercise.
Using Lemma 2.4 then we conclude that when discounted option payoff process is a
Q sub-martingale, the cost function is increasing in the non-option wealth position.
This, in turn implies that the average cost is decreasing in the size of the grant.
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We demonstrated in this section, that irrespective of stock price dynamics, when
the employee has CARA or CRRA type preferences, her exercise policies would make
average ESO costs decreasing in the grant size. We now consider the case when the
employee’s portfolio consists of multiple types of options, i.e., N > 1. The analysis
for this case is considerably involved. We begin by showing that there exists a partial
and intuitive order of exercises between different option types in the next section.
2.5 Option Exercises with Multiple Option Types
Generally speaking, an employee is likely to have unexercised options of multiple
types in her portfolio. However, because of the explosion of number of state variables
(options of each type have to be tracked), the problem becomes considerably difficult
to analyze. Before, moving on to the question of cost function structure in this case,
we consider some properties of relative exercises between options of different types
that can help to make the analysis easier. We begin by showing that the model based
on expected utility of a measure of terminal wealth, as described in (2.1), guarantees
a certain rational order of exercise between competing options. This is summarized
in the following lemma:
Lemma 2.5. The exercise policy of an employee seeking to optimize her expected
utility as in (2.1) will satisfy the following properties:
1. Any unexercised and expiring in the money options will be exercised.
2. For two options with same strike K but different expiries, the ones with the
earlier expiry will be exercised in entirety before any of the options with the
later expiry are exercised.
3. For two options with different strikes but same expiries, the ones with the lower
strike will be exercised in entirety before any of the options with the higher strike
are exercised.
Proof. The first property is trivial to show. For Property 2, simply note that if
there exists an optimal policy which exercises an option with a later expiry before an
option with an earlier expiry, with both having the same strikes, then switching the
unexercised earlier expiry options for an equal number of options with the later expiry
will result in a dominant strategy. Property 3 also follows from a similar argument,
but requires a little more effort. Let i, j be such that Ti = Tj but Ki < Kj. Assume
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that property 3 does not hold. Then for some values of Wt, St, αi, αj we must have
x∗i,t < αi but x
∗
j,t > 0. Now, consider an alternate strategy x˜ - which is identical to x
∗
except for following differences:
• x˜i,t = x∗i,t+ and x˜j,t = x∗j,t−, where  = min{αi−x∗i,t, x∗j,t} > 0. The employee’s
wealth at time t due to this strategy change increases by ∆ =  · βt(Kj −Ki)
• If along any sample path, we subsequently have α˜i(s, ω) < x∗i (t, ω) for s > t,
then set x˜i,t = α˜i(s, ω) and x˜j(t, ω) = x
∗
j(t, ω) + x
∗
i (t, ω)− α˜i(s, ω). Due to this,
the employee’s payoff in this state reduces by the amount ∆(s, ω) such that
∆(s, ω) = (x∗i (t, ω)− α˜i(s, ω)) · βs((Ss −Ki)+ − (Ss −Kj)+
≤ (x∗i (t, ω)− α˜i(s, ω))βt+1(Kj −Ki) .
Thus, the net change in terminal wealth by employing strategy x˜ over x∗ for any
sample path ω is given by
∆W = ∆−
Ti∑
s=t+1
∆(s, ω)
≥ βt(Kj −Ki)−
Ti∑
s=t+1
(x∗i (t, ω)− α˜i(s, ω))βt+1(Kj −Ki)
≥ (Kj −Ki)(βt − βt+1) > 0 ;
since
∑Ti
s=t+1(x
∗
i (t, ω)− α˜i(s, ω)) = . Thus x˜ dominates terminal payoffs over x∗ on
a path-by-path basis and hence x∗ cannot be an optimal exercise policy for (2.1).
Although, exercise properties mentioned in Lemma 2.5 appear intuitive and some-
what obvious, these properties - especially property 3, are not satisfied by all pro-
posed models of exercise behavior. For example, consider the model proposed in Jain
and Subramanian [75], in which the employee exercises to optimize utility of inter-
temporal consumption. In their model, employee’s optimization problem takes the
form
maxE
[
T∑
t=1
U(t, Pt)
]
.
where Pt denotes the payoff received at time t from option exercises. We illustrate
a simple example in Appendix A, that shows that under this model Property 3 of
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Lemma 2.5 can be violated8.
Lemma 2.4 imposes a partial order of relative exercise between different vested
options. However, it cannot predict the relative order of exercise between two options
with strikes K1 and K2 and expiries T1 and T2 when K1 < K2, but T1 > T2. The
exact order of exercise will depend on the believed stock dynamics and one can even
have an interleaving of the exercises of two options. This makes the general case of
multi-period multi-type ESO costing quite challenging.
In Section 2.6, we now turn again to the key question of interest - the nature of
the cost associated with a portfolio of ESOs when the employee has multiple types of
options. We consider the case of CARA utilities as they offer a considerable ease in
understanding this cost structure.
2.6 ESO costs for portfolios with multiple ESO
types
In Section 2.4, we observed that for most common utility functions the average cost
of an ESO grant is decreasing in grant size, irrespective of the stock-price dynamics.
This suggests that the cost of an ESO option portfolio is sub-linear i.e., it is less than
the sum of its parts. In this section, we seek to examine if the analogous property
of sub-additivity holds for portfolios with multiple ESO types. Unfortunately, it
turns out that in this case, the option cost can be super-linear for certain stock price
processes. However, under an “acceptable” set of stock price dynamics, as we will
clarify shortly, the sub-linearity property can be shown to hold for CARA utilities.
We also demonstrate that when there are multiple types of options, new grants can
have a retrospective effect on already issued ESOs (if the grant is unanticipated), by
making them cost more or less.
We consider only the CARA class of utilities in this section. CARA utilities offer
considerably simplify the analysis because future exercises become independent from
past exercises for these models.
We start with proving a useful property of exercise policies associated with CARA
utilities, that will help us to better understand the costs associated with different parts
of an ESO portfolio.
8Note that one would expect an employee to exercise an option with lower strikes first even when
faced with liquidity related issues.
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Lemma 2.6. Suppose the employee has a CARA type utility function and α1 vested
ESOs with expiry T1 and α2 vested ESOs with expiry T2 where T1 < T2. Both sets of
options have the same strike K. Then, her exercise policy and associated cost for α2
options with expiry T2 is the same as in the case when she is made only this grant
and not the α1 options with expiry T1.
Proof. To simplify notation, we consider two employees, A and B who have the same
CARA type preferences and identical beliefs about the stock price process St and also
use the same subjective discounting βt. Employee A has α1 options with expiry T1 as
well as α2 options with a later expiry T2. Employee B on the other hand has only α2
options with expiry T2. All options have the same strike K. Then the lemma states
that A and B will have identical policies for exercising the options with expiry T2.
From Lemma 2.4 it follows that A will have exercised all α1 options with expiry T1
before any option with expiryy T2 is exercised. Then, at the beginning of any period,
A′s portfolio will contain
1. some y > 0 options with expiry T1 and α2 options with expiry T2 OR
2. only unexercised options with expiry T2.
In the latter is true then as exercise policy of ESOs in case of CARA utilities are
independent of the non-option wealth level, further exercises of options with expiry
T2 by A, occur independently and uninfluenced by prior exercises of options with
expiry T1. Hence whenever A exercises options with expiry T2, B must also exercise
an identical number of her options with expiry T2, provided they had the same number
of options with expiry T2 at the beginning of the period. It also follows that they will
have identical exercises from that point onwards.
Thus to show the result of the lemma, all we need to show is that whenever
A leaves some options with expiry T1 unexercised, B does not exercise any of her
options.
To see why this is true, suppose at some point, A finds it optimal to leave α′ > 0
options with expiry T1 and all α2 options with expiry T2 unexercised. Now consider
another hypothetical employee C, identical to A and B in preferences, beliefs and
investment opportunities but having α′ + α2 options with expiry T2 at this juncture.
We argue that C will leave at least α2 of her options unexercised. Indeed, if this is
not the case then we have the following contradiction: as C has a strictly dominating
ESO portfolio over A, she must realize at least as much utility as A expects at that
point. If C exercises more than α′ of her options, it is clear that her strategy can
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be copied by A and hence their expected utilities at that point must be equal. Then
A′s exercise policy which can always be implemented by C, is also optimal for C
and should be the one chosen by C as it requires fewer exercises. Hence it must be
optimal for C to leave more than α2 of her options unexercised. From Lemma 2.2, it
follows that then B should not exercise any of her options, when A does not exercise
options that have expiry T2.
This also shows that the cost associated with the grant with expiry T2 is not
affected by any grant of options with the same (or even lower) strike and an earlier
expiry for CARA utilities. This establishes the result we sought to prove.
Lemma 2.7. Suppose the employee has CARA type utility function and α1 vested
ESOs with strike K1 and α2 vested ESOs with maturity K2, where K1 < K2. Both
sets of options have the same expiry T . Then, her exercise policy and associated cost
for α2 options with strike K2 is the same as in the case when she is made only this
grant and not the α1 options with strike K1.
Proof. The proof is broadly similar to that of Lemma 2.7 and omitted.
Lemma 2.6 shows that for CARA utilities, when an employee has a portfolio of
two different types of ESOs differing only in their expiries, the cost of the ESO with
a later expiry is essentially the same as it would have been when the employee was
made a grant of only that type of options. It is easy to see by a similar reasoning that
even when the employee has CRRA utilities, the exercise for ESOs with later expiries
will get “delayed” by presence of any options with earlier expiries. This usually means
that such a grant will cost more to the company then it would have on a stand-alone
basis. If the property of sub-additivity were to hold, then it must be true that the
exercise of options with the earlier expiry gets pushed forward and the consequent fall
in their cost makes up for any rise in the cost of options with the later expiry. Rather
surprisingly, this does not hold in general and thus the sub-linearity property does
not extend directly to ESO portfolios with multiple types of grants. The following
example illustrates the issue.
Example 2.2. We consider an employee with the CARA utility function U(W ) =
−exp(−cW ), with c = 0.00025. This employee has α1 = 100 options expiring at time
T1 = 1 and α2 = 100 options expiring at T2 = 2. All options are vested and have
strike K = 90. Further, the dynamics of stock price currently at 100 are as illustrated
in Figure 2.2.
48
Figure 2-1: Employee’s belief about stock price dynamics. Numbers on arrows indi-
cate a probability of transition while the circles enclose realized stock price.
We assume both the risk-free as well as subjective discounting factors to be constant
at 1 for simplicity. It turns out that that for this particular problem, the optimal
exercise strategy for the employee, with respect to the options expiring at T = 1 is to
not exercise any of them at t = 0. The corresponding fair value cost to the employer
for this part of the grant as a result is 100 · 12.88 = 1288. If however, the employer
was made a grant of only 100 options expiring at T1 = 1 and none expiring at T2,
then the employee would have been compelled to exercise 7.58 options immediately and
the rest at t = 1. The resulting cost would have been 7.58 · 10 + 92.42 · 12.88 = 1263.
As we know from Lemma 2.7 the cost associated with the option grant corresponding
to expiry T = 2 remains the same as it would have been had the grant been made in
isolation.
Thus, in this particular case, the cost of the total option grant turns out to be more
than the sum of its parts! In this example, the presence of longer duration options
helps the employee to in essence “diversify” the risk of payoffs with options expiring
at T = 1. In the event of a price decline at time t = 1, the presence of ESOs maturing
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at 2 will still allow her to receive a high payoff with a high likelihood. This enables her
to hold on to some of the options expiring at T = 1, which she would have otherwise
exercised.
In this same example, if we consider a more risk-averse employee with value of
c = 0.001, then this behavior flips. This employee, for the same stock price process,
will exercise all 100 options expiring at T = 1 if she also had the options expiring at
T = 2. On the other hand, if she did not have the options expiring latter, she would
have exercised only 23 options. It is easy to see that, the option cost of the portfolio
will be sub-linear or less than the sum of costs associated with the grants made in
isolation.
Example 2.2 shows that cost structure of portfolio with multiple types of ESO
grants can be difficult to generalize.
It turns out that we can trace the possibility of supper-additivity of option portfo-
lios to that of the use of different types of options for “diversification”. For most asset
dynamic models this should not be the case. We now formalize this notion. We first
fix an option type i to simplify notation. We define for CARA utilities, the Certainty
Equivalent and Incremental Certainty Equivalent of an option grant as follows:
Definition 2.2. Let the optimal utility of an employee with CARA utility and risk
aversion parameter c for an endowment of α options of the type i be U∗(α). Then,
the ‘Certainty Equivalent’ of this grant, h(α) is defined as
h(α) = − ln(−U
∗(α))
βc
,
where as before β is the period’s subjective discount factor.
Certainty equivalent can thus be viewed as a measurement of utility in “cash”
units, i.e, the amount of money needed to realize the same utility.
Definition 2.3. Suppose the optimal utility for an employee with CARA utility and
risk aversion parameter c holding a portfolio P of options is U∗(P ) and in case he is
made an additional grant of α options of type i, the same changes to U∗(α, P ). Let
βt be the accumulated discounting factor. If the current discounting factor is β, then
the “Incremental Certainty Equivalent” of this grant, ht(α|P ) is defined as
ht(α|P ) = − ln(−U
∗(α, P ))
βtc
+
ln(−U∗(P )))
βtc
.
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Similarly, we define the incremental certainty equivalent of the portfolio P as
ht(P |α) = − ln(−U
∗(α, P ))
βtc
+
ln(−U∗(α)))
βtc
.
We then define the “option non-diversifiability” condition as follows:
Definition 2.4. The stock price process considered by the employee is “ option non-
diversifiable” if the incremental certainty equivalents of any two option grants irre-
spective of their size or type are co-monotone.
Remark 2.5. Most commonly encountered stock price processes are independent “re-
turns” processes. For such processes, it is easy to see that Incremental Certainty
Equivalents are increasing functions of the current stock price and thus should be
co-monotone.
We now show that when the option non-diversifiability condition is satisfied, the
cost associated with an ESO portfolio is in fact sub-additive, i.e., less than the sum
of its parts. We first show that presence of additional grants speeds up exercises of
ESOs in general.
Theorem 2.1. For a CARA employee, if the stock price process considered by the
employee is option non-diversifiable then for any endowment P and option i and grant
size α:
•
h′0(α) ≥ h′0(α|P ) ,
• The optimal exercise strategy corresponding to the option type i in presence of
additional portfolio P is dominated by the optimal exercise strategy when not
endowed with P .
Proof. We prove this by induction on the time to expiry of option i, Ti. For Ti = 0,
the proposition trivially holds as both h0(α) and h0(α|P ) are given by (STi −Ki)+,
and either all or none of the options will be exercise in either case. Suppose the
proposition is true for Ti = k. Then, we show the same should hold for Ti = k + 1.
Suppose with Ti = k + 1 periods to go, in the case when the employee also has an
additional endowment P , the optimal exercise policy leaves her with a part P ′ of the
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portfolio P and α¯ options of type i. Then, as it is sub-optimal for the employee to
exercise any more options of type i, the first order optimality conditions imply
E[−cU(α¯, P ′) · β0(S0 −Ki)+ + Uα(α¯, P ′)] ≤ 0 ,
Hence,
h′0(α¯|P ) = h′0(α¯|P ′) =
E[β1 · exp(−β1c · (h1(α¯) + h1(α¯|P ′))) · h′1(α¯|P ′)]
E[exp(−β1c · (h1(P ′) + h1(α¯|P ′)))]
≥ β0(S0 −K)+ . (2.21)
Now, using the induction hypothesis,
E[β1 · exp(−β1c · (h1(α¯) + h1(α¯|P ′))) · h′1(α¯|P ′)]
E[exp(−β1c · (h1(P ′) + h1(α¯|P ′)))]
≤ E[β1 · exp(−β1c · (h1(α¯) + h1(α¯|P
′))) · h′1(α¯)]
E[exp(−β1c · (h1(P ′) + h1(α¯|P ′)))] . (2.22)
We now define a new probability measure R, such that its Radon-Nikodym derivative
w.r.t. the original measure P is given by
dR
dP
=
exp(−β1c · h1(α¯))
E[exp(−β1c · h1(α¯))] .
Then, from (2.21) and (2.22), we have
h′0(α¯|P ) ≤
E[exp(−β1c · (h1(α¯) + h1(P ′|α¯))) · β1 · h′1(α¯)]
E[exp(−β1c · (h1(α¯) + h1(P ′|α¯)))]
=
ER[exp(−β1c · h1(P ′|α¯)) · β1 · h′1(α¯)]
ER[exp(−β1c · h1(P ′|α¯))]
= lim
∆→0
1
∆
ER[exp(−β1c · h1(P ′|α¯)) · β1 · h1(α¯ + ∆|α¯)]
ER[exp(−β1c · h1(P ′|α¯))]
≤ lim
∆→0
1
∆
ER[exp(−β1c · h1(P ′|α¯))] · ER[β1 · h1(α¯ + ∆|α¯)]
ER[exp(−β1c · h1(P ′|α¯))] (2.23)
=
E[exp(−β1c · h1(α¯)) · β1 · h′1(α¯)]
E[exp(−β1c · h1(α¯))] . (2.24)
In (2.23), we have made use of the fact that as β1h1(α¯+ ∆|α¯) and β1h1(P |α¯) are
co-monotone by the assumption of option non-diversifiability, exp(−cβ1h1(α¯+ ∆|α¯))
and β1h1(P |α¯) must be negatively correlated.
From, (2.21) and (2.24) it follows that in the absence of the additional endowment
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P , the employee must leave α˜ ≥ α¯ options unexercised. This proves the second part
of the hypothesis.
Now to show the first part, we consider two cases:
1. The employee does not exercise any type i options when endowed with addi-
tional portfolio P . In this case, the option holder must also not exercise any
options, when not endowed with P . Thus α¯ = α˜ = α and the first part of the
induction hypothesis follows from (2.24).
2. The employee makes an exercise in the presence of P . In this case, h(α|P ) =
(S − Ki)+, which is a lower bound on the marginal certainty equivalent and
hence the first part of the induction hypothesis trivially holds.
Corollary 2.3. For CARA employees, the marginal cost to the employer of any
option grant is less when the employee has a portfolio of some unexercised options
compared to the case when she has none. Thus, the cost of the option portfolio is
sub-additive in its components.
Proof. This follows directly from Theorem 2.1 and Lemma 2.4.
Remark 2.6. It should, in fact, be easy to show a relatively stronger condition. If a
portfolio P can be parceled in two sub-portfolios P1 and P2, then
C(P ) ≤ C(P1) + C(P2) .
2.7 Summary
In this chapter, we demonstrated that one should not consider the employee decision
associated with exercising an ESO in isolation, but rather in the context of the entire
non-tradeable ESO portfolio that she carries. We sought to qualitatively analyze how
adopting such a point of view would impact the exercise behavior of the employee
and consequently the implied cost to the issuing company using a simple utility based
model as described in (2.1). We observed that in general, the cost function can be
sub-linear or super-linear in the size of the portfolio. However, for utility functions
commonly considered in literature, such as CARA and CRRA utilities, when the ESO
portfolio has only one type of option, the average cost of the grant can be shown to
be decreasing in grant size, irrespective of stock price process dynamics.
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The problem corresponding to ESO portfolios with options of multiple types, espe-
cially multiple maturities, is more complex. We first showed that the proposed model
ensures a “rational” order of exercise between different options. Then, we showed
how this property results in certain simplifications for CARA type utility functions.
However, in general, nothing can be said about the cost of an ESO portfolio vis-a-vis
the cost of its individual components for aribtrary stock price beliefs. Under addi-
tional reasonable restrictions on the stock price process, we showed that for CARA
utilities the cost due to ESO allocations will be sub-additive for an arbitrary portfolio
of options. The restriction that is required on stock price processes for this to hold is
in fact quite intuitive - it effectively says that ESOs should not have diversification
benefits with respect to one another. Note that no such assumption was necessary
while dealing with the case of options of the same type.
The model in in (2.1) is however not very suitable for practical use. This is
because in the most general case, it will entail solving a high dimensional dynamic
programming problem just to obtain the employee’s exercise policy. While the CARA
utility model has some nice properties and limits the state space to just unexercised
options of various kinds, it does not scale well as the number of different types of
options in the employee’s portfolio increases. Also restricting usability are the several
model parameters such as perceived or real world stock price dynamics and utility
function specifications that will be needed to use this model.
Our task going forward is then to develop a practically useable model to incorpo-
rate the portfolio effect on exercise policies. The ultimate goal of this model should
be to estimate the cost of the ESO portfolio for the employer. It will be also desirable
to have an attribution of the portfolio cost to its different components. The latter is
important because as we demonstrated, a new grant can affect the exercise and the
cost of already issued options, if it is not anticipated by the employee. Further, if the
employer wishes to transfer some of its ESO related liabilities to an external agency,
such a cost split-up estimate will be crucial for the external agency.
This motivates us to look for an alternate modeling approach, which is the topic
for Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3
Tractable Models for Pricing
Employee Stock Options
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, we observed that ESOs should ideally be priced at a portfolio level, as
an employee’s decision whether to exercise an ESO is likely to be influenced by the
presence of other ESOs in her portfolio. As a result, the approach of costing ESOs
on a stand-alone basis is probably flawed and an ESO portfolio’s cost may be very
different from what one would obtain when each component is priced individually.
Also, we observed that under reasonable assumptions, the portfolio cost function is
sub-additive and hence piecemeal costing of ESOs will in general overestimate their
cost.
The model presented in Chapter 2, though simple and appealing, is computa-
tionally demanding and involves several subjective parameters that would be difficult
to obtain or even estimate using limited stock option exercise data that a company
would typically have. These shortcomings motivate us to look in a relatively new
direction to tackle the problem of modeling ESO exercises.
In our proposed model, the employee uses a risk-management based framework
to make decisions about exercising ESOs. More specifically, an employee treats her
ESO portfolio as an investment portfolio and rebalances it periodically to manage
the associated risk that cannot be hedged. This rebalancing must occur through
exercising of options in lieu of trading them, as she is unable to do so because of
contractual reasons. We measure unhedgeable risk in terms of the short-term variance
it introduces to the employee’s portfolio. This is similar in spirit to the Markowitz
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mean-variance portfolio optimization framework, the oldest formal risk-management
toolkit known to finance for this purpose. Such an approach has not been used in the
literature before to the best of our knowledge and provides for a common framework
to analyze employee behavior for all stock-related compensation. It gives a joint
exercise model for all the ESOs in an employee’s portfolio and one which can be
solved very efficiently.
We find that the exercise behavior implied by this risk-management conisderation
can be computed using a simple optimization routine. We show that the employee
exercises an option, possibly partially, when a certain barrier function associated
with the option, which we call the “delta-barrier function” falls below a stochastically
varying threshold. Exercises based on this criteria are also shown to be consistent with
the partial relative order or exercises between different options as shown in Lemma
2.5 in Chapter 2, where this order was established from very different considerations.
Our exercise model takes into account only the impact of unhedgeable risk on
employee’s exercise decisions. This, we believe is the most important factor that
leads to early exercises. Some factors such as termination or quitting and vesting
would also affect pricing. The model we propose is still flexible enough to incorporate
these effects and with a little loss of computational tractability. Whenever applicable
we will remark how this may be done in practice, but for the most part, we retain
focus on demonstrating how coupled exercise behavior can be modeled in a tractable
way.
We also propose another related model for ESO exercises, where the employee
measures risk in terms of unhedgeable volatility of her portfolio. We show that this
simplifying modeling assumption leads to an all-or-none exercise by the employees
naturally, an unstated assumption in bulk of the ESO costing literature to date. This
also implies a linear pricing rule for ESO portfolios. This model provides an attractive
alternative for companies to estimate cost, when data is limited or for accounting
purposes. Another benefit is that under this model, the payoff that employee gets
upon exercising can be closely approximated by a martingale process. This allows us
to get narrowly spaced analytical bounds on the resulting cost of the option to the
employee.
A key advantage of these models is that it uses very few subjective parameters that
can make cost estimation and calibration cumbersome. Apart from a few parameters,
which are representative of employee’s risk-averseness and can be calibrated from
exercise data, the model refers to quantities that should be available from market
data. This has an added benefit in terms of hedging the ESO cost risks, for parties
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who intend to do so.
The key contributions in this chapter are:
(a) We provide a concrete and tractable framework to price ESOs as a portfolio
based on a risk-management approach.
(b) The exercise strategy that we derive is barrier based where the employee exer-
cises the option when an explicit function of the stock and option parameters
hits a threshold level. While, barrier based ESO exercise models, have been
examined and analyzed in the literature before, most explicit barrier functions
considered hitherto in the literature are ad-hoc and/or motivated primarily by
the ease of computation/analysis. We provide an investment decision rationale
for the proposed barrier function.
(c) Our exercise model, being a joint exercise model for a portfolio of options,
predicts how different options will be exercised in relation to each other. Our
model is parsimonious in terms of number of parameters making it easier to
calibrate and verify for use in practice. The model also guarantees a pecking
order of exercise between options.
(d) We also provide a simplified model, again inspired by a risk-management based
framework, that naturally leads to an all-or-none exercise by the employee and
a linear pricing rule for ESO portfolios. Further, for this model, we are able
to derive analytical bounds that bracket the cost of the option within a fairly
tight interval.
Chapter Layout
In Section 3.2, we describe the model used in this paper. In Section 3.3, the Risk
Management framework used to model exercise behavior for ESOs is motivated. We
the describe the myopic mean-variance optimization based decision model and derive
the employee’s exercise behavior for the same. We define the delta-barrier exercise
function which plays an important role in the exercise consideration in Section 3.4
and also list its important properties. In Section 3.5, we describe the myopic mean-
volatility decision framework. A special case of this framework makes the exercise
decisions with respect to different ESOs in the portfolio independent of each other
and the portfolio cost additive. Based on this, we derive analytical bounds on the
cost of an ESO in Section 3.6. Finally, in Section 3.7 we summarize the results and
the models presented to price ESOs.
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3.2 Model
As remarked in Chapter 2, we believe ESOs are modeled more appropriately as invest-
ment instruments rather than consumption ones. We therefore take an investment-
decision perspective for exercise models.
We model the problem of option exercise by employee as a portfolio optimization
problem. The employee then naturally considers the decision to exercise an option or
not in the larger context of her overall portfolio.
Employee’s Portfolio
Similar to the model in Section 2.2 in Chapter 2, we assume that the employee holds
a portfolio of N types of call options. We allow the portfolio to also include options
that are expected to be issued in future. Let αi denote the number of options of type
i held by the employee. Without loss of generality, we assume that the 1st N1 of
the N options have already been issued (but not necessarily vested). The ith issued
option where 1 ≤ i ≤ N1, is characterized by the tuple (Ki, Vi, Ti), with Ki denotes
the strike, Vi the vesting time, and Ti the expiry time for option i. Note that this
means that the employee can exercise an option of type i at any time between Vi and
Ti. We can easily include restricted stock grants in this model, as a special type of
call option by setting Ki = 0, and Vi as the time till which the stock must be held.
For restricted stock, Ti would be set to ∞ or the end of the planning horizon for the
employee.
The remaining N2 = N −N1 ESOs are the ones that have not been yet issued but
are anticipated by the employee and hence would affect her decision process. These
options, expected to be granted in the future, will not have an absolutely set strike.
However, the level of moneyness at which these options will be granted is assumed to
be certain and known, i.e., the strike is fixed as a multiple of the prevailing stock price
on the date of issue1. We characterize an unissued option i, where N1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
by the tuple (Ii,mi, Vi, Ti). Here, Ii denotes the issue date of the i
th anticipated
option, while mi is the preset ratio
SIi
Ki
and Vi and Ti denote respectively the vesting
and expiry times of the option as before. In addition to the ESO portfolio, we also
assume that the employee holds some non-option related wealth Wt. This wealth Wt
may also have some correlation with the employing company’s stock.
1For example, the future option could be known to at the money(ATM) at the time of issuance.
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Stock Price Dynamics
The stock price St is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian Motion as in the Black-
Scholes framework with volatility σ. We assume that there are no dividends to keep
the analysis simple. The model may be easily extended to incorporate continuous
dividends without much difficulty though.
If µ is the expected return on the stock, then
dSt = µStdt+ σStdZt .
The risk-free rate r is also assumed to be non-stochastic. In the risk-neutral world,
dSt = rStdt+ σStdZ
Q
t .
Let Ci,t denote the Black-Scholes value of the option i and Ei,t = (St −Ki)+, the
payoff upon exercise at time t. Also let δi,t denote the “delta” of this option or the
sensitivity of its Black-Scholes option value to St. For options that have already been
issued, i.e., for i : 1 ≤ i ≤ N1,
Ei,t = (St −Ki)+ ,
Ci,t = StN(di,t)−Ke−r(Ti−t)N(di,t − σ
√
Ti − t) ,
δi,t = N(di,t) ,
where, di,t =
ln( St
Ki
) + r(Ti − t)
σ
√
Ti − t
+
1
2
σ
√
Ti − t .
For those options for which the strike is yet to be set, i.e., for j : N1 + 1 ≤ j ≤ N ,
Cj,t = St
(
mjN(d¯j,t)− e−r(Tj−Ij)N(d¯j,t − σ
√
Tj − Ij)
)
, (3.1)
δj,t = mjN(d¯j,t)− e−r(Tj−Ij)N(d¯j,t − σ
√
Tj − Ij) ,
where, d¯j,t =
ln(mj) + r(Tj − Ij)
σ
√
Tj − Ij
+
1
2
σ
√
Tj − Ij .
From (3.1), we see that unissued options, in terms of their Black-Scholes value behave
very much like restricted stock until the issue date (or the time until which the strike
is fixed). We will appeal to this fact later in our analysis.
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Exercise Behavior
We characterize an employee in terms of her risk-averseness and exposure to the
company’s stock2.
In our setting, the employee can neither sell the option nor hedge it by selling
short the underlying stock. These are obvious restrictions that apply to ESO holders.
The only way the ESO holder can reduce the risk associated with the option payoff
is by exercising it. We do allow for limited proxy hedging in this model. We will
assume that the employee has no inside-information about stock prices that she can
exploit for personal gains.
Also, in our model the employee does not explicitly take into account the possibil-
ity of being terminated or quitting voluntarily departure or being forced to exercise
options to meet liquidity needs in future while making exercise related decisions.
These effects can be incorporated by adding them as exogenous shocks to the model.
For our basic model, we ignore the “reset” and “reload” features that may be
present in ESO terms. As we shall see later, our model can be easily augmented to
account for these.
We also assume that the employee is taxed immediately on the proceeds received
upon any exercise3 and the applicable marginal tax rate remains constant throughout
the planning horizon. Under this assumption, taxes do not make a structural differ-
ence to our problem and hence we assume without loss of generality that there are
no taxes (we can effectively replace all grants αi by αi(1− f), f being the marginal
tax rate, to account for the taxes and reduce the general problem to the case when
there are no taxes, see also Aboody [2].).
The key determinant of the employee’s decision process concerning ESO exercises
2Employees have a disproportionate exposure to the company’s stock as a bulk of their current
and future wealth is related to the stock performance of the company. Hence the entire risk associated
with company’s stock value (and not just the systemic risk, i.e., the market correlated risk) would
matter to the employee.
3There are more than one types of ESOs and they can defer in their tax and accounting treat-
ments. The most commonly issued type of ESOs are of the type called ‘Non-qualified Stock Options’
and are subject to the kind of tax treatment assumed here. Specifically, these options are treated in
the same way as compensation but are taxable at exercise. This means that for these options, the
value (St−K) realized upon exercise is treated as income irrespective of whether the stocks received
as a result of exercise are sold or not. Moreover, this value is assessed at the applicable income tax
rate for the employee. Certain other options called the Incentive Stock Options differ in their tax
treatment. For them, the tax is assessed only when the stocks received as a result of the exercise
are actually sold. If the stock is held for a sufficiently long time (typically a year), upon selling, the
gains realized (over the option strike price), if any, are assessed at the applicable capital gains tax
rate. Since the latter is typically much less than marginal income tax rates, an employee holding
an incentive stock option often has an incentive to convert the option to a stock and hold on to the
stock purely due to tax reasons. In this paper, we do not treat the case of Incentive Stock Options.
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is then her need to manage the risk associated with her ESO portfolio. We propose
two decision making frameworks based on risk-management or portfolio optimization
approach.
(a) Mean-Variance Optimization - Th mean variance optimization methodology
proposed by Markowitz [90] is probably the most commonly approach used to
model a risk - reward tradeoff. Here, we assume that the employee uses mean-
variance optimization to adjust her ESO portfolio on a day-to-day basis.
(b) Mean-Volatility Optimization - This framework is also motivated by a risk man-
agement perspective. It has an advantage over the mean-variance optimization
for pricing ESOs because under certain additional assumptions, it leads to an
all-or-none exercise strategy for options, and makes the portfolio pricing prob-
lem separable. This allows us to estimate the cost of a portfolio of options as a
sum of the costs of its components.
Unlike the utility based models in Chapter 2, the exercise models that will be
presented in this chapter are not suitable to get an idea of the subjective value of
ESO grants to the employee. The models that we propose only give us a handle on
the employee’s exercise behavior when granted a portfolio of options. Using this we
can estimate the cost of this grant to the company issuing the options.
Upon exercise of ESOs, as the granting company creates fresh new stocks, there
is also a dilution effect, see Black and Scholes [18]. We also neglect the effects of
such “dilution” since, in practice, the number of ESOs exercised will be very small
compared to the number of shares outstanding for a typical company, making this
effect relatively insignificant. We compute the cost associated with an ESO as simply
the expected value of payoffs received from the exercise under the risk neutral measure
Q.
We now describe our risk-management based exercise models in greater detail.
3.3 Risk Management Models
In this section, we propose a method to model employee exercise behavior, that is
both computationally as well as conceptually simple. To motivate the model, we start
with a discrete time setting, where the employee divides her time horizon into evenly
spaced periods of length ∆ for making exercise related decisions. As described below,
a simplifying assumption that we make is that the employee manages her portfolio
risk myopically.
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• Instead of assuming trading restrictions on the ESOs for their entire duration,
for deciding whether to exercise an option in the current period or not, we
assume the employee weighs in the effect of trading restrictions on the options
for only that period. This is the myopic enforcement of the trading constraints.
Under this view, the employee can hedge the option position after time t + ∆,
and thus lock in its fair market value at the end of the period, which for type
i option is Ci,t+∆. Suppose, at time t, the employee exercises xi,t of the αi,t of
the type i options she had at the beginning of the period. As a result, she will
be left with αi,t+∆ = αi,t − xi,t type i unexercised options at the beginning of
the next period t+ ∆. Then the (time-discounted) value realized from the ESO
portfolio is
V =
N∑
i=1
xi,tEi,t + exp(−r∆)
N∑
i=1
αi,t+∆Ci,t+∆ .
• The reason an employee may exercise her options earlier than she would have
in absence of trading restrictions, is because of the risk related to the option
position during the current period that she could not hedge. In the absence of
this risk, the time t fair value of the total discounted payoff received via her
strategy of exercising xi,t type i options at t is given by
EQ[V ] =
N∑
i=1
xi,tEi,t + EQ
[
exp(−r∆)
N∑
i=1
αi,t+∆Ci,t+∆
]
(3.2)
=
N∑
i=1
xi,tEi,t +
N∑
i=1
(αi,t − xi,t)Ci,t . (3.3)
However, because the employee cannot hedge the option position by short selling
the stock, some of this value is at risk and the employee accounts for it by
penalizing the fair value obtained in (3.3) by a term that is proportional to the
variance in the realized value under her exercise strategy for the period.
varQ(V ) = varQ
(
exp(−r∆)
N∑
i=1
αi,t+∆Ci,t+∆
)
.
• This effectively means that at each period the employee solves a one-step mean-
variance portfolio optimization, but using the risk-neutral distribution instead of
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subjective or actual probabilities4. We characterize the employee’s risk aversion
to unhedgeable risk by a parameter λ, which can be interpreted as the penalty
imposed on unhedgeable risk per period. The employee’s objective function is
then to
maxEQ[V ]− λ
2
varQ(V ) . (3.4)
The employee’s problem is thus a standard one stage portfolio optimization
problem in a risk-neutral setting where the employee maximizes the unhedgeable
variance adjusted value of her ESO portfolio at the end of the period. The trade-
off that the employee faces is to exchange some ESOs for their intrinsic value
to cut the portfolio variance at the expense of some of its “fair” value. The
variance metric makes the option exercise problem a true portfolio problem as
different entities of the portfolio are correlated.
• The different ESOs in the employee’s portfolio are all correlated because their
value depends on the employer’s stock price. The myopic setting enables us to
get a handle on quantifying this dependence as it can be now modeled through
the option’s “delta” which is its local sensitivity to the stock price St.
For small ∆, using the first order Taylor expansion, the discounted value of the call
option i at t+ ∆ can be approximated as
e−r∆Ci,t+∆ ≈ Ci,t + δi,t · (e−r∆St+∆ − St) .
Thus, the variance of V is given by
varQ(V ) =
(
N∑
i=1
(αi,t − xi,t)δi,t
)2
σ2S2t ∆ .
The portfolio optimization problem that the employee wishes to solves is to max-
imize the short-term variance penalized value of her portfolio and can be stated as:
4Subjective or actual forward distributions pose a difficult estimation problem as well, making
their use undesirable in a practical setting. Also under the assumption that the risk due to St is
completely unhedgeable and hence uncorrelated with the market, the average rate of return µ on
St should be equal to the risk-free rate r under the CAPM or APT theory. This will lead to an
identical problem for the employee.
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max
N∑
i=1
xi,tEi,t +
N∑
i=1
(αi,t − xi,t)Ci,t −
λ∆
2
(
N∑
i=1
(αi,t − xi,t)δi,t
)2
σ2S2t ;
s.t. 0 ≤ xi,t ≤ αi,t ,
xi,t = 0 if t < Vi . (3.5)
One drawback of the above formulation is that it may recommend exercises for
options that are not in the money. We fix this by adding a constraint that only in
the money options can be considered for exercise. With this additional constraint,
problem (3.5) is equivalent to the following quadratic optimization problem.
max −
N∑
i=1
xi,t(Ci,t − Ei,t)− λ∆
2
σ2S2t
(
N∑
i=1
(αi,t − xi,t)δi,t
)2
; (3.6)
s.t. 0 ≤ xi,t ≤ αi,t ,
xi,t = 0 if St ≤ Ki or t < Vi . (3.7)
The problem in (3.7), being a quadratic programming problem with linear constraints
(LCQP), can be readily solved using standard convex optimization techniques. As
we shall see in Section 3.4, it also has an intuitive solution in terms of how options
are chosen for exercises. We first see how the model can be augmented to allow
partial or proxy hedging of the employer stock related risk as well as incorporate
other unhedgeable risk in the employee’s portfolio without making any structural
change in the problem (3.7) that the employee needs to solve.
Partial hedging with the myopic Mean-variance Optimization
Model
Until now, we assumed the option risk is completely unhedgeable and the employee
does not possess any illiquid non-option wealth. The myopic mean-variance maxi-
mization model can be naturally extended to include possible partial hedging by the
employee as well as other assets in the employee’s portfolio that cannot be hedged
or traded. We now assume that there is a market tradeable factor ZMt that has a
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correlation ρ with ZMt . Thus, the variation of St can then be written as
dSt
St
= r · dt+ σρdZMt + σ
√
1− ρ2Z¯Qt
The factor ZMt denotes the tradeable market risk while Z¯
Q
t denotes the idiosyn-
cratic risk associated with St and is uncorrelated with Z
M
t . Let Yt denote an appro-
priately sized zero net cost portfolio, with a volatility σSt in value and exposure to
ZMt . Then,
dYt = σStdZ
M
t
in the risk neutral setting.
The employee may also have other unhedgeable and illiquid assets in her invest-
ment portfolio. These may also add to her exposure to the employer’s stock price. An
example would be pension fund contributions. We can incorporate these our model
as well. Let Wt be the time t fair value of the other non-tradeable assets that the
employee owns. Let β0 denote the exposure of return on these assets to return on
the stock St and σ0 denote the uncorrelated risk in the portfolio. We again assume a
factor representation for Wt,
dWt
Wt
= rdt+ β0σdZ
Q
t + σ0dZ
Y
t .
To keep notation simple, we will assume that the factor corresponding to ZYt is
idiosyncratic and cannot be hedged against, but the general case can be dealt with
in a similar fashion.
The problem (3.7) then becomes
max
{xi,t},yt
Wt +
N∑
i=1
αi,tCi,t −
N∑
i=1
xi,t(Ci,t − Ei,t)− λ∆
2
Σ2 ;
s.t. Σ2 = σ2S2t
(
ρ
(
β0
Wt
St
+
N∑
i=1
(αi,t − xi,t)δi,t
)
+ yt
)2
+ (1− ρ2)
(
β0
Wt
St
+
N∑
i=1
(αi,t − xi,t)δi,t
)2
+ σ20W
2
t ,
0 ≤ xi,t ≤ αi,t ,
xi,t = 0 if St ≤ Ki or t < Vi . (3.8)
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This is equivalent to the problem
max
{xi,t}
−
N∑
i=1
xi,t(Ci,t − Ei,t)− λ∆
2
(1− ρ2)σ2S2t
(
β0
Wt
St
+
N∑
i=1
(αi,t − xi,t)δi,t
)2
;
s.t. 0 ≤ xi,t ≤ αi,t ,
xi,t = 0 if St ≤ Ki,t or t < Vi,t . (3.9)
Thus in effect, we add β0
Wt
St
of restricted stock to the employee’s portfolio, and the
problem (3.9) is structurally similar to (3.7). Note also that ungranted but anticipated
options also behave like restricted stock with the exposure as given by (3.1) and these
may also be incorporated in the model likewise.
The term λ that corresponds to the penalty applied to the one period variance
in value that cannot be hedged against and the length of the period ∆ for which the
short-selling restriction is imposed appear in conjunction. In the limiting case one
can make the short selling constraint less severe by reducing the time step ∆, while
simultaneously increasing the penalty term for the unhedgeable risk resulting from
this constraint, in such a way that the product λ∆ is held constant and thus come
up with a continuous version of the myopic mean-variance optimization problem.
Another advantage of the model from a practical point of view is that the individ-
ual’s risk averseness and ability to hedge as well as the discretization time-step are
all captured by a single hyperparameter
υ
4
= λ∆(1− ρ2).
In practice, υ should be obtained empirically from employee stock option exercise
data.
We can thus consider the problem as stated in (3.10) below as the prototype of
the employee’s exercise problem.
max −
N∑
i=1
xi,t(Ci,t − Ei,t)− υ
2
σ2S2t
(
N∑
i=1
(αi,t − xi,t)δi,t
)2
;
s.t. 0 ≤ xi,t ≤ αi,t ,
xi,t = 0 if St ≤ Ki or t < Vi . (3.10)
In the next section, we examine some of the interesting properties of exercise
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policies that are obtained as solutions of (3.10).
3.4 Exercise Behavior under Myopic Mean Vari-
ance Optimizing Policy
We now consider the solution to the problem in (3.10).
For notational convenience, henceforth, we will drop the suffix t for each quantity
in this section, with the understanding that the optimal policy x∗i and the quantities
discussed in this section are computed for each time t.
We now characterize the nature of the exercise policy that the employee will
follow to maximize the myopic mean variance criterion. Let G denote the set of
vested options that are in the money. G represents the set of options that are eligible
for immediate exercise.
Lemma 3.1. Let G denote the set of options that have vested and are in the money.
If i, j ∈ G and Ci−Ei
σSσi
<
Cj−Ej
σSδj
, then options of type i must be all exercised before any
of type j is exercised.
Proof. Let x∗i denotes the optimal number of type i options to be exercised.
The “delta” of the portfolio at optimality can then be defined as
δ∗
4
=
N∑
i=1
(αi − x∗i )δi .
The first order optimality conditions for Problem (3.10) then require that:
Ci − Ei ≥ (λ∆δ∗σ2S2)δi if i ∈ G and x∗i = 0 ,
Ci − Ei = (λ∆δ∗σ2S2)δi if i ∈ G and 0 < x∗i < αi ,
Ci − Ei ≤ (λ∆δ∗σ2S2)δi if i ∈ G and x∗i = αi .
Hence, if Ci−Ei
σSδi
<
Cj−Ej
σSδj
, then any option of type i cannot be exercised unless all
options of type j have been exercised.
Lemma 3.1 immediately motivates the following simple algorithm to solve the
optimization problem (3.10).
Algorithm 3.1. Algorithm to find Optimal Exercise Policy
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1. Initialize x∗i := 0 for all i, δ
† :=
∑N
i=1 αiδi
2. Find G, the set of indices of exercisable options
3. Sort the options in G in increasing order of
ζi
4
=
Ci − Ei
δi
(3.11)
4. Loop through options in G in increasing order of ζjs. For each option j
If ζj ≥ υσSδ†, then
Stop. The current values of all x∗i are optimal and δ
† = δ∗
else if ζj < υSδ
† but ζj ≥ υσS(δ† − αjδj), then
Set x∗j :=
δ†− ζj
υσS
δj
and then δ† := ζj
υσS
Stop. The current values of all x∗i and δ
∗ are optimal and δ† = δ∗
else
Set x∗j := αj and δ
† := δ† − αjδj
Note, that the portfolio’s delta δ† (and hence its instantaneous variance) as well as
its value monotonically decrease throughout the algorithm. Algorithm 3.1 works by
decreasing the delta of the portfolio until the myopic mean-variance objective reaches
its optimal value.
In general, the myopic mean-variance maximization model would recommend both
partial as well as complete exercises. As can be seen from Algorithm 3.1, at any time,
the model recommends an all or none exercise policy for all but one option. However,
in practice as the stock price varies continuously, at any given time the method would
almost always recommend no exercise or a partial exercise of one particular option.
In the next section we see that the myopic mean-variance based exercise strat-
egy guarantees the same logical order of exercises between options as the one we
established in Chapter 2 from a utility maximization consideration.
The delta-barrier function and its properties
The quantity ζj as defined in (3.11) plays an important role in determining and
sequencing options for exercise. ζj is a function of the option’s strike and time to
expiry. It also depends on the current stock price. ζj can thus be interpreted as an
exercise barrier function associated with each option.
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Definition 3.1. The “delta-barrier” function of an option with strike K and time to
expiry T is defined as
B(S,K, T ) =
C(S,K, T )− (S −K)+
σSδ(S,K, T )
. (3.12)
Here δ(S,K, T ) is the delta of a call option with expiry T and strike K.
The delta-barrier function admits an intuitive interpretation as a pseudo-Sharpe
ratio for the option. (Note that the delta-barrier is a ratio of the option premium
(C-E) over the short-term volatility of this premium.) Algorithm 3.1 shows that the
employee always exercises options in an increasing order of their pseudo-sharpe ratios.
Definition 3.2. An exercise strategy is a “delta-barrier based exercise strategy” if it
satisfies the following property:
There exists a global, possibly stochastic, threshold ν ≥ 0 such that the strategy
recommends to (partially or completely) exercise an option with strike K and time to
expiry T if and only if
(a) the option is in the money and
(b) B(S,K, T ) ≤ ν .
The myopic mean-variance optimizing exercise strategy is thus a “delta-barrier”
based exercise strategy. The delta-barrier function has certain monotonicity proper-
ties with respect to its arguments. As a consequence, a delta-barrier based exercise
strategy guarantees the same pecking order in which options will be exercised as we
obtained from a different argument in Lemma 2.5 in Chapter 2. We demonstrate this
through a series of results on the properties of the delta-barrier function.
Lemma 3.2. The function B˜(S,K, T )
4
= C(S,K,T )−S+K
σSδ(S,K,T )
is monotone in S and de-
creases with the same.
Proof. We have,
C = SN(d)−Ke−rτN(d− σ
√
T ) ,where ,
d =
ln( S
K
)
σ
√
T
+
( r
σ
+
σ
2
)√
T .
Note that both the numerator and the denominator of B˜(S,K, τ) are always non-
negative as C ≥ (S−K)+ ≥ (S−K), C being the Black-Scholes value of the option.
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Further the denominator σSN(d) is an increasing function of S as d is increasing in
S and so is N(·). The numerator, on the other hand, is a decreasing function of S as
∂
∂S
(C − S +K) = N(d)− 1 < 0 .
It then follows that B˜(S,K, t) is decreasing in S .
Corollary 3.1. Between two ESOs having the same expiry, a delta-barrier based
exercise strategy first exercises the option with a higher value of the ratio S
K
; i.e., it
exercises first the option that is deeper in the money.
Proof. The proof follows directly from Lemma 3.2. Observe that for in-the-money
options B˜(S,K, T ) = B(S,K, T ). Moreover, B(·) (and B˜(·) ) are homogeneous in
the sense that B(S,K, T ) = B( S
K
, 1, T ). It then follows from the definition of a
delta-based exercise strategy that between two options having the same expiry, such
a strategy would first exercise an option with the lower strike.
Lemma 3.3. When the option is in the money, i.e., S ≥ K; the delta-barrier function
B(S,K, T ) is increasing in T .
Proof. This property requires a bit more effort to prove. We define the function
b(m, y) = B(mK,K, y2) = B(m, 1, y2) .
It follows that the delta-barrier function is increasing in T if b(m, y) is increasing
in y. Note that we operate under the case m > 1.
Now,
b(m, y) =
1
mσ
C − E
N(d)
.
⇒ ∂b
∂y
=
1
mσ
(
Θ
N(d)
+
(C − E)Φ(d)
(N(d))2
(
lnm
σy2
−
( r
σ
+
σ
2
)))
,
where,Θ = mΦ(d)σ + 2ryN(d− σy)e−ry2 .
Note that Θ ≥ 0 and (C − E) ≥ 0. Thus, it follows that if
lnm
σy2
−
( r
σ
+
σ
2
)
≥ 0 ,
then the delta-barrier function is increasing in τ . Hence, we need only consider the
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case when
lnm
σy2
−
( r
σ
+
σ
2
)
< 0 . (3.13)
In this case,
∂b
∂y
=
Φ(d)
mσ(N(d))2
(
mN(d)σ + 2rye−ry
2N(d)N(d− σy)
Φ(d)
+ (C − E)
(
lnm
σy2
− r
σ
− σ
2
))
.
The quantity in the brackets,
Q = mN(d)σ + 2rye−ry
2N(d)N(d− σy)
Φ(d)
+ (C − E)
(
lnm
σy2
− r
σ
− σ
2
)
,
is increasing in m when m ≥ 1 and the condition (3.13) is satisfied. This can be
verified easily by taking 1st order derivatives and noting that N(d), N(d−σy) should
increase with m, while the quantity C − E decreases with m and so does Φ(d) when
m > 1. It then follows that if we can show that Q ≥ 0 for m = 1, then ∂b
∂y
should be
positive for all m ≥ 1. At m = 1, we have Q = Q0 with
Q0 = N(d)σ + 2rye
−ry2N(d)N(d− σy)
Φ(d)
−
(
N(d)− e−ry2N(d− σy)
)( r
σ
+
σ
2
)
⇒ yQ0 = −N(d)
( r
σ
− σ
2
)
y + e−ry
2
N(d− σy)
(( r
σ
+
σ
2
)
y + 2ry2
N(d)
Φ(d)
)
.
Again, if f
4
= ( r
σ
− σ
2
)y ≤ 0, it will trivially follow that Q0 > 0, hence we consider the
case when f > 0. Note that 2ry2 = d2 − f 2 when m = 1. Thus, we have
yQ0 = −N(d)f + e−
d2−f2
2 N(f)
(
d+
N(d)
Φ(d)
(d2 − f 2)
)
= −N(d)f + Φ(d)N(f)
Φ(f)
d+
N(d)N(f)
Φ(f)
(d2 − f 2)
=
N(d)N(f)
Φ(f)
((
Φ(d)
N(d)
d+ d2
)
−
(
Φ(f)
N(f)
f + f 2
))
.
Since d ≥ f , it will follow that yQ0 ≥ 0 if we can show that the function
f(x)
4
=
Φ(x)
N(x)
x+ x2
is increasing in x from x ≥ 0. This in turn follows from the fact that the function
g(x)
4
= Φ(x)
N(x)
+ x ≥ 0 for x ≥ 0 and is also increasing in x, a fact proved in Lemma
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B.1 in Appendix B.
Corollary 3.2. Between options having the same strike, any delta-barrier based exer-
cise strategy completely exercises the one with the shorter before exercising an option
with a longer expiry.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of the Lemma 3.3.
To summarize, a delta-barrier based exercise strategy naturally satisfies the fol-
lowing desirable properties that one would expect of a rational exercise behavior as
obtained in Lemma 2.5 in Chapter 2.
1. An option which is at the money at expiry will be exercised. This is because
the barrier function B is zero for such options and by definition, the threshold
υ > 0.
2. Between two options that are in the money and have the same expiry, the
strategy always exercises the option that has the lower strike first.
3. Between two options that are in the money and have the same strike, the strat-
egy always exercises the option that has the shorter expiry first.
Figure 3-1 shows how the delta-barrier function varies with moneyness i.e., S
K
and
time to maturity(for r = 0.05 and σ = 0.2 (annualized)).
Under the myopic mean-variance optimization framework, the option exercise
problem for the employee is a simple quadratic problem. This enables us to ob-
tain the cost of an entire ESO portfolio by simply simulating a price process path for
the stock. Also, the same simulations can be used to allocate the cost of the portfolio
amongst its different components by simply keeping tracks of the exercise along each
sample path.
The exercise threshold ν for the delta-barrier based exercise strategy that we
derived from the mean-variance optimization framework is in general stochastic and
depends on the overall portfolio structure. This makes the option pricing problem
non-linear. While this, as we argued in Chapter 2, represents a truer picture of ESO
portfolio cost, a linear model is simple and more interpretable to report. In the next
section, we see how we can derive a linear model for pricing ESOs by a suitable
modification of the risk management framework presented in this section.
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Figure 3-1: Variation of Delta-Barrier function w.r.t. moneyness and time to matu-
rity.
3.5 Myopic Mean-Volatility Based Exercise Model
The myopic mean-variance based exercise model allows one to model parsimoniously
the effects of partial exercises and coupling of option exercises. Under this model
the ESO portfolio cost will be non-linear. Based on our analysis in Chapter 2, such
non-linear models are likely to present a truer picture of the ESO costs. However
they might be unsuitable for accounting and reporting purposes. Moreover costs still
have to be recovered via simulation of the stock price, which does not provide a great
insight to the price process. These properties result from using a variance based
optimization scheme.
We now propose a variant of the myopic mean-variance based optimization model,
the “myopic mean-volatility optimization” model, where the employee penalizes the
instantaneous volatility in his/her portfolio instead of the instantaneous variance. As
a side-note, for normal distributions, the problem of penalizing the volatility instead
of variance in the utility function is akin to Value at Risk (VaR) or Conditional Value
at Risk (CVaR) constrained optimizations, that organizations often use to manage
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their risk.
We will see that with certain additional assumptions, the problem of finding the
optimal exericse policy for ESOs becomes separable for this model. An immediate
related consequence is options are exercised as all or none and we get a linear pricing
rule for options, where the cost of an option portfolio can be obtained as the sum of
its parts. Another surprising and extremely useful benefit of the model is that we get
simple analytical formulae for bounds on the cost of an ESO.
The only difference that we make in our model is that the employee now penalizes
the fair value of her portfolio by its short-term unhedgeable volatility rather than
variance. Thus her objective as described in (3.4) now changes to
maxEQ[V ]− χ
√
varQ(V ) . (3.14)
Here χ is a risk-averseness parameter, and ∆ as before is the length of a time-
period.
The problem (3.9) then becomes:
max
{xi,t},yt
Wt +
N∑
i=1
αi,tCi,t −
N∑
i=1
xi,t(Ci,t − Ei,t)− χ
√
∆Σ ;
s.t. Σ2 = σ2S2t
(
ρ
(
β0
Wt
St
+
N∑
i=1
(αi,t − xi,t)δi,t
)
+ yt
)2
+ (1− ρ2)
(
β0
Wt
St
+
N∑
i=1
(αi,t − xi,t)δi,t
)2
+ σ20W
2
t ,
0 ≤ xi,t ≤ αi,t ,
xi,t = 0 if St ≤ Ki or t < Vi . (3.15)
For the optimal choice of yt, the problem in (3.15) reduces to
max
{xi,t}
−
N∑
i=1
xi,t(Ci,t − Ei,t)− χ
√
∆Σ ;
s.t. Σ2 = σ2S2t (1− ρ2)
(
β0
Wt
St
+
N∑
i=1
(αi,t − xi,t)δi,t
)2
+ σ20W
2
t ,
0 ≤ xi,t ≤ αi,t ,
xi,t = 0 if St ≤ Ki or t < Vi . (3.16)
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Just as in the model presented in Section 3.3, the term χ that corresponds to the
penalty applied to the one period volatility in value due to hedging restrictions and
the length of the period ∆ for which the short-selling restriction is imposed appear
in conjunction. Again, in the limiting case one can make the short selling constraint
less severe by reducing the time step ∆, while simultaneously increasing the penalty
term for the unhedgeable risk resulting from this constraint in such a way that the
product χ
√
∆ is held constant and thus effectively use the myopic mean-volatility
optimization problem in (3.16) in a continuous time setting.
We now show that the optimal exercise policy for (3.16) is a delta-barrier based
exercise policy. Moreover, if the only source of unhedgeable risk in the employee’s
portfolio comes through the exposure to the employer’s stock, then the threshold in
the delta-barrier based exercise policy becomes a constant and the problem becomes
separable.
Proposition 3.1. The optimal exercise strategy corresponding to the problem in
(3.16) is a “delta-barrier” based strategy. Also if σ0 = 0, then the exercise thresh-
old becomes fixed and the optimal exercise strategies for different option types become
decoupled.
Proof. We will again drop the suffix t, to ease notation. Let x∗i denote the optimal
number of type i options to be exercised. We define the quantity δ∗ and the variance
at optimality as follows
δ∗ = β0
W
S
+
N∑
i=1
(αi − x∗i )δi ;
(Σ∗)2 = (δ∗)2(1− ρ2)σ2S2 + σ20W 2 .
Let G denote the set of options that are vested and are in the money, i.e., can be con-
sidered for exercise. Then the first order optimality conditions imply, at optimality:
Ci − Ei ≤ χ
√
∆
β∗(1− ρ2)σ2S2
Σ∗
δi if i ∈ G and x∗i = 0 ,
Ci − Ei = χ
√
∆
β∗(1− ρ2)σ2S2
Σ∗
δi if i ∈ G and 0 < x∗i < αi ,
Ci − Ei ≥ χ
√
∆
β∗(1− ρ2)σ2S2
Σ∗
δi if i ∈ G and 0 < x∗i < αi .
Hence there exists a threshold ν such that an option i is exercised only if it is in
the money and its delta barrier function ξi =
Ci−Ei
σSδi
satisfies ξi < ν.
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Now consider the case, when σ0 = 0. Problem (3.16) (with the time t suffixes
dropped) in this case becomes
max
{xi}
−
N∑
i=1
xi(Ci − Ei)− χ
√
∆
√
1− ρ2
(
β0
W
S
+
N∑
i=1
(αi − xi)δi
)
σS ;
s.t. 0 ≤ xi ≤ αi ,
xi = 0 if i /∈ G. (3.17)
This is a Linear Optimization problem. Let
ν = χ
√
∆
√
1− ρ2 .
Then a solution to (3.17) is given by
x∗i = αi if ξi =
Ci − Ei
σSδi
< ν and i ∈ G ,
x∗i = 0 if ξi =
Ci − Ei
σSδi
≥ ν or i /∈ G . (3.18)
Thus, the exercise policy in this case is an all or none policy. Moreover, the
threshold ν = χ
√
∆
√
1− ρ2 is a constant and independent of the portfolio struc-
ture. This shows that the optimal exercise policy for each option can be determined
independently.
As the exercise policy for (3.16) is delta-barrier based, the rational exercise order
properties stated in Lemma 2.5 in Chapter 2 will hold for this version of the employee’s
problem as well. With the exercise policy obtained through solving (3.18), the ESO
costing problem is not only decoupled, i.e., the problem can be solved for each option
separately but also becomes linear i.e., the cost of the portfolio of ESOs now will
simply be a sum of the cost of its components.
We term the exercise strategy obtained in the special case when σ0 = 0, as de-
scribed in (3.18) as a ”fixed threshold delta-barrier based exercise strategy”. Again
we observe that the model parameters, χ, ∆ and ρ can be combined in a single
hyperparameter ν given by
ν = χ
√
∆
√
1− ρ2 . (3.19)
ν can be interpreted as the target pseudo Sharpe-ratio, desired by the employee
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of an option to keep it in her portfolio. Intuitively, this strategy recommends exer-
cise to the employee when the instantaneous volatility in the option value becomes
significantly high compared to the incremental value of holding the option vis-a-vis
exercising it, i.e., its pseudo Sharpe-ratio drops below a fixed threshold. Only ν mat-
ters for pricing options and this is the parameter that should be empirically calibrated
for implementation.
Lemma 3.2 showed that the delta-barrier function is decreasing in S (for S >
K). The barrier function is also homogeneous in S and K. Thus, given an exercise
threshold ν, there exists a critical multiple Mt such that, if the ratio
St
K
of the stock
price to the option’s strike exceeds this multiple then the option will be exercised. In
our model, M depends only on the option’s time to expiry.
Figure 3.5 shows the critical exercise price by strike multiple as a function of time
to expiry for various values of ν under the fixed-threshold delta-barrier based exercise
strategy (at 20% annualized volatility in stock returns σ and risk free-rate r = 5%
annualized). The relationship is almost linear, especially when option has some time
to expiry.
Figure 3-2: Exercise multiple v/s and time to expiry for different values of ν.
Barrier policies where the employee exercises her ESOs when the stock price to
strike multiple exceeds a barrier function have been suggested in the literature before.
For example, in the Hull and White [72] model, the employee exercises the stock price
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hits a certain multiple. Note that this model does not consider the impact of time to
expiry on the option exercises. Another such method is proposed in Cvitanic, Weiner
and Zapatero [47], in which the employee exercises an ESO whenever the ratio of the
stock price to the option’s strike exceeds a target multiple that declines exponentially
with the residual life of the option. This target multiple also has a discontinuity
at the option expiry time. These barrier based exercise strategies are ad-hoc and
motivated primarily from analytical considerations. The fixed threshold delta-barrier
based exercise strategy proposed here, in (3.18), was derived from a simplified but
explicit model of employee behavior.
In addition, as we shall see in the next section, this model of exercise behavior
also offers computational advantages. In particular, we can obtain tight analytical
bounds on the implied cost of an ESO for the employer.
3.6 Pricing ESOs under the fixed threshold delta-
barrier exercise strategy
In the previous section, we saw that under the myopic mean-volatility optimization
framework, when the only risk that the employee is unable to hedge is the one cor-
responding to her employer’s stock, the portfolio cost of ESOs becomes linear and
can be obtained by adding the cost of all constituent options. Moreover each ESO
in the portfolio is exercised independently of the other and according to the fixed
threshold delta-barrier based exercise strategy as described by (3.18). In this section,
we attempt to price analytically the cost Cν of the ESO for this exercise strategy,
given an exercise threshold ν. Suppose at time t = 0, the employee has an option
with strike K and maturity T . Let the prevailing stock price be S0. We first under
the case that the option has already vested, i.e., the employee can exercise the option
right away if she desires to do so. To recap, under the fixed threshold delta-barrier
based exercise policy, the employee exercises the option when the following conditions
are satisfied
• The option is in the money, i.e., St > K ,
• The delta-barrier function Bt = Ct−EtσδtSt is less than or equal to the exercise
threshold ν.
Because, the stock price process is continuous, the barrier function Bt, which is
a continuous function of the stock price St will also follow a continuous path. Hence
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if B0 > ν, and if the option is exercised at a subsequent time τ ; we can expect the
following condition to be satisfied at the time of exercise τ .
Bτ = ν
⇒ Cτ − Eτ = νσSτδτ . (3.20)
Unfortunately, condition (3.20) does not hold strictly and there is a probability that
Bt < ν at exercise. To see how this can happen, consider a sample path where the
option remains out of money up to time τ . The delta-barrier function however could
still decrease and it might be the case that Bτ < ν. If now the option moves into
the money, the delta-barrier function will decrease even further and under the fixed
threshold exercise policy, the option must be exercised at this point. The condition
(3.20) will be violated in this case. Fortunately, such an event can occur only with
a small probability and close to option expiry. We can in fact show that (3.20) is
violated if and only if the option is exercised in the window (T −TN , T ), where TN is
a constant that depends on the risk free-rate r, volatility σ and the exercise threshold
ν. Also when the violation does occur it is small in magnitude. As a result, we can
derive upper and lower bounds on the cost of the option to the issuer which will be
fairly close to each other and thus give a fair indication of the actual cost to the
employee.
Lemma 3.4. Given an exercise threshold ν, risk-free rate r and volatility level σ,
there exists a unique critical expiry TN such that
• B(S, t) ≥ ν for all out of the money options if t < T − TN and
• If t > T − TN and the option has not yet been exercised, then the option will be
exercised as soon as it gets in the money.
Proof. Let us define TN as that expiry for which B(K,K, T − TN) = ν. Note that
B(K,K, T − TN) = 1− e−rTN
N
((
r
σ
− σ
2
)√
TN
)
σN
((
r
σ
+ σ
2
)√
TN
) .
and thus depends neither on K nor on T but only on r, σ and ν. From Lemma 3.3, it
follows then B(K,K, t) > ν for t < TN . Also for t = T − TN , the barrier function for
ATM stock price is exactly ν. Hence, for t > T − TN from Lemma 3.3 and Lemma
3.2, B(S, t) ≤ ν for all values of S ≥ K. This completes the proof.
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Lower bound on the cost Cν of a vested ESO
Let τ be the time the barrier B(t) first hits the threshold ν before time T and that
the option is in the money, i.e., the exercise time of the option. If the option expires
unexercised, then we set τ =∞. Let τ ∗ = min{τ, T}. Then τ ∗ is a stopping time.
Lemma 3.5.
EQ[e−rτ (Cτ − Eτ )] = C0 − Cν0 , (3.21)
where Cνt denotes the cost function of issuing the ESO (as incurred by the employer),
and Ct denotes the Black-Scholes price of the Call option that has the same terms as
the ESO.
Proof. Let us define A as the event that the employee exercises her option during its
lifetime, i.e., τ = τ ∗.
EQ[e−rτ∗Cτ∗ ] = P (τ ∗ = τ)EQ[e−rτ
∗
Cτ∗|τ = τ ∗] + P (τ ∗ 6= τ)EQ[e−rτ∗Cτ∗|τ 6= τ ∗]
= P (τ <∞)EQ[e−rτCτ |τ <∞] + P (Ac)EQ[e−rTCT |Ac] .
Note Ac is the event τ 6= τ ∗. Now, as an expiring in the money option is always
exercised under a delta-barrier based exercise policy. Ac ⇒ ST < K and hence in this
case, the ESO was never exercised i.e., τ ∗ = T . Also, since ST < K, CT = 0. It then
follows that
EQ[e−rτ∗Cτ∗ ] = EQ[e−rτCτ ] .
As Ct is the price of a tradeable asset, e
−rtCt is a martingale. Since τ ∗ is a stopping
time, by the optional stopping theorem, EQ[e−rτ∗Cτ∗ ] = C0.
Finally, note that EQ[e−rτEτ ] = Cν0 by definition. Hence, we conclude that
EQ[e−rτ (C(τ)− E(τ))] = C0 − Cν0 .
Lemma 3.6.
EQ[e−rτδ(τ)Sτ ] = S0δ0 . (3.22)
Proof. Again, let A be the event that the employee exercises her option during its
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lifetime, i.e., τ = τ ∗. We have
EQ[e−rτ∗Sτ∗δτ∗ ] = P (τ ∗ = τ)EQ[e−rτ
∗
Sτ∗δτ∗ |τ = τ ∗] + P (τ ∗ 6= τ)EQ[e−rτ∗Sτ∗δτ∗|τ 6= τ ∗]
= P (τ <∞)EQ[e−rτS(τ)δ(τ)|τ <∞] + P (Ac)EQ[e−rTST δT |Ac] .
As an expiring in the money option will be exercised, Ac ⇒ ST < K. Hence
conditioned on Ac, δT = 0. This is because δ(t) = N
(
ln(St
K
)+r(T−t)
σ
√
T−t +
1
2
σ
√
T − t
)
.
Hence if ST < K δ(T ) = 0 (in limit). It then follows,
EQ[e−rτSτδτ ] = EQ[e−rτ
∗
Sτ∗δτ∗ ] .
Now,
e−rtStδt = e−rt(Ct +Ke−r(T−t)N(dt + σ
√
T − t))
= e−rt
(
EQt
[
e−r(T−t)(ST −K)+
]
+ EQt
[
e−r(T−t)K · 1{ST>K}
])
= EQt [e−rTST · 1{ST>K}] .
Thus, the function e−rtStδt is in fact a martingale under the risk neutral measure Q.
Since, τ ∗ is a stopping time it then follows
EQ[e−rτ∗Sτ∗δτ∗ ] = S0δ0 .
Lemma 3.7. Under the fixed threshold delta-barrier exercise policy, the cost of the
ESO to the employer is lower bounded by
Cν0 ≥ Cν−0 4= max(0, C0 − νσS0δ0)
= S0N(d0)(1− νσ)−Ke−rTN(d0 − σ
√
T ) . (3.23)
Proof. Under the fixed threshold delta-barrier exercise policy, the following inequality
always holds.
Bτ ≤ ν
⇒ Eτ ≥ Cτ − νσSτδτ .
Hence, EQ[e−rτEτ ] ≥ E[e−rτCτ ]− νσE[e−rτSτδτ ]
⇒ Cν0 ≥ C0 − νσS0δ0 .
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Upper bound on the cost Cν0 of a vested ESO
Lemma 3.8. If T > TN then,
Cν0 ≤ C(S,K, T − TN) ,
where C(S,K, T − TN) denotes the price of the call option with same strike K but
maturity T − TN .
Proof. From Lemma 3.4, it follows that
• If the option is in the money at time T − TN , then it will be exercised at that
time if it already has not been,
• If the option is exercised after time T − TN , then it was out of money at time
T − TN . It will then be exercised as soon as the option gets in money since the
barrier function Bt will always be less than ν for an ATM option for t > T −TN .
It then follows that the payoff for exercise in [T − TN , T ] will be less than  for
any  > 0 and the contribution to the option costs for an exercise in this interval
can be neglected.
Then, we can consider the option exercise strategy as a (possibly sub-optimal) way
of exercising an American Call option with strike K and expiry T − TN . This gives
us the desired bound.
The bound given by Lemma 3.4, although simple turns out to be rather weak in
practice. The following result allows us to compute a much stronger bound.
Refined Upper Bound on the cost Cν0 of a vested ESO
Lemma 3.9. Let T ′ = T − TN . Then
Cν0 ≤ Cν+0 4= max
(
S0 −K,EQ[e−rT ′(CT ′ − νσST ′δT ′)+]
)
. (3.24)
Proof. We know on any sample path where the option was exercised for a non-zero
payoff i.e., before time T ′ = T − TN ,
Eτ = Cτ − νσSτδτ .
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From the martingale property,
e−rτEτ = EQτ [e−rT
′
(CT ′ − νσST ′δT ′)]
≤ EQτ [e−rT
′
(CT ′ − νσST ′δT ′)+] .
As before, let A denote the event that the option was exercised sometime during its
life. Then,
Cν0 = EQ[e−rτEτ ;A] ≤ EQ[e−rT
′
(CT ′ − νσST ′δT ′)+;A]
≤ EQ[e−rT ′(CT ′ − νσST ′δT ′)+] .
In Appendix B, the following expression for E[e−rT ′(CT ′ − νσST ′δT ′)+] is derived in
terms of bivariate normal distributions:
Cν0 ≤ C0 − σνS0δ0
+Ke−rTN2
(
d(S0, K, T )− σ
√
T ,−d(S0, K, T ′) + σ
√
T ′,−
√
T ′
T
)
−(1− νσ)S0N2
(
d(S0, K, T ),−d(S0, K, T ′),−
√
T ′
T
)
, (3.25)
where
d(S,K, T ) =
ln( S
K
)
σ
√
T
+
( r
σ
+
σ
2
)√
T .
N2(a, b, ρ) denotes the probability Pr(X ≤ a, Y ≤ b) for two jointly normal random
variables X and Y , each having zero mean and unit variance, and correlation ρ.
Exercise
Threshold ν
Maturity
Shortening TN
Lower
Bound Cν−0
Upper
Bound
Refined Upper
Bound Cν+0
0.00 0.000 25.21 25.21 25.21
0.25 0.096 21.42 24.82 21.44
0.50 0.378 17.63 23.64 17.72
0.75 0.839 13.84 21.65 14.05
1.00 1.473 10.05 18.73 10.43
1.25 2.280 6.26 14.65 6.85
Table 3.1: Cost Estimates (Upper bounds and Lower bounds) for an ATM ESO for
different values of the exercise threshold.
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Table 3.1 shows the bounds obtained by this method for a range of exercise thresh-
olds on at-the-money vested ESO with strike 100 (for r = 0.05, σ = 0.2 (both annu-
alized) and T = 4 years). In general, the lower bound obtained is a better estimate of
the true cost, as it differs from the actual cost only when there has been an exercise
after time T −TN . In this case, the lower bound contribution naively adds a negative
payoff to the cost instead of a zero payoff. However, both the magnitude of the nega-
tive payoff as well as the probability of exercise in the interval (T − TN , T ) are small.
As we can see the lower and refined upper bounds are quite close to each other. Both
bounds get tighter as ν decreases and converge to the Black-Scholes value for ν = 0.
Also, the bounds also converge together to 0 and intrinsic value respectively for the
option for that value of ν for which TN = T .
Pricing unvested ESOs
In this section, we consider the case when the options have not yet vested, but will
vest at a future time T0 > 0. In presence of the constraints imposed due to the
vesting feature, the fixed threshold delta-barrier based exercise strategy would exercise
options as follows:
(a) If at the vesting time T0, the barrier-delta function is less than the exercise
threshold i.e., BT0 ≤ ν, and the option is in the money then it is exercised
immediately at T0.
(b) If at time T0, the barrier-delta function is above the exercise threshold ν, then
the option is exercised whenever it is in money and BT0 ≤ ν.
Vesting provision in fact increases the cost of the option to the employer. This is
because the vesting constraint can only cause the employee to delay her exercise of
the ESO. This effect of vesting on ESO cost has been observed before, see Ingersoll
[73]. At time T0, when the ESO vests, if the stock price then exceeds the threshold L
where L satisfies B(L,K, T − T0) = ν then the option is exercised immediately. To
obtain the cost of the option with vesting, we must then replace the option cost for
the sample paths when ST0 > L to the realized cost which is e
−rT0(ST0 −K)+.
Lemma 3.10. Under the delta-barrier exercise strategy with a fixed threshold ν, the
cost W ν0 of the ESOs with maturity T , vesting lag T0 and strike K can be bounded as
follows: Let T ′ = T −TN where TN is as defined in Lemma 3.4. Suppose T ′ ≥ T0 and
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L be such that
B(L,K, T − T0) = ν. (3.26)
Then,
Y ν0 ≥ Y ν−0 = ∆V + C0 − νσS0δ0;
Y ν0 ≤ Y ν+0 = ∆V + EQ[e−rT
′
(CT ′ − νσST ′δT ′)+] ,where,
∆V = EQ[e−rT0(ST0 −K − CT0 + νσST0δT0)+] . (3.27)
Proof. It is clear that at T0, if ST0 ≥ L the option will be exercised, else it will behave
like a regular ESO, with no vesting from that point. Since T−T0 ≥ TN , using Lemma
3.4, we get L ≥ K. Further, from Lemma 3.2,
ST0 −K > CT0 − νσST0δT0 for K > L .
Then,
Y ν0 = EQ[e−rT0(ST0 −K);ST0 ≥ L] + EQT0 [e−rT0CνT0 ;ST0 < L]
= EQ[e−rT0(ST0 −K − CT0 + νσST0δT0);ST0 ≥ L] + EQ[e−rT0(CT0 − νσST0δT0);ST0 ≥ L]
+EQT0 [e
−rT0CνT0 ;ST0 < L]
= EQT0 [e
−rT0(ST0 −K − CT0 + νσST0δT0)+] + EQ[e−rT0(CT0 − νσST0δT0);ST0 ≥ L]
+EQT0 [e
−rT0CνT0 ;ST0 < L]
= ∆V + EQ[e−rT0(CT0 − νσST0δT0);ST0 ≥ L] + EQT0 [e−rT0CνT0 ;ST0 < L] .
Then, using Lemma 3.7, we have
Y ν0 ≥ ∆V + EQ[e−rT0(CT0 − νST0δT0);ST0 ≥ L] + EQ
[
EQT0 [e
−rT0(CT0 − νσST0δT0)];ST0 < L
]
= ∆V + C0 − νσS0δ0 .
And using Lemma 3.9 we get,
Y ν0 ≤ ∆V + EQ[e−rT0(CT0 − νST0δT0);ST0 ≥ L]
+EQ
[
e−rT0EQT0 [e
−r(T ′−T0)(CT ′ − νσST ′δT ′)+];ST0 < L
]
≤ ∆V + EQ[e−rT ′(CT ′ − νσST ′δT ′)+] .
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This completes the proof.
It may be noted that ∆V can be expressed in terms of bivariate normal distri-
butions, once we have the value of threshold L. L however must be computed nu-
merically by inverting the delta-barrier function, which should be relatively straight
forward as this function is monotonic. Also, when T ′ < T0, then the value of the
vested option simply becomes equal to that of a call option with expiry T0 under the
delta-barrier exercise strategy.
Incorporating Termination and Reload Effects
We can extend the delta-barrier method to account for termination effects at the
expense of some analytical tractability. With a reload feature, the employee upon
exercising her ESOs gets new ESOs aside from the exercise proceeds. To incorporate
reload options in our models, we can simply add the additional value of reload options
to the exercise payoff in our myopic setting. This feature can thus be accounted with
little additional computational complexity.
Similarly termination effects can be incorporated in the model exogenously. A
common approach used is to model termination as an arrival in a Poisson process
(with possibly time inhomogeneous arrival rates). Since the exercise strategy used by
the employee is easily solvable, we can price the ESO in presence of the possibility of
early termination by using direct Monte Carlo simulations.
3.7 Conclusions and Future Directions
In this chapter, we proposed a myopic risk management based framework to model
exercise behavior for Employee Stock Options (ESOs). This framework leads to a
tractable method to compute the cost of an ESO portfolio. This was directly moti-
vated by the Markowitz portfolio optimization problem. The resulting exercise be-
havior is governed by the level of a barrier function which depends on the time value
of the option, i.e., the option’s premium over its intrinsic value and the instantaneous
volatility in the option price, both evaluated at their Black-Scholes’ values. Using
this exercise behavior, we can price the cost of ESOs to the issuing company. We also
showed that in general, neither would a risk-averse employee exercise all her options
at the same time nor would the cost of a portfolio of options be equal to the sum
of its parts. However, this becomes the case under certain model assumptions which
lead to an exercise behavior where the employee exercises her option when it is in
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money and the barrier function is below a threshold which depends on the employee’s
risk-averseness. These assumptions also allow us to derive tightly spaced analytical
bounds on the cost of the option to the issuers. We also indicated how these results
can be extended to account for vesting and exogenous termination.
In terms of future work, it will be interesting to see if one can build a dynamic
but tractable model that can take into account portfolio effects for expensing options.
Also the delta-barrier function implies an artificial shortening of the option lifetime
which is an undesirable modeling side-effect. A model which better accounts for the
remaining value of the option’s time value will be useful and so will be tighter bounds
on the option’s cost. Finally, an empirical analysis to see how well the predicted
exercise behavior matches with observed behavior will be of great interest.
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Chapter 4
Variable Annuities with
Guaranteed Lifetime Payouts
4.1 Introduction
Advances in medicine and better mechanisms to contain and deal with man-made and
natural calamities have led to a remarkable increase in life expectancies over the last
few decades. People are living longer and spending a significant part of their lives in
retirement, especially in the developed countries. At the same time, the social security
systems have come under a cloud. Particularly in the US, many influential voices in
both political and academic circles have expressed concerns about the sustainability
of the government sponsored social security system. For example, see the opinion
expressed by John Snow [111]. Moreover, life-style and health-care related costs have
continuously spiralled upwards, especially for the elderly - who are a high risk group
and have made life in retirement not only longer but also more expensive. As a
result of all this, the idea that individuals and households need to have a systematic
retirement plan for and by themselves, is now gaining more and more traction.
The private sector industry has come up with several innovations and offerings in
the retirement solutions space. Insurance companies have been offering equity linked
pension schemes with portfolio insurance for quite some time. Variable Annuity (VA)
products are widely popular in the US across all demographics as investment and
tax-planning instruments. VA Sales in the were expected to cross $180 billion for the
year 2007 according to research by Milliman. Similar products are also very popular
in other developed markets such as the UK and Japan and are gaining grounds in the
emerging markets as well. Companies offering VA products are now embedding them
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with options that will allow investors to also use them as a steady and assured source
of income during retirement. More than 95% VA products now offer some sort of
financial guarantees with them. These guarantees generally offer the investor a form
of downside protection against market risk and thus helps her secure her retirement
nest-egg.
Over time, the options provided with VAs have become more innovative and exotic.
One of the earliest embedded options made available with VAs was the “Guaranteed
Minimum Death Benefit” scheme, see Milevsky and Posner, [93] for details. GMDB
entitles the investor’s beneficiary to collect a minimum benefit (usually the initial
amount invested in the VA fund with a small appreciation rate) upon the investor’s
death. Thus the GMDB is like a stochastic maturity put option. Insurance compa-
nies subsequently introduced schemes that would enable the investor to collect the
scheme’s benefits during her own lifetime, unlike the GMDB. Examples of these are
the Guaranteed Minimum Accumulation Benefits (GMAB) family and Guaranteed
Minimum Income Benefits (GMIB) family (also known as Guaranteed Annuity Op-
tions(GAO)). GMAB guarantees to the investor a certain minimum level of capital
appreciation over pre-specified horizons and is again a complex variant on the basic
put option. Under the GMIB/GAO scheme, which became especially popular in the
UK, investor’s money is invested in a VA fund for a fixed duration and upon maturity,
which typically occurs at retirement age, the underlying account value can be either
withdrawn or annuitized at a guaranteed payout rate. GMIB/GAO can be considered
as an equity-quantoed (equity denominated) interest rate option.
More recently, companies have been offering the “Guaranteed Minimum With-
drawal Benefit” (GMWB) schemes. Under this scheme, the investor’s capital is in-
vested through a VA fund in an asset-mix of her choice. The investor is guaranteed
that upon maturity, again linked usually to the retirement age, she will be able to
take at least an x % of her initial investment every year for N years, no matter how
the underlying investment performs1. According to Milliman’s third annual Guaran-
teed Living Benefits (GLB) survey of leading U.S. VA carriers, election rates of the
GMWB scheme or its variants have increased steadily from from 24% in 2004 to 29%
in 2005, to 40% in 2006, and then to 43% during the first six months of 2007 and the
GMWB family has now become the most popular of all VA products.
Insurance companies have now also started offering a lifetime benefit feature with
GMWB and other VA linked options, enabling the investor to simultaneously manage
both financial as well as longevity related risks. While a lifetime benefit feature can be
1Typically x ·N = 100 so that the total guarantee is equal to the original investment.
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offered with any of the GMAB, GMIB or GMWB schemes, according to Milliman’s
third annual GLB survey, that offered with the GMWB is emerging as the most
popular of these and continues to wrest market share from the other two. GMWB
with lifetime withdrawals is commonly known as “Guaranteed Lifetime Withdrawal
Benefits” (GLWB) or “Guaranteed Withdrawal Benefits” (GWB) for life. GWB
for life typically guarantees to the investor withdrawal amounts that are indexed
to her VA account’s high water-mark value (called the benefit base) for her entire
life. A key advantage of the GMWB/GWB family of schemes over other VA related
options available in the market is that in these schemes, the underlying investment
can continue to have market exposure even when the withdrawals start and thus has
a better growth opportunity. In contrast, if exercised the GMIB/GAO annuitizes the
investor’s account value, effectively converting it into fixed income instruments upon
maturity. The GWB for life usually also has a ratchet like feature commonly known as
step-ups, where the benefit base used to calculate the guaranteed withdrawal amounts
is periodically and automatically raised to the VA account value, if the latter exceeds
the same.
Unlike exchange traded or over the counter options, the investor pays for the op-
tions elected with VAs in a piece-meal way over several years, typically as a fixed
fraction of the underlying VA account value or the defined “protection” level2. Cur-
rently, insurance companies are offering the GWB for life at annual fees in the range
of roughly 50 to 90 basis points. The fee is typically indexed to the benefit base that
is used for calculating the guaranteed withdrawal amounts3.
If fairly priced, the GWB for life option is an attractive retirement solution for
investors as it allows them to manage the risks related to their own longevities, which
cannot be mitigated at an individual level. Further, the ability to stay invested in
the market while in retirement would allow investors to better cope with the inflation
related risk, which becomes significant as the retirement lifespans get longer4.
For the long term sustainability of the GWB, it is also important that the com-
panies offering it remain profitable and viable. For example, GAO schemes were
2This type of arrangement is in part due to the insurance industry conventions and in part to
ease the burden of large payments from clients. The fee structure impacts both pricing and risk
management of these products.
3Schemes differ in terms of promised withdrawal rates as well as features such as the frequency of
“step-ups” in the benefit base and the indexing of the fees. The website http://www.annuityfyi.com
provides a long but non-comprehensive list of leading insurance companies offering GWB for life like
products.
4Equity markets are known to be better hedges against inflation as compared to fixed income
instruments like annuities over a long run, see, for example, Bodie [20].
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launched in the UK in a high interest rate environment, but as they drew closer to
maturity, interest rates plummeted while the stock markets soared, forcing at least
one company to close its product to new buyers (Chu and Kwok, [39]). Also, if
the GWB is significantly underpriced or raises the possibility of a debilitating loss
for the underwriting company, then the related credit-worthiness issues should make
potential clients skeptical of the GWB. This is because payouts from the GWB for
life option, if they happen at all, will occur only 20 to 30 years after the client has
enrolled into the option. Hence the continued claims paying ability of the company
underwriting the GWB guarantee is considerably important. Because VA based so-
lutions are so widely used and can have a huge impact on market (over 55% of the
estimated trillion dollar plus worth of VA assets are beleived to be in equity mar-
kets according to VA Data Research Services (VARDS)), this is an issue that should
concern regulators as well.
Our goal for this chapter as well as Chapter 5 is to analyze the cost and risk of
underwriting the GWB for life guarantee. Our analysis suggests that concerns about
GWB will not be entirely misplaced because the product entails considerable risk
from a large number of factors that should pose serious challenges in its valuation
and risk management.
4.1.1 Related Work
Brennan and Schwartz [24] and Boyle and Schwartz [23] were one of the first to extend
the option pricing methodology to insurance contracts where the time or frequency
of payouts are linked to investor’s death.
The GMDB option, which is essentially a stochastic maturity put option, has
been extensively analyzed in the literature; for example by Milevsky and Polsner [93],
Mudavanhu and Zhuo [97]. Chu and Kwok [38] analyze the GMAB type principle
protection scheme with reset features. Moreover, Milevsky and Salisbury [95], Dai,
Kwok and Zong [48], Siu [110] also consider how policy-holders can strategically
exercise options embedded in a VA and their impact on the implied cost. Biffis [17],
Chu and Kwok [39], Boyle and Hardy [22], Ballotta and Haberman [10], Pelsser [100]
have analysed the GMIB/GAO type option feature in VAs.
“Equity Indexed Annuities” (EIAs) constitute another family of products similar
to VAs with embedded options and allow investors to claim a limited or (“capped”)
upside in equity markets, with a floor protection. Practically, EIAs are different from
VAs because unlike the VA based options which are derived from privately managed
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funds, EIAs are contractually linked to the published market indices. However, both
families of products are analyzed using similar methods and models. EIAs have also
been studied extensively: see for example, Gaillardetz and Lin [59], Buetow [26],
Kijima and Wong [80], Siu [110], Cheung and Yang [36].
The GWB for life is a relatively recent addition to the market space, and is yet
to be analyzed in detail in the literature. A product similar to the GWB for life -
the GMWB which guarantees withdrawals over a fixed number of years, has been
analyzed in Milevsky and Salisbury [95], Dai, Kwok and Zong [48], Chen, Vetzal and
Forsyth [34]. Milevsky and Salisbury [95] point out that GWMB is like a Quanto
Asian Put Option in a Black-Scholes economy and find that it is possibly severely
underpriced. Dai, Kwok and Zong [48] analyze the same product from an investor’s
perspective and focus on deriving the optimal withdrawal policies, again in a Black-
Scholes framework. Recently Chen, Vetzal and Forsyth [34] also consider the impact of
optimal “withdrawal” strategies as well as jump risks in the context of GMWB. These
papers do not consider the ratchet or step-up feature that is common in GWB for
life products. Another recent work by Hoz, Kling and Rub, [69], presents a numerical
analysis of the GWB for life with ratchet like features using the general contingent
claim analysis framework for VAs as outlined by Bauer, Kling and Russ [13]. Again
the valuation is in a Black-Scholes world. Thus, valuations of the GWB/GMWB
family have so far been based primarily on the basic Black-Scholes framework with
constant interest rates.
Coleman et. al [40] investigate effects of jumps and stochastic volatilities in hedg-
ing the GMDB with a ratchet or step-up like feature. Coleman, Li and Patron [41]
consider hedging against both interest rate and equity related risks in the context of
long-duration VA liabilities.
Insurance products that offer financial guarantees over an investor’s lifetime also
face risks related to population mortality (or longevity) apart from the risk due to
the market factors. Lately, researchers have begun to question the commonly made
assumption that population mortality risk can be considered to be statistically diver-
sifiable. Cairns, Blake and Dowd [28], Biffis [16] and Milvesky, Promislow and Young
[94] have argued that population mortality related risk may consist of a systemic com-
ponent to it5 and hence may not be entirely diversifiable. Biffis and Millossovich [17]
suggest interesting ways to jointly model mortality risks as well as various financial
risks in the context of GAOs.
5For example, medical breakthroughs or natural or man-made calamities can systematically im-
pact a population’s longevity.
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4.1.2 Goals, findings and Contributions
In this chapter, we seek to develop a basic understanding of the GWB for life feature
and investigate the associated risk-factors and their severity.
• We formally introduce the GWB for life feature and examine how such a product
would have performed, if it were offered in the past.
• We first analyze a continuous time version of the GWB for life assuming re-
tirement lifespans are exponentially distributed and Black-Scholes asset price
dynamics. This model allows us to obtain an analytical expression for GWB
value. While this analysis cannot be used as an absolute valuation tool for the
GWB for life, it provides us valuable insights into the possible sources of risk.
We find that:
– The GWB guarantees become more expensive for the company as the
volatility of the underlying VA fund increases. Also, the product value
varies significantly depending on the investor age at inception thus creating
an adverse selection bias risk.
– The GWB value has a convex relationship with interest rates making it
susceptible to volatilities in interest rates as well.
– GWB for life also has a sizeable risk related to investor pool longevities.
4.1.3 Chapter Layout
In Section 4.2, we formally describe the product specifics and other stylized features
that we consider in this chapter as well as the next. Section 4.3 then provides an
idea of how such a product might have fared (from the point of view of the com-
pany offering the product) in a historical context. Next, in Section 4.4, we derive
an analytical expression for the fair value of the GWB for life guarantee under the
simplifying assumptions mentioned earlier. We then use this analysis with some nu-
merical examples to get a sense of the relative price of GWB for life and the different
sources of risk to value in Section 4.5. We conclude with a summary of the findings
in Section 4.6.
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4.2 Product Description
In this section, we formally describe the Guaranteed Withdrawal Benefit (GWB) for
life feature. Typically, this option is available as an add-on or a rider feature with a
VA account at a fee premium.
• All guaranteed payments and fees are defined in terms of two state variables -
one is simply the underlying VA account value and the other is referred to as the
“benefit base”. The benefit base is used to determine the guaranteed withdrawal
amount for a year. We use Bn and Cn to respectively denote the benefit base
and the account value net of withdrawals, if any, at the nth anniversary.
• Suppose at time 0, an investor aged A opens an account with the GWB for
life feature with an initial investment C0. This capital is invested in an asset
mix of investor’s choice through a VA fund. All dividends and distributions are
assumed to be reinvested. For simplicity, we construct a reference index St for
the VA fund to tracks its total returns. The initial value of the benefit base is
set as B0 = C0.
• There is a minimum waiting period W and a retirement age AR defined in the
contract. The investor can start taking withdrawals from her account from
the (T + 1)st anniversary, where T = max(AR − A,W ). We assume A,AR,W
to be all integers. For n > T , the investor is guaranteed to be able to take
a withdrawal of q · Bn−1 at the nth anniversary. The insurance company is
responsible for covering any shortfall in case the account value falls below the
guaranteed withdrawal level, i.e., q ·Bn−1. This is the GWB guarantee and q is
termed as the guaranteed withdrawal rate.
• If the withdrawal taken at the nth anniversary does not exceed the contractual
guarantee (i.e., 0 for the first T anniversaries and q ·Bn−1 thereafter), the benefit
base Bn at the n
th anniversary is set to the higher of Bn−1 and the contract
value after withdrawals (if any), i.e., Cn. This is the step-up (also sometimes
known as ratchet) feature. If the withdrawals exceed the contractual guarantee,
then Bn is set to the lower of Bn−1 and Cn.
• The investor is allowed to withdraw during any year the greater of the gains in
her account value over the previous year or a certain fraction b of her account
value without any penalties. Withdrawals in excess of these and the guaranteed
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level, however, result in the imposition of a surrender charge. In addition, large
withdrawals may also result in tax penalties.
• Every year, the investor is charged a fraction h of the benefit base for the year,
i.e., h ·Bn−1 at the nth anniversary, as fees for the GWB guarantee. We assume
that the fees are charged separately to the investor rather than being deducted
from the account6.
• Upon investor’ death, the residual account value is returned to a beneficiary.
While the above description does not fit any one specific product in the market,
it captures the key features of this class of products. Annual fees for GWB for life
option are usually the same for all participating investors, irrespective of their age
or chosen asset mix. Most insurance companies offering GWB also leave room to
unilaterally increase GWB fees after sales. We do not analyze the value of this option
to the GWB provider. Any tendency to increase the premium in contracts already
made poses a reputation risk besides going against the very spirit of insurance and
will make potential clients wary.
Appendix C provides a numerical illustration of the evolution of GWB over an
investor’s lifetime for a hypothetical sequence of the reference VA fund returns and
withdrawals by the investor.
GWB valuation is clearly dependent on how the investor chooses to withdraw.
In principle, the investor can strategize her withdrawals. Milevsky and Salisbury
[95], Dai, Kwok and Zong [48] and Chen, Vetzal and Forsyth [34] investigate the
implications of “optimal” dynamic withdrawals by investors in the context of the
GMWB and find them to increase the GMWB costs substantially. However, we
believe that in practice, especially for the GWB for life type product, investors are
unlikely to follow such optimal dynamic policies. This is because:
• “Optimal” withdrawal policies typically recommend the investor to withdraw
her investment out completely, when the protection guarantee is out-of-the
money. The papers cited above consider only the surrender charges that the
insurance company levies on large withdrawals to evaluate the cost of large
6In practice, fees related to VA products are typically deducted from the investor’s account every
year and thus affect the account value. The assumption about fees being charged separately allows
us to isolate the cash inflows and outflows associated with the product. This makes the break-even
fee computation, which otherwise would need solving a fixed point problem, much easier. As the fee
involved is small, typically few tens of basis points a year, we do not expect this approximation to
alter our results in a significant way.
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withdrawals for the investors. In practice, investors will also incur high indirect
costs in terms of taxes on the excess distributions and this is likely to make
taking large strategic withdrawals unattractive for investors.
• Investors are also more risk-averse, unable to hedge risks due to their own
longevities and less equipped than institutions like insurance companies to hedge
financial risk.
• Withdrawing less than the allowed amount is also likely to be sub-optimal for
the investor as the guarantees are valid for her lifetime.
Also, n practice, most investors follow simple thumb rules rather than complex dy-
namically optimal strategies to manage their investments. In our analysis, we will
primarily focus on the case where the investor withdraws the contractually guaran-
teed amount at each anniversary7. This is the maximum withdrawal the investor can
take without causing the step-ups to reverse. Let Rsn+1 denotes the return on the
underlying VA fund for the period (n, n+ 1]. The dynamics of the account value Cn
and the benefit base Bn for a steady contract specified rate of withdrawal are given
by:
Cn+1 = (Cn ·Rsn+1 − qn+1Bn)+ ;
Bn+1 = max(Bn, Cn+1) , (4.1)
where
qn =
{
0 , if n ≤ T ,
q , if n > T .
(4.2)
So far, we have not incorporated the mortality related randomness in our model. We
assume that the mortality process is independent of the market dynamics, and the
insurance company is risk-neutral with respect to it. We denote by Q, the measure on
the expanded sample space containing both the securities market and the investors’
mortalities and which is obtained by combining the risk neutral pricing measure
and the mortality laws. While we do not price the mortality risk into the GWB,
we investigate the magnitude of the implied risk. This can be used to compute a
premium or risk capital. See Milevsky, Promislow and Young, [94] for suggestions
about pricing mortality risk.
In the subsequent parts of this chapter as well as Chapter 5, we provide increas-
ingly refined analyses of the GWB product. Before proceeding to a formal analysis
7Later, in Section 5.3 in Chapter 5, we consider an alternate dynamic withdrawal strategy.
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using the risk-neutral pricing machinery, we first perform a small but interesting back-
testing experiment and examine how liabilities and revenues for a GWB guarantee
underwriter would have looked like, had it been offered in the past.
4.3 GWB - A Hypothetical Historical Analysis
We examine in this section how GWB would have fared had it been offered at var-
ious times in this and the last century. We set the GWB product parameters as
follows- guaranteed withdrawal rate q = 6%, minimum waiting period W = 3 years,
retirement age AR = 65 years, and fee rate h = 0.65%.
We then calculate the total values (discounted back to the time of account opening)
of the liabilities and fees for the insurance company arising from the GWB feature
if an investor aged 60 opened an account with an initial investment of 100, 000 at
the beginning of each of the 1124 months from January 1871 to December 1972.
We consider three possible asset allocation mixes, 20% equities, 60% equities and
100% equities by value. The balance is assumed to be invested in bonds, whose
month-on-month returns, we assume are the same as the prevailing long term interest
rates. We also assume that the VA portfolio is re-balanced monthly to get the desired
asset mix composition and dividends from equities are re-invested, i.e., there are no
distributions. We consider three values for realized investor longevity - 85 years, 90
years and 95 years.
To compute the cash-flows involved, we use the monthly data for S&P composite
levels, dividends and long-term interest rates, as extrapolated by Shiller and available
online from the website [1] for the period - January 1871 to December 2007. Since the
corresponding benchmark short-term interest rates were not available for the entire
period, we use a flat annual rate of 3.5% for discounting all cash-flows.
We first consider the performance of the GWB, if the month when the VA account
was opened was one of the 277 months from December 1949 to December 1972. This
ensures that we consider the markets for the relatively stable post second world war
interval only.
Rather surprisingly, for all asset-mix choices, in not one of these 277 scenarios,
the insurance company underwriting the GWB would have had to finance any part of
the guaranteed withdrawals, even if the investor went on to live for 95 years. Thus,
in all cases, the minimum withdrawal guarantee was superfluous and never drawn
upon! Table 4.1 summarizes the distribution of the net-value earned to the company
from the product, i.e., the difference between the total discounted value of the fees
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collected and the payouts made over the product’s lifespan. This suggests a healthy
20% to 30% margin on sales on average. Also, it suggests that the longer the investor
lives and the more aggressive her VA fund choice, the higher are the revenues for the
company on average8.
Equity
Expo-
sure
Investor
Age at
Death
Average Std. minimum
5%le
value
Median
95%le
value
maximum
85 17,145 2,541 14,259 14,471 15,806 22,467 22,677
20% 90 20,554 3,524 16,568 16,787 19,317 27,552 27,751
95 23,970 4,308 18,708 19,006 22,741 32,004 32,286
85 19,978 2,699 16,401 16,747 19,110 25,791 26,669
60% 90 24,510 3,638 19,480 20,210 23,804 33,308 34,361
95 29,709 4,753 23,118 24,095 28,881 42,141 43,572
85 23,509 6,889 16,042 16,655 21,214 43,566 45,767
100% 90 28,965 7,986 19,930 20,776 25,080 51,064 54,000
95 35,565 9,118 23,719 25,922 32,119 57,311 60,933
Table 4.1: Distribution statistics of GWB for life net value in different scenarios for an
account started between Dec. 1949 and Dec. 1972 (for initial investment of 100,000).
If however, we consider the entire range of the data available9, i.e., a total of 1224
vintages with the month of account opening ranging from January 1871 to December
1972, the results look very different. Table 4.2 shows key statistics for the total
discounted value of the payouts that the company would have had to finance while
Table 4.3 shows the same for the total discounted net value, i.e., fees less payouts,
that the company booked.
Equity
Expo-
sure
Investor
Age at
Death
Average Std. minimum
5%le
value
Median
95%le
value
maximum
85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20% 90 124 939 0 0 0 5,045 13,876
95 1,630 4,025 0 0 0 19,549 29,182
85 579 3,613 0 0 0 20,340 44,813
60% 90 2,669 9,642 0 0 0 51,255 75,390
95 5,898 16,436 0 0 0 79,621 101,371
85 9,734 27,822 0 0 0 130,526 160,970
100% 90 17,268 42,238 0 0 0 182,010 231,579
95 25,672 55,316 0 0 0 225,359 291,843
Table 4.2: Distribution statistics of GWB for life payouts in different scenarios for an
account started between Jan. 1871 and Dec. 1972 (for initial investment of 100,000).
8Note that these are average revenues and do not represent fair values.
9The corresponding time-frame would include two world wars and the Great Depression.
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Equity
Expo-
sure
Investor
Age at
Death
Average Std. minimum
5%le
value
Median
95%le
value
maximum
85 15,004 1,880 12,070 13,173 14,569 22,199 22,677
20% 90 17,011 2,781 5,269 14,645 16,305 27,232 27,751
95 17,424 5,319 (8,252) 8,653 17,320 31,636 32,286
85 18,378 4,512 (17,936) 13,392 17,855 27,698 29,486
60% 90 19,511 9,209 (44,945) 1,293 20,367 33,046 35,122
95 19,350 15,793 (67,686) (19,154) 22,156 39,785 43,572
85 14,989 25,965 (115,372) (50,905) 19,273 51,043 58,948
100% 90 12,475 40,230 (170,711) (89,250) 22,063 64,825 74,888
95 8,929 53,827 (223,944) (120,486) 25,229 76,652 88,656
Table 4.3: Distribution statistics of GWB for life net value in different scenarios for an
account started between Jan. 1871 and Dec. 1972 (for initial investment of 100,000).
These tables show that while still profitable on average, the GWB for life is defi-
nitely not a low-risk money spinner. The net-income values are considerably smaller
and the insurance company would have had to burden guaranteed withdrawals in
quite a few scenarios resulting in substantial losses (assuming no hedging). Also,
average net value now decreases with the aggressiveness of the chosen asset mix and
higher investor longevities no longer appear beneficial to the company.
The statistics for shortfall and net-value given in Table 4.2 imply that they have a
skewed distribution in which large losses occur with small probabilities. This suggests
that model estimation risk is important for GWB as it is the extreme events that drive
most of the losses and the pricing model used must be able to accurately capture them.
We end this section with a caveat - in general, any historical analysis for GWB
can be regarded as best as only instructive, because the GWB not only has a skewed
distribution for realized value but also has a long duration and financial data is
typically not stationary over such durations.
We now turn to valuing GWB using risk neutral pricing methods.
4.4 Black Scholes Model with Continuous Step-
ups and Exponential Mortality - CBSME Model
As (4.1) indicates, GWB has discrete cash-flows and step-ups. Considerable analytical
simplicity however is offered by considering a continuous time version of the GWB.
In this section, we consider this case and derive an analytical expression for the GWB
value. This is useful in generating insights in to the risk factors associated with the
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GWB.
• Step-ups as well as all cash-flows, i.e., withdrawals and fee payments are made
continuously.
• Investor’s lifespan in retirement is exponentially distributed with mean 1
λ
.
We assume that St, the reference index for the chosen VA fund, follows a geomet-
ric Brownian motion with constant volatility σ and the risk free rate r rate is also
constant. This is basically the Black-Scholes model [18].
The investor starts taking withdrawals from time t > T
4
= max(W,AR−A) at the
rate qtBt where,
qt =
{
0 , if t ≤ T ,
q , if t > T .
The investor also (separately) pays fees to the company at rate h indexed to Bt.
For ease of reference, we shall henceforth refer to this model, which treats GWB as a
continuous time instrument and prices it under the Black Scholes framework assuming
exponential retirement lifespans, as the CBSME model.
In this model, the only state variables that affect the GWB value are Bt, Ct and
the investor age or equivalently time t. The dynamics for Bt and Ct are given as:
dCt =
{
rCtdt− qtBtdt+ CtσdZQt if Ct ≥ 0 ,
0 if Ct = 0 .
(4.3)
dBt = 1{Ct=Bt}(dCt)
+ . (4.4)
Here ZQt is a Q Brownian motion. Now, let L(C,B, t) denote the fair value of the
protection offered to the investor through the GWB scheme at t as a function of the
state variables. This is simply the part of the withdrawals that are borne by the
insurance company. Note that if H(C,B, t) denotes the fair value of all withdrawals
made by the investor or her beneficiary, then the following equality holds
L(C,B, t) = H(C,B, t)− C . (4.5)
Let Gh(C,B, t) denote the value of the revenue stream from the investor at time
t as a function of the state variables. We also define a normalized revenue stream as
G(C,B, t)
4
= Gh(C,B,t)
h
.
Our goal is to find the functions L(C,B, t) and G(C,B, t).
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We first prove the following property that reduces the dimensionality of the prob-
lem.
Proposition 4.1. The functions L(C,B, t) and G(C,B, t) are homogeneous B,C
and satisfy the following relations:
L(C,B, t) = B · L
(
C
B
, 1, t
)
;
G(C,B, t) = B ·G
(
C
B
, 1, t
)
. (4.6)
Proof. Let the tuple (Bt, Ct) denote an investor’s benefit base and account value at
time t. For a given sample path ω of the evolution of the market and mortality
factors, let (Bs(ω), Cs(ω)) be the value of this tuple at some time s ≥ t along ω.
From the homogeneity of the system dynamics as given by (4.4), it follows that had
the investor started with a benefit base and account value combination (y ·Bt, y ·Ct)
for some y > 0, then the sample path ω values of these quantities at some time s ≥ t
would have been (y · Bs(ω), y · Cs(ω)). Moreover, the cashflows that the company
incurs, i.e., the shortfalls and revenues at any time t are also homogeneous functions
of the benefit base Bt and account value Ct. From these, it follows that for any y < 0,
L(y · C, y ·B, t) = y · L(C,B, t) ;
G(y · C, y ·B, t) = y ·G(C,B, t) .
Hence for B > 0, we must have
L(C,B, t) = B · L
(
C
B
, 1, t
)
;
G(C,B, t) = B ·G
(
C
B
, 1, t
)
.
In light of Proposition 4.1, we define the functions l(x, t) and g(x, t) as follows
l(x, t) = L(x, 1, t) . . . , 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 ;
g(x, t) = G(x, 1, t) . . . , 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 . (4.7)
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The quantity x can be interpreted as the benefit base capitalization ratio C
B
. The func-
tions l(x, t) and g(x, t) are to be interpreted as the values of respectively the liabilities
and revenue streams, normalized by the benefit base, before a step-up operation is
performed.
It turns out that for t ≥ T , it is easier to find L(C,B, t) and G(C,B, t) (or
equivalently l(x, t) and g(x, t)) by solving a differential equation. Once this is done,
L(C,B, t) and G(C,B, t) can be determined for t < T by taking a risk neutral expec-
tation of their respective values at time T . For this we will need the joint distribution
for (BT , CT ) conditional on (Bt, Ct) for t ≤ T under the risk neutral measure Q. We
therefore break the pricing of GWB into two different phases:
1. Phase 1: When t < T . There are no withdrawals in this phase.
2. Phase 2: When t ≥ T and the investor has started taking withdrawals.
We now describe each of these in detail beginning with Phase 2.
Value of Cashflows in Withdrawal Phase (Phase 2)
Here, because of the assumption that the investor has an exponentially distributed
residual life in retirement, l(x, t) and g(x, t) as defined in (4.7) become independent
of time t for t ≥ T . We summarize and prove this in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2. For t ≥ T ,
l(x, t) = l(x, T ) ;
g(x, t) = g(x, T ) . (4.8)
Proof. Note that both the market returns process and the mortality process are mem-
oryless for t ≥ T . Moreover the dynamics of the state variables as given (4.4) also do
not depend on t for t ≥ T as qt = q is a constant for this period. It then follows that
for t ≥ T , the system has no memory and hence
L(C,B, t) = L(C,B, T ) ;
G(C,B, t) = G(C,B, T ) .
Using (4.7), the result in (4.8) then follows immediately.
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For t ≥ T , then l(x, t) and g(x, t) can be regarded as functions of just one variable.
To ease notation, for this particular subsection, where we are working under the case
t ≥ T , we shall denote them as simply l(x) and g(x) respectively.
Lemma 4.1. 1. The function l(·) satisfies the following 2nd order differential equa-
tion
1
2
σ2x2l′′ + (rx− q)l′ − (r + λ)l = 0 ; (4.9)
and the boundary conditions
l(0) =
q
r + λ
, (4.10)
l′(1) = l(1) . (4.11)
2. The function g(·) satisfies the following 2nd order differential equation
1
2
σ2x2g′′ + (rx− q)g′ − (r + λ)g + 1 = 0 ; (4.12)
and the boundary conditions
g(0) =
1
r + λ
, (4.13)
g′(1) = g(1) . (4.14)
Proof. We will prove the result only for l(x), as the proof for g(x) follows along
identical lines. We know that in phase 2, L(C,B, t) = L(C,B, T ) = B · l(C
B
). Let A
be the event that the investor passes away in the interval (t, t + dt]. Thus P(A) =
λdt+ o(dt2). When 0 < C < B, dB = 0. Then by Ito’s Lemma,
dL = P(A) · (0− L) + (1− P(A)) ·
(
∂L
∂C
dC +
1
2
∂2L
∂C2
< dC · dC >
)
= −λLdt+ ∂L
∂C
(
(rC − qB)dt+ σCdZQt
)
+
∂2L
∂C2
σ2C2dt .
Here, < dC · dC > is short-hand for EQ[dC2]. Under the risk-neutral measure, we
must have
EQ[dL] = rLdt− (qBdt− L)+ ,
i.e., (rC − qB)∂L
∂C
+
1
2
σ2C2
∂2L
∂C2
− λL = rL . (4.15)
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Using the property that L(C,B, t) = B · l(x), with x 4= C
B
, we get
(rx− q)l′ + 1
2
σ2x2l′′ − λl = rl ,
i.e.,
1
2
σ2x2l′′ + (rx− q)l′ − (r + λ)l = 0 .
For the first boundary condition, we simply note that
l(0) = L(0, 1, T )
= EQ
[∫ ∞
0
exp(−(r + λ)t) · qdt
]
=
q
r + λ
.
The second boundary condition is more technical and represents a “smooth pasting
condition”. We give a rough proof:
Suppose step-ups can occur only after a delay ∆. Let Bt = B, Ct+∆ = C and
L(Ct+∆, Bt+∆) = L(C,max(C,B))
4
= L˜B(C). The function L˜B(·) is assumed to be
continuously differentiable. Then, it follows that
if C > B,
dL˜B(C)
dC
=
dL(C,C)
dC
= l(1) .
By continuity,
dL˜B(C)
dC
|C=B = l(1) . (4.16)
Now, since Bt is continuous,
lim
∆→0
L˜B(C) = Bl
(
C
B
)
,
hence, lim
∆→0
dL˜B(C)
dC
= l′
(
C
B
)
. (4.17)
Putting (4.16) and (4.17) together, we get the boundary condition (4.11).
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The differential equations in Lemma 4.9 have the following general solutions
l(x) = C1x−ke−
q
σ2xWhM
(
k,m,
2q
σ2x
)
+ C2x−ke−
q
σ2xWhW
(
k,m,
2q
σ2x
)
,
(4.18)
g(x) = D1x−ke−
q
σ2xWhM
(
k,m,
2q
σ2x
)
+D2x−ke−
q
σ2xWhW
(
k,m,
2q
σ2x
)
+
1
r + λ
;
(4.19)
where
k =
r
σ2
− 1 ,
m =
√(
1
2
+
r
σ2
)2
+ 2
λ
σ2
.
The functions WhW(k,m, z) and WhM(k,m, z) are hypergeometric functions that
solve the Whittaker Differential Equation (see Mathworld, [91]):
d2u
dz2
+
du
dz
+
(
k
z
+
1
4
−m2
z2
)
u = 0 .
Some basic properties of these functions, as well as the limits limz→∞WhM(k,m, z)
and limz→∞WhW(k,m, z) are provided in Appendix D. Using these properties, we
can find the constants C1, C2, D1, D2 satisfying the boundary conditions given in
Lemma 4.1 as
C1 =
q
r + λ
·
(
2q
σ2
)k Γ(1
2
− k +m)
Γ(1 + 2m)
; (4.20)
C2 = C1 ;
(1
2
+ k +m)WhM(k + 1,m, 2q
σ2
) + WhM(k,m, 2q
σ2
)
WhW(k + 1,m, 2q
σ2
)−WhW(k,m, 2q
σ2
)
; (4.21)
D1 = 0 ; (4.22)
D2 =
1
r+λ
WhW(k + 1,m, 2q
σ2
)−WhW(k,m, 2q
σ2
)
. (4.23)
Value of Cashflows at Inception and in Phase 1
The values of liabilities and the normalized revenue streams for the GWB product at
time T , when the withdrawals start will be given by
L(CT , BT , T ) = BT · l
(
CT
BT
)
;
G(CT , BT , T ) = BT · g
(
CT
BT
)
,
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where the functions l(·), g(·) and the various parameters in the formulae are given by
(4.18), (4.19) and (4.20)-(4.23). Since there are no cash outflows involved in Phase 1
or during the waiting period, when the investor does not withdraw, it follows that, if
It denotes the indicator variable that the investor is alive at time t, then
L(C0, B0, 0) = EQ[IT e−rTL(CT , BT , T )]
= e−rTE[IT ]EQ
[
BT · l
(
CT
BT
)]
. (4.24)
For the revenue stream, we have
G(C0, B0, 0) = EQ
[∫ T
0
e−rtItBtdt+ IT e−rTG(CT , BT , T )
]
=
∫ T
0
(
e−rt · E[It] · EQ[Bt]
)
dt+ e−rT · E[IT ] · EQ
[
BT · g
(
CT
BT
)]
.
(4.25)
From (4.24) and (4.25), it follows that, to compute the value of the product at time
0, we need:
• The joint distribution of BT and CT under the risk neutral measure.
• The marginal distribution of Bt under the risk neutral measure.
Fortunately, both these quantities are computable, using properties of Brownian Mo-
tion. It is easier to work with the transformed processes
ct
4
= ln
(
Ct
C0
)
; (4.26)
bt
4
= sup
u:0≤u≤t
cu
= ln
(
supu:0≤u≤tCu
)
C0
= ln
(
Bt
B0
)
. (4.27)
The equality in (4.27) follows from the fact that ln(·) is a monotonous function and
that C0 = B0.
It can be shown that the joint distribution of ct, bt under Q is given by
fQct,bt(z,m) =
{
2(2m−z)
σ2t
· 1
σ
√
t
Φ
(
2m−z
σ
√
t
)
· exp
(
ν
σ2
z − ν2
σ2
t
)
. . . , m ≥ z ,
0 . . . , m < z ;
where, ν = r − 1
2
σ2 . (4.28)
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The function Φ(x)
4
= 1√
2pi
exp(−x2
2
) is the standard normal density function. The
marginal distribution of bt on the other hand is given by
fQbt (m) =
2
σ
√
t
Φ
(
m− νt
σ
√
t
)
− 2ν
σ2
exp
(
2νm
σ2
)
·N
(−m− νt
σ
√
t
)
. . . ,m ≥ 0. (4.29)
Here N(·) denotes the standard normal cumulative density function. Equations (4.28)
and (4.29) are derived in Appendix E. These distributions then allow us to compute
the expectations in (4.24) and (4.25) and consequently L(C,B, 0) and G(C,B, 0).
Note that (4.28) and (4.29) are respectively the joint distribution of (bT , cT ) and
marginal distribution of bt conditional on b0 = c0.
For evaluating the value of the product at an intermediate time s during Phase
1, such that, 0 < s < T , we would need these distributions conditional on general
values of bs, cs satisfying cs ≤ bs. This can be in fact obtained readily from (4.28)
and (4.29) by noting that
bt = sup
u:0≤u≤t
cu
= max{bs, sup
u:s≤u≤t
cu} .
Unfortunately, although we know the joint distributions for bt and ct (and hence
effectively Bt and Ct), through (4.28), the integrals in (4.24) and (4.25) do not have
a closed form representation and must be evaluated numerically.
Note that, we have assumed exponential mortality model for the investor only in
Phase 2. Investor mortality rates during Phase 1, to be used in (4.24) and (4.25) can
be arbitrary.
We now use the expressions derived in this section, to compute the value and
sensitivity of the GWB for life product for a typical offering.
4.5 Numerical Results
In this section, we use the results derived in Section 4.4 for some numerical compu-
tations. As the CBSME model considered therein is an approximation of the actual
GWB product, we focus more on risk and sensitivity analysis rather than absolute
valuations. The experimental set-up is as follows:
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Product Parameters
• We set the minimum waiting period W = 3 years, the retirement age AR = 65
years and the guaranteed withdrawal rate q = 6%. These are indicative of
typical offerings.
• For computing the net value of the GWB, we will assume that the fees are
charged at the rate h= 0.65% of the benefit base and take a reference initial
investment of C0 = 100. Thus the net value figures that we obtain can be
interpreted to have units of percentage of sales of VAs for which the GWB for
life was elected.
Investors’ Profiles
• We consider investor age at inception, i.e., A to vary in the range 50 to 70 years.
• Investor chooses an asset-mix for investment by selecting a target level of expo-
sure (by value) that her portfolio will have to equities and we denote the same
by α. We consider four levels for α - 20%, 40%, 60% and 80%. The balance of
the portfolio will be invested in relatively less volatile instruments, which we re-
fer to as “bonds”10. The VA fund is also assumed to be continuously rebalanced
to maintain the taget exposures.
• We also consider the overall value of GWB for the insurance company for sales
across different investor cohorts and investment plans. For this, we assume
that the distribution of clients’ age at inception, A, weighted by their initial
investment amount C0 is uniformly distributed in the range 50 to 70. Further,
for each cohort, the fraction of investment in VA funds with values of α as
20%, 40%, 60% and 80% is 0.1, 0.4, 0.4 and 0.1 respectively. We refer to this
portfolio of clients with the stated distribution of age at inception and asset-
mix selection as the “meta-portfolio” and this is again indicative of a typical
VA client pool.
• For estimating mortality risk, we use the year 2008 mortality table11 published
by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PGBC) and which is used to
value annuities under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
10These need not be interest rate or zero-coupon bonds.
11These mortality rates have been obtained as a 50-50 blend of mortality rates for healthy males
and females in the US.
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Section 4050 available from [101]. We assume that the mortality rates remain
stationary, i.e., different cohorts experience the same mortality rate at the same
ages. We convert this agewise table into a continuous time mortality or hazard
rate function by modeling investor death as the arrival of a time inhomogeneous
Poisson process with piecewise constant intensities, each piece being of length
one year12. For convenience, the relevant mortality rates published in this table
and the implied hazard rates and average residual life (for ages 49 and above)
are listed in Appendix F.
For Phase 2, i.e., for t > T , we then set the intensity to be the inverse of
the expected residual life of the investor at T , as implied from the hazard rate
function. Thus, in Phase 2, we model death as the arrival of a time homogeneous
Poisson process.
For illustration, Table 4.4 gives the maximum number of Phase 1 and average
number of Phase 2 years for five different cohort ages - 50, 55, 60, 65 and 70. For
the cohort who starts at ages 50, 55 and 60, withdrawals will start at age 65.
Because of the minimum waiting period constraint, withdrawals for the cohorts
aged 65 and 70 at inception will start at ages 68 and 73 respectively.
Cohort Age Max. Phase 1 years (T)
Avg. Withdrawal
Years ( 1λ)
50 15 20.38
55 10 20.38
60 5 20.38
65 3 18.01
70 3 14.27
Table 4.4: Maximum Phase 1 years and Average Phase 2 years for select cohorts.
Asset Dynamics
We assume that both equity markets as well as bonds have log-normal returns and
are uncorrelated. The Black Scholes volatility of the equity market returns σe, is set
to 20% (annualized), while the same for the bonds, σb, is set to 2% (annualized).
The one year risk-free rate is taken to be 3.5%. Because the VA fund is rebalanced
continually, the VA fund index St will follow a geometric Brownian motion consistent
with the assumptions of Section 4.4. Its volatility σ for an exposure α to equities is
12This is commonly known as De-Moivre’s approximation.
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obtained as
σ2 = α2 · σ2e + (1− α)2 · σ2b . (4.30)
The following table gives the effective volatility for the four asset allocation mixes
that we consider:
Equity Exposure (α) Effective Volatility (σ)
20% 4.31%
40% 8.09%
60% 12.03%
80% 16.01%
Results
For each cohort or age-group, we compute the value of Liabilities and Revenue
base at inception for an account started with an investment of 100, i.e., the values
L(100, 100, 0) and G(100, 100, 0). These are reported in Tables 4.5 and 4.5 respec-
tively. These are used to compute the break-even fee h0, or the fee at which the Net
Present Value will become 0 and the NPV, assuming a fee of h = 0.65%. Results for
each cohort and asset mix are summarized in Tables 4.5 and 4.5.
Exposure to equities
Cohort Age 20% 40% 60% 80%
50 10.38 14.97 21.80 30.57
55 10.55 14.98 21.38 29.33
60 10.77 14.89 20.53 27.29
65 8.64 11.96 16.44 21.77
70 5.28 7.66 10.97 14.98
Table 4.5: Liability Values for different cohorts and asset mixes under the CBSME
Model.
From these results, it would appear that the typical fees of around 65 bps charged
by the company grossly underprices the product. However, we re-emphasize that the
CBSME model used here analyzes a continuous time version of the actual product
and is not comparable to the same at an absolute level. Besides, the exponential
model for retirement lifespans is also rather crude as is evidenced by Figure 4-1 that
shows how average residual life varies with age.
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Exposure to equities
Cohort Age 20% 40% 60% 80%
50 2684 2870 3126 3427
55 2192 2345 2545 2776
60 1712 1829 1975 2138
65 1423 1515 1628 1754
70 1247 1325 1420 1526
Table 4.6: Revenue Values/Fees for different cohorts and asset mixes under the CB-
SME Model.
Exposure to equities
Cohort Age 20% 40% 60% 80%
50 0.39% 0.52% 0.70% 0.89%
55 0.48% 0.64% 0.84% 1.06%
60 0.63% 0.81% 1.04% 1.28%
65 0.61% 0.79% 1.01% 1.24%
70 0.42% 0.58% 0.77% 0.98%
Table 4.7: Break-even fees for select cohorts and asset mixes under the CBSME
Model.
Exposure to equities
Cohort Age 20% 40% 60% 80%
50 7.07 3.69 -1.48 -8.30
55 3.70 0.26 -4.83 -11.29
60 0.36 -3.00 -7.69 -13.39
65 0.61 -2.11 -5.85 -10.37
70 2.82 0.95 -1.74 -5.06
Table 4.8: Net value of the GWB product for select cohorts and asset mixes under
the CBSME Model.
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Figure 4-1: Average Residual life as a function of Age
Nevertheless, since the version of GWB considered by the CBSME model is struc-
turally similar to the actual product, we can use the results of Section 4.4 to get an
idea of primary risk factors and their magnitudes. The availability of a near closed
form solution considerably speeds up the computations needed for this investigation.
Figure 4-2, shows how the break even fee varies with cohort age while Figure 4-3
shows the variation of net-value (at h = 0.65% fees) with cohort age for different asset
mix choices.
We observe that:
• In general, the more aggressive the asset mix, the more expensive would be
the GWB for life guarantee. A decomposition of the net-value as provided in
Tables 4.5 and 4.5 for selected cohorts reveals that in fact the payout liabilities
increase sharply with the VA fund volatility. This would mean that the risk
capital requirements will also be higher for GWB guarantee associated with
the more volatile VA funds. The corresponding changes in the net value and
break-even fees are more subdued because the fee structure which is indexed to
the benefit base provides a greater upside in revenues for more aggressive asset
mixes and helps to somewhat offset the increases in the liabilities.
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Figure 4-2: Break Even fee as a function of Age A for different asset mix choices
under the CBSME Model.
• Cohort age is a significant determinant of the value of the product. The ideal
time for an investor to opt for GWB is probably just before retirement so as
to minimize the duration of Phase 1 and maximize the same for which the
withdrawal guarantee applies, i.e., Phase 2. Because of the waiting period
W = 3 years, the number of years for which withdrawals are guaranteed starts
decreasing with the investor age at inception, A, for A ≥ 62. However, for an
investor with A < 62 years, the number of phase 2 years is the same as what it
would have been had she started at age 62 years, because she must reach the
retirement age AR = 65 years before withdrawals can start. On the other hand,
the number of years for which the insurance company can collect fees from the
investor is more. This leads to a fall in the break-even fees and an increase
in the net value for the company13. As a result cohorts aged 62 are the most
expensive for the insurance company.
13Because of the step-up feature, the costs and revenues associated with the GWB actually have a
slightly more complex relationship with cohort age. However, as step-ups tend to increase the value
of both the withdrawal guarantees as well as the fee base, the effects somewhat offset each other.
This also suggests that the step-up feature is of limited additional value to the investor because
the fees are indexed to the benefit base and hence they also get stepped up with the level of the
guarantee.
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Figure 4-3: Net Value as a function of Age for different asset mix choices under the
CBSME Model.
We find that there is a significant risk of adverse selection of clientele in the one
price fits all approach that the companies have been using to market and sell the
GWB. In the long run, companies must differentiate in fees based on the investor
age and their fund selections. A few companies have started charging a premium for
GWB guarantees on more aggressive asset mixes. However price differentials across
investor ages are also needed.
Next, we consider the sensitivity of the entire client portfolio, i.e., the meta-
portfolio described earlier to shifts in interest rates and mortality rates. Figures
4-4 and 4-5 show how respectively the break-even fees and the net-value fluctuate
with the interest rate r. As expected, the GWB guarantee becomes more expensive
as interest rates decrease. Further, the relationship between net value and interest
rates is convex14. This indicates that interest rate volatility will work to lower GWB
valuations and must be considered in pricing it.
Finally, we compute the net value and break even fees for the meta-portfolio if
all average residual lives (during Phase 2) were to change by ±1. The numbers,
14An intuitive reason for this convex nature is that as the risk-free rate decreases, not only does
the possibility of a withdrawal shortfall increase but also the discount factor that would apply to
the resulting payouts decreases.
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Figure 4-4: Break even fee for the meta-portfolio as a function of risk-free rate under
the CBSME Model.
presented in Table 4.9, show that the mortality related risk is substantial. To put
things in perspective, the average residual lives at 65 for healthy males and females
in the US differ by more than 2 years.
Change in Avg.
Residual Life
Break even fee Net value at h=0.65%
none 0.80 % -3.09
+1 0.85 % -4.08
-1 0.76 % -2.10
Table 4.9: Impact of changes in average withdrawal years on break-even fee and net
value of the meta-portfolio under the CBSME Model.
Thus, the scenarios considered in Table 4.9 are well within the realms of possibility.
Also, the effective longevities for the insurance company can be different from the
population longevities and difficult to estimate if the amount of capital invested and
investor age are dependent. Further, because there are no liquid mortality sensitive
instruments, the resultant risk can be difficult to manage.
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Figure 4-5: Net Value of the meta-portfolio as a function of risk-free rate for the
CBSME Model.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced the GWB for life feature - an exotic option that
insurance companies have been offering to investors to plan for their retirement. The
GWB feature allows an individual to stay invested in the market and capture the
upside while being assured of a steady income during retirement.
We then used a simplified model to derive an analytical expression for the value of
liabilities and revenues due to the GWB option. Using these results, we analyzed the
impact of various risk factors on the same for typical values of the problem parameters.
This analysis showed:
• The value of the product is sensitive to the choice of the asset mix by the
investor. The more aggressive (or volatile) the asset mix, the more expensive is
the GWB guarantee.
• The value of GWB is also significantly dependent on the cohort age. In general,
the product becomes more expensive for the company (and conversely more
attractive to the investor), the shorter the pre-withdrawal period and longer
the withdrawal period. The dependence of the break-even fee on investor char-
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acteristics might lead to an adverse bias in company’s customer profile, unless
more price differentiation is provided.
• The product is negatively exposed to volatility in interest rates.
• The product value is quite sensitive to the client pool’s mortality distribution.
This is a challenge, because this risk can be difficult to hedge in practice.
In the next chapter, we seek to value the GWB in a more realistic setting, taking
into account the various risk factors identified in this chapter.
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Chapter 5
Guaranteed Lifetime Payouts:
Further Analysis
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4, we introduced the Guaranteed Withdrawal Benefits (GWB) for life
product that insurance companies have been offering off late as a retirement invest-
ment solution. We also presented in Section 4.4 of this chapter, the simple CBSME
model for analysing the GWB. The various simplifying assumptions - notably Black
Scholes asset price dynamics, exponentially distributed retirement lifespans and con-
tinuous step-ups helped us to derive an almost closed-form solution for the value of
GWB liabilities and revenues.
We shift the focus of this chapter to modeling the GWB product in a more realistic
setting. Inevitably, this will come at the cost of the tractability that we achieved with
the CBSME model. We first remove the assumptions about continuous step-ups and
an exponential distribution for the retirement lifespans. This gives us a base-line
valuation of the product in the Black-Scholes model.
Ballotta [9], Lee and Stock [84], Wang, Gerrard and Haberman [115] have pointed
out the importance of considering interest rate risks for VA products with embedded
options. However, except for the GAO/GMIB type of products, which are primar-
ily interest rate options, valuation impact due to stochastic interest rates is seldom
considered. Since GWB for life has long durations, that can easily extend over 30
to 40 years, interest rates can fluctuate significantly during the product’s lifetime.
The analysis presented in Section 4.5 of Chapter 4 using the CBSME model also
indicated a negative exposure to interest rate volatility. Apart from interest rate
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risks, as the historical analysis presented in Section 4.3 of Chapter 4 revealed, GWB
is like a deep-out-of-the money option. Hence, sound modeling of the “tail events”
in asset returns is crucial for GWB valuations. As we pointed out in Chapter 4,
the GMWB/GWB family has been regarded in the literature as primarily an equity
based product and has not really been analysed in the literature beyond the Black-
Scholes model, which assumes constant interest rates and a normal distribution for
(continuously compounded) asset returns.
In this chapter, we refine the basic Black-Scholes models to investigate the effect of
stochasticity in interest-rates and “stochastic volatilities” on GWB pricing. Milevsky
and Salisbury [95], Dai, Kwok and Zong [48] and Chen, Vetzal and Forsyth [34] show
how fully rational or strategic investor behavior can impact GMWB costs in a Black-
Scholes model. We find that even under “typical” investor behavior, accounting for
stochasticity of interest rates as well as stochastic volatilities can significantly impact
GWB valuation. We also consider an alternate withdrawal behavior for investors
where they refuse step-ups in the Phase 2 of the product, but find it to have a limited
negative impact on valuation. Like Chapter 4, we also conduct a sensitivity analysis
GWB value with respect to investor characteristics such as age and asset-mix choice
as well as mortality rates, under different models. We then examine some issues
related to hedging the GWB.
5.1.1 Findings and Contributions
In this chapter, we seek to price the GWB in a realistic setting, incorporating the
risk-factors identified in Chapter 4. We proceed by taking a typical GWB offering and
pricing it under a series of valuation models. We start with the basic Black Scholes
framework and then incrementally refine it to account for first, stochastic interest
rates and then, stochastic volatilities. We ensure that the models are tuned so that
they correspond to the same level of interest rates and option implied volatilities. We
find:
• All models corroborate the key inferences made from the simple CBSME model,
namely,
– GWB value is quite sensitive to both the chosen asset mix as well as the
age of the investor.
– GWB has a high sensitivity to the client pool’s mortality.
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• Accounting for stochasticity in interest rates and return volatilities has a mate-
rial downside effect on valuations.
• The value put to the GWB has a high dependence on the class of models
used. Neither the GWB nor an equity-option with duration anywhere close to
the GWB lifespan is actively traded in the market. Any valuation of a GWB
product will involve assumptions about markets and investors, not all of which
can be inferred from the market data. Hence companies issuing the GWB must
value them using their own proprietary models1. Given its impressive sales, this
“model risk” associated with the GWB implies that there is a high possibility of
a significant mis-valuation of the insurance companies’ liabilities due to model
mis-specification.
• Investor behavior on the other hand, does not seem to impact the cost sig-
nificantly. This, we believe, can be attributed to the step-up feature and the
indexing of fees to the benefit base, which provide a natural hedge against
dynamic withdrawals.
• Hedging GWB is challenging because its valuation itself is sensitive to the model
family used. Further, it has a high exposure to risk factors such as mortality
rates for which effective hedging instruments may not be available. Moreover,
on the whole, though net-value seems less sensitive to investor behavior, hedging
policy would depend on how customer behavior evolves. We also show that even
simple delta-hedging poses challenges, as the step-up feature makes the delta
discontinuous.
We find that on the whole, there is considerable ambiguity surrounding the true value
of GWB for life. This and a high exposure to risk factors that are not actively traded
implies that the GWB for life bears a substantial risk for its underwriters that will
be very challenging to manage and hedge against.
5.1.2 Chapter Layout
In this chapter, we consider three arbitrage pricing models to value the GWB for
life. These models differ in their assumptions about asset price dynamics in the risk-
neutral world. In Section 5.2, we first outline a general pricing framework for the
1GWB for life should be a Level 3 asset in the parlance of the FAS 157 standard issued by the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), [55].
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GWB. We then describe in detail each of the three models that we use for pricing. In
Section 5.3, we present an alternate and dynamic mode of withdrawals by investors
and discuss how GWB value can be computed for this withdrawal strategy under the
different models considered in this chapter. In Section 5.4, we present and analyze
numerical results from valuations under different models and assumptions on with-
drawal behavior. This is followed by a discussion on hedging and potential issues
therein in Section 5.5. Finally, we summarize the findings and some directions for
future research in Section 5.6.
5.2 Valuation Models
In this section, we describe the three asset dynamics models that we use to price the
GWB guarantees. The CBSME model in Section 4.4 of Chapter 4 made two rather
strong assumptions:
1. Step-ups and cash-flows happen continuously.
2. The residual life of investor in retirement is exponentially distributed.
Step-ups for a GWB type product typically happen annually. Continuous step-ups
can significantly distort valuation. The 2nd assumption is also inaccurate as mortality
rates typically increase with age.
We relax both these assumptions for the analysis in this chapter.
This means we consider both the step-ups as well as cash-flows to happen dis-
cretely, more specifically, annually. The product that we analyze then corresponds
exactly to the specifications given in Section 4.2 of Chapter 4. For the analysis in
this section, we will assume that the investor withdraws the contractually guaranteed
amount at each anniversary. We restate the dynamics in (4.1) of the GWB state
variables under this assumption:
Cn+1 = (Cn ·Rsn+1 − qn+1Bn)+ ;
Bn+1 = max(Bn, Cn+1) , (5.1)
where
qn =
{
0 , if n ≤ T ,
q , if n > T .
(5.2)
As before Rsn+1 =
Sn+1
Sn
denotes the return on the underlying VA fund for the
period (n, n+ 1].
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In addition, we also now allow the investor’s residual life, TA, to have an arbitrary
distribution, say fTA(·). The only assumption we make is that TA is independent of
the market factors.
When the mortality related risk is diversifiable or the insurance company is risk-
neutral to such risk (as we assume for our valuation analysis), there are two equivalent
ways to account for the randomness in TA:
1. Find the value of the product as a function of TA. The fair value of the product
is obtained as simply an expectation of this value function under fTA(·).
2. Model the investor’s death as the arrival time of a non-homogeneous Poisson
process, i.e., one with time dependent intensity such that the implied distribu-
tion of the residual life TA is fTA(·). Note for any distribution function fTA(·),
such an intensity process (often known as a mortality or hazard rate) can al-
ways be defined2. We then find the value of GWB as a function of time using
backward substitution.
The second method, as we shall illustrate shortly, has computational advantages.
While we do not consider the case of stochastic mortalities here, this framework also
allows one to incorporate the same, if desired, more easily (see Biffis [16]).
5.2.1 General Framework for pricing GWB products
Let Ln(Cn, Bn, ω) and Gn(Cn, Bn, ω) respectively denote the values of liabilities and
revenue base (i.e., revenues normalized by the fee rate h), at time n, excluding the
cash-flows pertaining to the nth anniversary for a given sample path ω.
Let rfn
4
=
∫ n
n−1 rsds denote the continuously compounded risk-free rate for the
interval (n−1, n] and In be the indicator variable that the investor is alive at the end
of year n. Then on a given sample path ω,
In(ω)Ln(Cn, Bn, ω) = In+1(ω) · e−r
f
n+1
(
(qn+1Bn − CnRsn+1)+ + Ln+1(Cn+1, Bn+1, ω)
)
In(ω)Gn(Cn, Bn, ω) = In+1(ω) · e−r
f
n+1 (Bn +Gn+1(Cn+1, Bn+1, ω)) (5.3)
For an investor aged A, we define
λAn
4
= ln
(
P(In = 1)
P(In−1 = 1)
)
.
2To achieve this, hazard rate at time λt at time t is simply set a λt
4
= fTA (t)1−FTA (t)
, with FTA(·),
being the cumulative density function for TA.
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λAn is thus a discrete time “hazard” or mortality rate. It is common to assume that the
residual life spans corresponding to different cohorts have stationary distributions.
This means that the hazard rate can be expressed as a function of the investor’s
current age. More specifically, if λn is the hazard rate of a population at birth then,
λAn = λA+n. Thus P(In = 1) = exp(−
∑n
i=1 λ
A
i ). We assume there exists a finite N
such that P(IN+1 = 1) = 0, or equivalently, λN+1 =∞.
We define product epochs as dates where contractual adjustments or cash-flows
related to the product occur. From (5.1) and (5.3), it can be seen that all epochs
related to the GWB, whether cash-flows in terms of withdrawals by the investor and
payment of fees to the company or changes to state variables due to step-ups or
withdrawals, happen on contract anniversaries. Hence, any arbitrage pricing model
that gives the joint distribution of one year risk free rate rfn and R
s
n can be used to
price the GWB. Most commonly used asset price and interest rate dynamics models
are Markovian. If we are working with such a Markovian model with a state vector
Yt, which by assumption must be independent of mortality dynamics, then it must be
possible to express liabilities and revenue stream values as some functions of time and
the state variables Cn, Bn and Yn. Let Ln(Cn, Bn, Yn) and G(Cn, Bn, Yn), respectively
denote the fair value of liabilities and revenues conditional on the investor being alive
at year n. These functions must satisfy the following recursive relations:
Ln(Cn, Bn, Yn) = e−λ
A
n+1EQ
[
e−r
f
n+1
{(
qn+1Bn − CnRsn+1
)+
+ Ln+1
(
(CnRsn+1 − qn+1Bn)+,max(Bn, CnRsn+1 − qn+1Bn), Yn+1
)} | Yn] ,
Gn(Cn, Bn, Yn) = e−λ
A
n+1EQ
[
e−r
f
n+1 {1
+ Gn+1
(
(CnRsn+1 − qn+1Bn)+,max(Bn, CnRsn+1 − qn+1Bn), Yn+1
)} | Yn] .
(5.4)
For compliant investor withdrawals, we have a homogeneity relation along the lines
of Proposition 4.1 in Chapter 4.
Proposition 5.1. If investor withdraws at the contractual rate q ·Bn, then
Ln(Cn, Bn, Yn) = Bn · Ln
(
Cn
Bn
, 1, Yn
)
,
Gn(Cn, Bn, Yn) = Bn ·Gn
(
Cn
Bn
, 1, Yn
)
.
Proof. We note that the dynamics of the state variables Bn+1 and Cn+1 as described
in (5.1) are homogeneous in Bn and Cn. Also, all the cashflows that the insurance
company incurs are homogeneous in Cn, Bn. The proof then follows along the same
lines as Proposition 4.1 in Chapter 4.
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In light of Proposition 5.1, we define functions ln(x, Yn) and gn(x, Yn) for 0 ≤ x ≤
1. as follows:
ln(x, Yn)
4
= Ln(x, 1, Yn) ,
gn(x, Yn)
4
= Gn(x, 1, Yn) .
From Proposition 5.1 and (5.4), it follows that:
ln(x, Yn) = e−λ
A
n+1 ·
{
x · EQ
[
e−r
f
n+1
(qn+1
x
−Rsn+1
)+
| Yn
]
+ EQ
[
e−r
f
n+1 · ln+1
(
x ·Rsn+1 − qn+1, Yn+1
) · 1{ qn+1x <Rsn+1≤ 1+qn+1x } | Yn
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(5.5)
gn(x, Yn) = e−λ
A
n+1 ·
{
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e−r
f
n+1 | Yn
]
+ EQ
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e−r
f
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(
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· gn+1(1, Yn+1) · 1{Rsn+1> 1+qn+1x } | Yn
]}
.
(5.6)
The above model is quite generic and will hold for any Markovian asset returns
process. If, the asset price returns and interest rates have no memory (such as is the
case in the Black Scholes Model), or have dynamics such that the state vector Yn
equilibrates, i.e., reaches a steady state distribution in an interval corresponding to
the epoch interval (which is 1 year in our case), then we may drop the conditioning
and dependency on Yn. This leads to a simpler model, which we call the independent
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period returns model. The simplifications can be explicitly written as:
ln(x) = e
−λAn+1 ·
{
x · EQ
[
e−r
f
n+1 ·
(qn+1
x
−Rsn+1
)+]
+ EQ
[
e−r
f
n+1ln+1
(
x ·Rsn+1 − qn+1
) · 1{ qn+1
x
)<Rsn+1≤
1+qn+1
x
}
]
+x · ln+1(1) · EQ
[
e−r
f
n+1 ·
(
Rsn+1 −
qn+1
x
)+]}
(5.7)
gn(x) = e
−λAn+1 ·
{
EQ
[
e−r
f
n+1
]
+ EQ
[
e−r
f
n+1 · gn+1
(
x ·Rsn+1 − qn+1
) · 1{ qn+1
x
)<Rsn+1≤
1+qn+1
x
}
]
+x · gn+1(1) · EQ
[
e−r
f
n+1 ·
(
Rsn+1 −
qn+1
x
)+]}
(5.8)
To use the model in equations (5.7) and (5.8), all one needs is a joint distribution
of one period asset returns and interest rates. The Black-Scholes model is just one
example of such asset return dynamics. We may use, for example, a more heavy
tailed-distribution (to adjust for the observed smiles and skews in option volatilities)
for the asset price returns.
In practice, most sophisticated asset return models are Markovian with state vec-
tors that are mean reverting. For GWB, product epochs are contract anniversaries
and are thus spaced apart by a year. If the state variables have mean reversion times
that are small compared to this interval, then we may assume that the corresponding
Markov process has equilibrated by the next epoch and thus approximate the returns
over different periods as independent.
A drawback with this approach is that it cannot be used for mid-epoch-interval
valuation, i.e., when we are trying to find the value of the product between epochs,
especially when a contract anniversary is imminent. Mid-epoch-interval valuation is
important if the GWB is to be hedged dynamically with frequent trading. However,
this shortcoming can be easily dealt with by invoking the stationarity assumption
only after a certain duration, e.g, after the second product epoch (or the one after
the closest product epoch).
State variables for some models such as, equity stochastic volatility models some-
times have relatively fast mean reversion, (see for example, Dragulescu and Yakovenko
[50]) compared to the one year time-frame. Unfortunately, however many interest rate
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models used in practice have dynamics that involve variations over long periods3. For
example, multi-factor affine rate models have long equilibrating periods and hence
state vectors associated with them would have an impact on product valuations. In
this case, we need to preserve the state of the system.
5.2.2 Pricing Models for the GWB for life
We now consider three different models to price GWB for life. We assume that the
underlying VA fund is invested in a mix of equity and bonds and is continuously
rebalanced to maintain a fixed proportion by value between these two asset classes.
The equity exposure is the key source of volatility in the account. We take the
relatively less volatile bonds asset class to have excess returns (over the risk-free
rates) that are log-normal and independent of the risk-free rate and equity returns
in all the models considered. For the joint dynamics of the risk-free rate and excess
equity returns, we consider three different models:
BSM model : In this we assume that the interest rates are non-stochastic and
constant and the equity returns are lognormal. Since the bond returns are
also log-normal and the VA fund is continuously rebalanced to hold a constant
proportion by value of equities and bonds, it will also have log-normal returns
in this model. Thus, we do not have any state variables in the BSM model.
SILN model : In this model, we allow for interest rates to be stochastic and use
a two factor Vasicek model, which is an extension of the model proposed by
Vasicek [113] for interest rates. We continue to assume log-normal excess returns
for equities and by extension for the VA fund.
SISV model : Here, the interest rates are modeled by a two-factor Vasicek model
as in the SILN model. In addition, we use the Heston model (see Heston [68]),
which is a stochastic volatility model for excess equity returns.
We do not consider the effect of jumps in asset prices which is sometimes important
for short-duration derivatives. However, we do not believe this to be significant for
the GWB, as jump effects are likely to be diffused out over the interval between two
epochs4. Also models that employ jumps are difficult to calibrate in practice.
3This may be an artifact of the fact that stochastic volatility models are calibrated using options,
which have a much smaller duration, typically less than a year, while interest rate models are
calibrated using instruments with substantially longer durations.
4Chen, Vetzal and Forsyth [34] report that jumps significantly increase the product price for the
GMWB. However, they add jumps on top of the diffusion process and do not attribute how much of
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The risk due to jumps in asset prices becomes significant when one is very close to
a contract anniversary, especially if a step-up is imminent. However, the probability
of such an event should be small. We refer to Bakshi, Cao and Chen [8], Biffis and
Millossovich [17] for more information on stochastic jump based models.
We now describe each of the three models presented earlier in more detail. For
notational convenience, we define an equity market index Et.
Black Scholes Asset Dynamics - BSM Model
In this section, we consider the valuation of GWB in the Black-Scholes setting, i.e.,
the risk-free rates r(t) and the equity market volatility σe(t) are known as functions
of time. Since the underlying VA fund is continuously rebalanced to hold a constant
proportion of stocks and bonds, it will also follow a geometric Brownian motion.
Further, the volatility of the returns in the VA fund will also be a known function of
time. Thus St evolves as:
dSt
St
= r(t)dt+ σ(t)dZQt (5.9)
in the risk neutral world. For brevity, henceforth we shall refer to this model as
the BSM model. As discussed earlier, the asset returns in Black-Scholes world are
independent (in fact, returns over arbitrarily small periods that are disjoint are inde-
pendent) and there is no state-vector associated with this model. Using (5.7) in this
context, we get
ln(x) = e−(λ
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n+1+r
f
n+1) ·
{
x ·
∫ ln( qn+1x )
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(qn+1
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− ez
)
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+
∫ ln( 1+qn+1
x
)
ln( qn+1x )
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∫ ∞
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(
1+qn+1
x
) (ez − qn+1
x
)
· Φ (z;µn+1, σn+1) dz
}
.
(5.10)
the increase can be attributed to an increase in the effective volatility of the diffusion process and
how much is due to the jump effects.
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Here, σ2n+1
4
=
∫ n+1
n
σ2(s)ds and µn+1
4
= rn+1− 12σ2n+1 and Φ(z;µ, σ) denotes the normal
density function for mean µ and variance σ2. For gn(x), we have a similar relation:
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.
(5.11)
We also have the boundary conditions:
lN = 0 ,
gN = 0 . (5.12)
Using the integral equations in (5.10), (5.11) together with (5.12), one can re-
cursively solve backwards for the function ln(·), gn(·). In fact, the first and the last
expectation terms in (5.10) and the last term in (5.11), can be computed using the
Black-Scholes option formulae for call, put and digital options. However, the central
term in these equations seems to render an exact closed form solution difficult, though
very good approximations can be computed quickly using interpolation.
In Section G.1 in Appendix G, we provide further details on how we use equations
(5.10) and (5.10) for numerical computations.
Remark 5.1. Note that if we had an exponential residual life distribution, i.e., λAn
were constant for n ≥ T and the risk-free rates rfn and volatilities σfn were also con-
stants, then the functions ln(·) and gn(·) would be identical for n ≥ T0 and these could
be solved using a recursive version of equations (5.10) and (5.11). Integral equations of
these kind are known as Fernholz Integral Equations of the 2nd kind. These equations
are counterparts of the equations (4.16) and (4.17) in Chapter 4. The key change
is that the boundary condition (4.11) that applied to the latter, was a consequence of
continuous step-ups and does not hold in the current setting.
Stochastic Interest Rates and Lognormal Equity Returns - SILN Model
Through this model, we consider the impact of stochasticity of interest rates of GWB
valuation. For this, we use a two-factor Vasicek Model for the short-rate, as suggested
in [39] for GAO pricing. A 2-factor model is preferred over the simpler one factor
interest rate models, because in a one factor model, all forward interest rates become
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fully correlated. The two factor model is the simplest model, which allows for a
relative movement between different points in the yield curve. The short rate model
(under the risk-neutral measure) is given by
rt = x
1
t + x
2
t + b(t) ;
dx1t = −κ1x1t + σ1dZ1t ;
dx2t = −κ2x2t + σ1dZ2t ;
< dZ1t · dZ2t > = ρdt . (5.13)
The function b(t) is deterministic and chosen so as to agree with initially observed
yield curve in the market. Our model for the equity returns is
dEt
Et
= rtdt+ σedZ
e
t . (5.14)
Zet is assumed to be independent of the factors driving the short rate. Thus, in essence
we assume that the excess equity returns are independent of the short rate process
and has a log-normal distribution. Again, as the excess bond returns are also assumed
to be log-normal and as the VA fund is continuously rebalanced, it should also have
log-normal excess returns. We will refer to this model as the Stochastic Interest Rate,
Lognormal Excess returns Model or SILN model for short. For the SILN model, the
state variable Yn is the two dimensional vector (x1,n, x2,n).
The short rate model, considered here is a Gaussian model, and entails a small
but non-zero probability of the short-rate becoming negative. A way to avoid this
problem is to instead use the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process for short rates, see Cox,
Ingersoll and Ross [44] and Duffie [51].
The Gaussian model however has the advantage that the Stochastic Differential
Equation in (5.13) has a solution, which makes valuation computations using simula-
tions much faster. More details on how this can be used for faster GWB valuations,
as well as on how b(t) is adjusted to fit the initial yield curve are provided in Section
G.1 in Appendix G.
Stochastic Interest Rates and Stochastic Volatility - SISV Model
In the SISV model, we take both interest rates and equity volatilities to be stochastic.
For interest rates, we use the same 2-factor Gaussian Model as described by (5.13) for
the SILN model. We model excess equity market retuns to follow the Heston process
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(see Heston [68]) under the risk neutral measure:
dEt
Et
= rtdt+
√
VtdZ
e
t ;
dVt = κe(θs − Vt) + ξ
√
VtdZ
σ
t ;
< dZQt · dZσt > = ρedt . (5.15)
Zet and Z
σ
t are assumed to be independent of the short rate factors. The Heston
Model is a stochastic volatility model and can capture the skew and smile effects
seen in the implied volatility curves. In addition, because of the square-root term in
(5.15), it does not allow the variance to go negative. We re-emphasize that even for
the SISV model, we assume that the excess bond returns are log-normal. Thus the
Heston model is used only to model excess equity returns5. Section G.3 in Appendix
G briefly outlines how we use the SISV model in numerical valuations of GWB.
5.3 Valuation under Alternate Withdrawal Strat-
egy
So far, we assumed that the investor continues to withdraw anually at the product
stipulated rate q, that will allow her to capture the step-ups. In reality investors
do have some leeway in selecting their withdrawal patterns and this can impact the
cost of the GWB to the insurance company. For example, Milevsky and Salisbury
[95] analyze that for the related GMWB, strategic withdrawals by investors can in-
crease the break-even fee by over two-folds over the one obtained assuming a passive
withdrawal scheme. “Optimal” withdrawal schemes usually require the investor to
take large excess withdrawals in many scenarios (see for example, Dai, Kwok and
Zong [48]). As remarked in Section 4.2, Chapter 4, we believe this is likely to be
sub-optimal in practice because large excess withdrawals incur for the investor not
only an imposition of a moderate surrender charge or an excess withdrawal penalty
by the insurance company but also possibly more severe indirect costs in terms of
tax payments. Given that the only incentive for excess withdrawals will be to save
on future GWB premium (which is typically small at few tens of basis points), it is
unlikely that in the presence of reasonably high indirect costs due to taxes, a rational
investor will make the large excess withdrawals that can hurt the insurance company
5Note that the returns on a fixed proportion by value portfolio of multiple assets do not follow a
Heston process, even when returns for each individual asset are modeled to follow one.
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severely.
Generally, excess withdrawal fees are not charged for withdrawing gains in the
contract portfolio value. Considering this and the fact that withdrawing during a
down market actually will cause the benefit payments to reset to a lower value and
is likely to be sub-optimal, we consider the following alternative withdrawal strategy
for the investor
• The investor does not take any withdrawals in Phase 1, i.e., upto the first T
years.
• In Phase 2, i.e., after time T , the investor takes withdrawals in a way so as to
sustain the guaranteed payment level set at time T .
The rationale behind this “excess withdrawals only during up-markets” is that by
avoiding any excess withdrawals that will cause the benefit base to fall, the investor
does not let the level of the guaranteed withdrawals to drop in retirement. On the
other hand, by not allowing the same to rise in Phase 2 years, the investor does
not allow the fees to rise in the up-market scenarios, where the GWB protection is
unlikely to be exercised. This is because the average remaining duration of the GWB
guarantee decreases every year, once in Phase 2 and the probability of a shortfall
given an account value that fully capitalizes the benefit base is also declining as a
result. The investor allows for step-ups to take place in the Phase 1 years, because
when in Phase 1, the average duration of the guarantee does not decrease at the next
anniversary.
The dynamics of the state variables Cn and Bn under this “dynamic withdrawal
policy” are given by:
Wn =
{
0 . . . n ≤ T ,
max(q ·Bn−1, Cn−1(Rsn − 1)) . . . n > T .
(5.16)
Cn = (Cn−1 ·Rsn−1 −Wn−1)+
Bn =
{
max(Bn−1, Cn−1 ·Rsn) . . . n ≤ T ,
Bn−1 . . . n > T .
Wn represents the withdrawal made on the n
th anniversary.
Again, if one considers a Markovian asset dynamics model with the state variable
Yn, the value of future liabilities and revenue streams under this modified withdrawal
policy at time n will be given by some functions L˜(Cn, Bn, Yn) and G˜(Cn, Bn, Yn)
respectively.
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Further, because the dynamics as given in (5.17) are again homogeneous in the
state variables, it can be easily verified that Proposition 5.1 holds for L˜(Cn, Bn, Yn)
and G˜(Cn, Bn, Yn) as well and
L˜(Cn, Bn, Yn) = Bn · L˜
(
Cn
Bn
, 1, Yn
)
;
G˜(Cn, Bn) = Bn · G˜
(
Cn
Bn
, 1, Yn
)
.
Let l˜n(x)
4
= Ln(x, 1, Yn) and g˜n(x)
4
= Gn(x, 1, Yn). Then, we have:
l˜n(x, Yn) =
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(5.17)
g˜n(x, Yn) =
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(5.18)
Relations in (5.17) and (5.18) can be used to obtain GWB valuations for any Marko-
vian model for asset price dynamics, including the BSM, SILN and SISV models
described earlier.
We now turn to a numerical analysis of GWB valuations and sensitivity analysis
under different models and withdrawal strategies.
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5.4 Numerical Results
We use the models described in Sections 5.2 to price the GWB numerically. The
values of different parameters related to GWB terms and investor characteristics are
the same as in Section 4.5 of Chapter 4 and are restated below:
Product Parameters
The guaranteed withdrawal rate q is set to 6%. The minimum waiting period W is
taken to be 3 years, and the retirement age AR to be 65 years. For computing net
value of the GWB, we will assume that the fees are charged at the rate h= 0.65% of
the benefit base per year and take a reference initial investment of C0 = 100. Thus
the net value figures that we obtain can be interpreted to have units of percentage of
sales of VAs for which the GWB for life was opted.
Investors’ Profile
We perform a valuation of GWB across a cross-section of investor ages and asset mix
choices as in Section 4.5 of Chapter 4.
• We consider investor age at inception, i.e., A to vary in the range 50 to 70 years.
• Investors choose an asset-mix for investment by selecting a level for α, which
is the exposure (by value) their VA account will have to equities. We consider
four levels for α - 20%, 40%, 60% and 80%. The balance of the portfolio will be
invested in bonds.
• Finally, we consider the average value of GWB for the insurance company for
sales across different investor cohorts and investment plans. For this, we assume
that clients’ age at inception, A, weighted by their initial investment amount
is uniformly distributed in the range 50 to 70. Further, each investor chooses
the values of α - 20%, 40%, 60% and 80% with probabilities 0.1, 0.4, 0.4 and 0.1
respectively. We refer to a portfolio of clients with the stated distribution of
age and asset-mix selection as the “meta-portfolio”.
Mortality Rates
We compute the mortality rates λn from the table published by the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PGBC) in [101]. Relevant values from this table are also
listed in Appendix F for reference. As before we use de-Moivre’s approximation to
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convert these mortality rates into hazard rates6. For sensitivity analysis with respect
to mortality we consider two cases:
• Population mortality rates shift to the right by 1 year7 to get the new mortality
rates as λ−n = λn+1, with λ
−
m =∞ for m ≥ N .
• Population mortality rates shifts to the left by 1 year to get the new mortality
rates as λ+n = λn−1.
Asset Dynamic Models
As indicated before, we use three different asset dynamic models for pricing GWB.
For each of these models, we assume that excess returns for bonds are lognormally
distributed and are independent of equity and interest rate dynamics. Also for all the
models considered, we assume that excess equity returns are independent of interest
rates. The structural parameters for various models are as follows:
BSM Model : We take the functions r(t) and σ(t) in (5.9) to be constant at 3.5%
and 20% respectively. Both numbers are annualized values. In addition, we
take the volatility of bond returns to be σb = 2%. The effective volatility of the
VA fund returns for a given level of α is then given by (4.30).
SILN Model : For the interest rate dynamics in (5.13), we use the same structural
parameter values as specified in [39] i.e., κ1 = 0.77, κ2 = 0.08, σ1 = 2%,
σ2 = 1% and ρ = −0.7. The function b(t) is deterministic and chosen so
as to agree with the initially observed yield curve in the market. To make
this comparable to the BSM model, unlike Chu and Kwok [39], who prefer to
choose an upwardly sloping curve as the initial yield curve, we use a flat initial
yield curve, γ0(t) = 3.5%. The parameter values chosen translate to about
0.63% annualized volatility in one year interest rates. This volatility would also
contribute to the total volatility in equity and bond returns. Hence, for the
accompanying equity rate dynamics as specified in (5.14), we choose a slightly
smaller value of σe, to ensure that the one-year total volatility in equity returns
is the same as that for the BSM model i.e., 20%. This value of σe turns out
to be 19.99% and is not much different from the one used in the BSM model.
We similarly adjust the volatility in excess bond returns down to σb = 1.90%
6Because we effectively use a discrete time framework with one year time steps for valuing GWB,
one year mortality rates and hazard rates can actually be used interchangeably.
7Note that this operation leads to a decrease in longevities.
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so that the total one year return volatility matches that in the case of the BSM
model.
SISV Model : Since the interest rate dynamics for the SISV model are the same
as in SILN model, we continue to use the same values for parameters κ1, κ2,
σ1, σ2, ρ and b(t) as in the SILN nodel. For the structural parameters in the
Heston model (5.15), we set their values close to those suggested by Bakshi,
Cao and Chen in [7]. In particular, we take κe = 1, ξ = 0.42, ρe = −0.75. The
values of ρe, ξ and κe basically give the volatility smile curve its shape, with
ρe primarily influencing the the skew and ξ the curvature. Various empirical
estimations of the Heston model from market data report parameter values
for ρe and ξ close to the ones that we use, see Bakshi, Cao and Chen [7, 8],
Moodley [96], Zhang and Shu [119]. There seems to be a large variation in
reported values of κe, see Dragulescu and Yakovenko [50]. The wide range of
values is indicative of the practical issues in estimating or calibrating parameter
values for sophisticated models such as the Heston model. The value of κe, that
we choose is at the lower end of this spectrum. After fixing these parameters,
we impose the constraint V0 = θ, and simultaneously adjust them so that the
Black-Scholes implied volatility8 for a 1-year ATM option, assuming a fixed
interest rate of 3.5% is 20%. This yields a value of θ = V0 = 0.0496. We again
adjust the volatility in excess bond returns down to σb = 1.90% so that the
total one year return volatility matches that in the case of the BSM model.
Additional details about computational procedures for each model are provided in
Appendix G.
Remark 5.2. In practice, estimation of model parameters for asset-dynamic models
is a challenging problem in itself, especially for complex models such as the two-factor
Gaussian short rate model and the Heston Model. These are usually computed by a
so-called calibration of the models, so that the model implied prices agree with observed
market prices of common liquid instruments. Since the number of instruments used
for calibration is typically much greater than that of model parameters, “pure” models
would rarely fit well to explain all the observed market prices. Moreover, the best-
fitting parameter values for one day are unlikely to be same as the ones the next
day. Hence model parameter values are often estimated by using both cross-sectional
8We do not consider the effect of interest rate volatilities here, but as discussed in the context of
SILN model, do not expect this to be significant.
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data of market instruments and time-series data, see Bakshi, Cao and Chen [7]. This
presents some difficulties, as while the model is indicative of asset dynamics under the
risk-neutral measure, the time series data is representative of the real world dynamics.
For the case of the GWB, this task is especially challenging, as an ideal model
should represent risk-neutral dynamics over a very long time-frame.
Finally, interest rate models and stochastic volatility models are likely to be cal-
ibrated independently in practice as they serve to price mostly non-overlapping uni-
verses of securities. An estimation of market implied correlation between the factors
driving these models is in most cases difficult because of the lack of liquid securities
having exposure to both. For our analysis here, we have ignored these complexities
of model estimations, and chosen a set of “typical” values for the more structural
parameters while choosing the values of other parameters so that the models agree on
the annual volatility of the equity index and the initial yield curve.
5.4.1 Valuation and Impact of Model Selection
We see that the choice of model used to price the GWB guarantee has a substantial
impact on the valuation. Table 5.1 shows the break-even fees while Table 5.2 shows
the net value at 0.65% fees for various combinations of investor age at inception and
asset-mix selection. As compared to the continuous step-ups and exponential residual
mortality rates framework of Chapter 4, the break even fees are much smaller and
the net value much higher. This can be primarily attributed to the discreteness of
step-ups.
Accounting for interest rate stochasticity (SILN model) substantially reduces the
valuations over the BSM model. The break-even fee for the meta portfolio increases
from 47 basis points under the BSM model to 55 basis points under the SILN model,
while the net value decreases from 3.75% of sales to 2.11% of sales. These decreases
are driven by interest rate volatility effects. Figures 5-1 and 5-2 show how respectively
the break even fee and net value for the meta-portfolio change with interest rate r for
the BSM model. As in the case of the CBSME model, the relationship is convex and
indicates that interest rate volatility will make the GWB offering more expensive for
the insurance company.
Incorporating stochastic volatility through the SISV model leads to a further
significant decrease in valuations over the SILN model. These reductions are again
uniform across all cohorts and asset mix selections. Thus stochastic interest rates and
stochastic volatilities are both significant effects in the case of GWB for life.
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Contract Specified With-
drawals
Dynamic Withdrawals
Cohort
Age
Equity
Expo-
sure
BSM SILN SISV BSM SILN SISV
20% 0.16% 0.26% 0.27% 0.16% 0.26% 0.27%
50 40% 0.29% 0.39% 0.42% 0.29% 0.39% 0.43%
60% 0.49% 0.57% 0.62% 0.49% 0.58% 0.62%
80% 0.71% 0.78% 0.83% 0.71% 0.79% 0.83%
20% 0.19% 0.30% 0.32% 0.19% 0.30% 0.32%
55 40% 0.35% 0.45% 0.49% 0.35% 0.46% 0.49%
60% 0.57% 0.66% 0.70% 0.58% 0.66% 0.70%
80% 0.81% 0.89% 0.92% 0.82% 0.90% 0.93%
20% 0.24% 0.36% 0.37% 0.24% 0.36% 0.37%
60 40% 0.43% 0.53% 0.55% 0.43% 0.53% 0.56%
60% 0.67% 0.75% 0.78% 0.68% 0.76% 0.80%
80% 0.93% 1.00% 1.02% 0.95% 1.02% 1.04%
20% 0.17% 0.26% 0.27% 0.17% 0.26% 0.28%
65 40% 0.34% 0.41% 0.44% 0.34% 0.42% 0.45%
60% 0.56% 0.62% 0.66% 0.57% 0.63% 0.67%
80% 0.79% 0.85% 0.89% 0.81% 0.87% 0.91%
20% 0.06% 0.12% 0.13% 0.06% 0.12% 0.13%
70 40% 0.17% 0.22% 0.25% 0.17% 0.22% 0.26%
60% 0.32% 0.37% 0.43% 0.33% 0.38% 0.44%
80% 0.51% 0.55% 0.62% 0.53% 0.57% 0.64%
Meta Meta 0.47% 0.55% 0.58% 0.47% 0.55% 0.59%
Table 5.1: Break-even fees under different models.
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Contract Specified With-
drawals
Dynamic Withdrawals
Cohort
Age
Equity
Expo-
sure
BSM SILN SISV BSM SILN SISV
0.20 13.47 10.90 10.52 13.40 10.74 10.37
50.00 0.40 10.17 7.63 6.63 10.01 7.39 6.42
0.60 4.86 2.42 0.97 4.75 2.24 0.82
0.80 -2.03 -4.36 -5.88 -1.89 -4.30 -5.82
0.20 10.41 7.98 7.66 10.34 7.84 7.53
55.00 0.40 7.05 4.78 3.98 6.89 4.57 3.79
0.60 1.93 -0.19 -1.21 1.82 -0.33 -1.36
0.80 -4.48 -6.49 -7.40 -4.33 -6.35 -7.34
0.20 7.41 5.35 5.15 7.33 5.23 5.04
60.00 0.40 4.14 2.35 1.84 3.98 2.17 1.67
0.60 -0.47 -2.09 -2.70 -0.59 -2.19 -2.83
0.80 -6.01 -7.53 -7.99 -5.85 -7.33 -7.89
0.20 7.20 5.89 5.71 7.12 5.79 5.63
65.00 0.40 4.90 3.74 3.26 4.69 3.53 3.08
0.60 1.57 0.51 -0.16 1.32 0.29 -0.37
0.80 -2.52 -3.52 -4.17 -2.61 -3.56 -4.26
0.20 7.49 6.88 6.74 7.42 6.79 6.67
70.00 0.40 6.43 5.82 5.32 6.21 5.59 5.14
0.60 4.57 3.96 3.13 4.23 3.64 2.87
0.80 2.02 1.43 0.41 1.67 1.11 0.14
Meta Meta 3.75 2.11 1.40 3.61 1.95 1.25
Table 5.2: Net value under different models.
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Figure 5-1: Break even fee for the meta portfolio as a function of risk-free rate for
the BSM model.
On the other hand, if investors follow a dynamic withdrawal policy, there is a
relatively small effect on valuations. The net values on the whole again decrease
when compared to those obtained under a contractual withdrawal policy assumption.
We also see that changes in the break-even fees are somewhat more subdued as
compared to the changes in net-value with a change in withdrawal policies. This
is because changing the withdrawal behavior from contractual to a dynamic policy
decreases both the payout liabilities and the revenue streams. Their net result in
this case is typically a very small increase in break-even fees. These differences are
revealed more clearly in Tables 5.3 and 5.4, which list the liabilities and revenue
streams separately. Thus, although a dynamic withdrawal behavior might not impact
net-valuation much, it still can have an important bearing on hedging. Tables 5.3
and 5.4 also show that, the revenue-stream valuations are considerably stable across
different models (with a difference of less than 30 basis points on sales.) However,
the value of the guarantee can swing by as much as 2.5 percentage points on sales.
This suggests that model selection will have an effect not only on the valuations, but
also on capital requirements for prudent risk and liquidity management.
Since, the dynamic withdrawal policy has on the whole a relatively small effect on
140
Contract Specified With-
drawals
Dynamic Withdrawals
Cohort
Age
Equity
Expo-
sure
BSM SILN SISV BSM SILN SISV
20% 4.25 7.07 7.56 4.21 7.02 7.52
50 40% 8.43 11.25 12.43 8.23 11.05 12.27
60% 15.02 17.74 19.35 14.48 17.20 18.90
80% 23.43 26.03 27.62 22.32 24.94 26.67
20% 4.28 6.94 7.32 4.24 6.89 7.29
55 40% 8.38 10.89 11.77 8.18 10.67 11.61
60% 14.53 16.88 17.93 13.98 16.31 17.48
80% 22.12 24.35 25.21 20.97 23.18 24.25
20% 4.35 6.59 6.80 4.31 6.54 6.77
60 40% 8.20 10.18 10.67 7.99 9.94 10.50
60% 13.58 15.37 15.91 12.99 14.74 15.41
80% 19.99 21.66 21.97 18.72 20.37 20.90
20% 2.55 3.98 4.16 2.52 3.95 4.13
65 40% 5.31 6.59 7.03 5.17 6.42 6.91
60% 9.23 10.40 10.97 8.81 9.94 10.61
80% 13.96 15.08 15.56 13.04 14.09 14.77
20% 0.79 1.49 1.63 0.79 1.48 1.62
70 40% 2.22 2.91 3.38 2.17 2.85 3.33
60% 4.55 5.23 5.98 4.38 5.04 5.82
80% 7.60 8.26 9.15 7.18 7.81 8.77
Meta Meta 9.58 11.40 12.09 9.21 11.00 11.78
Table 5.3: Value of insurance company liabilities from GWB for life under different
models.
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Contract Specified With-
drawals
Dynamic Withdrawals
Cohort
Age
Equity
Expo-
sure
BSM SILN SISV BSM SILN SISV
20% 17.72 17.97 18.07 17.61 17.76 17.89
50 40% 18.60 18.88 19.06 18.24 18.44 18.69
60% 19.88 20.16 20.32 19.23 19.44 19.71
80% 21.40 21.67 21.74 20.43 20.64 20.85
20% 14.69 14.93 14.98 14.58 14.73 14.82
55 40% 15.43 15.67 15.75 15.07 15.24 15.40
60% 16.46 16.69 16.72 15.80 15.97 16.12
80% 17.65 17.86 17.81 16.64 16.83 16.91
20% 11.75 11.94 11.95 11.64 11.77 11.81
60 40% 12.34 12.52 12.50 11.96 12.10 12.17
60% 13.11 13.28 13.21 12.40 12.54 12.58
80% 13.98 14.13 13.98 12.88 13.03 13.02
20% 9.74 9.87 9.87 9.64 9.73 9.76
65 40% 10.21 10.33 10.28 9.86 9.95 9.99
60% 10.80 10.91 10.81 10.13 10.23 10.24
80% 11.44 11.55 11.39 10.42 10.52 10.51
20% 8.29 8.37 8.37 8.21 8.27 8.29
70 40% 8.65 8.73 8.70 8.39 8.45 8.48
60% 9.11 9.19 9.11 8.61 8.68 8.69
80% 9.62 9.69 9.56 8.85 8.92 8.91
Meta Meta 13.33 13.51 13.50 12.82 12.95 13.03
Table 5.4: Value of revenues from GWB for life under different models.
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Figure 5-2: Net value of the meta portfolio as a function of risk-free rate for the BSM
model.
valuations, henceforth we consider valuations based on contract-compliant withdrawal
policy only.
5.4.2 Valuation Spreads Across Asset mixes and Cohort Ages
Figures 5-3 and 5-4 show that across all models, break-even fees and net-value num-
bers are significantly different for different asset mixes and cohort ages. This confirms
the findings of Section 4.5 in Chapter 4 that charging a uniform premium across all
cohorts and asset-mixes might lead to a selection bias in the investor pool. In general,
investors choosing a more aggressive asset-mix get a “better deal” on the GWB. Also,
the optimal age to select the GWB feature is around 62 years. This is the age that
has the highest ratio of years during which withdrawals can be made to the overall
GWB duration.
5.4.3 Sensitivity to Mortality rates
We next investigate how a shift in cohort mortality rates would impact GWB for life
values. For this, GWB for life valuation was done for the cases when the mortality
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Figure 5-3: Break even fee as a function of Cohort Age for different models and asset
mixes assuming contract compliant withdrawals.
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Figure 5-4: Net value as a function of Cohort Age for different models and asset mixes
assuming contract compliant withdrawals.
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rate curve was shifted in and out by 1 year to obtain the modified mortality rates
λ+n and λ
−
n respectively as described earlier in the section. Table 5.5 summarizes
the impact on valuation of the meta-portfolio in these scenarios. The numbers again
corroborate the analysis in Section 4.5 of Chapter 4. All models indicate a very high
sensitivity to assumed mortality rates.
Mortality rates
Model λn λ+n λ
−
n
BSM 0.47% 0.51% 0.43%
Break-even fees SILN 0.55% 0.59% 0.50%
SISV 0.58% 0.63% 0.54%
BSM 3.75 2.96 4.47
Net Value SILN 2.11 1.19 2.96
SISV 1.40 0.52 2.23
Table 5.5: Sensitivity of the meta portfolio value to mortality rates under different
models assuming contract compliant withdrawals.
5.5 Hedging Considerations for the GWB
Since GWB for life constitutes a financial option like guarantee whose risk cannot be
diversified away, it must be “hedged” using offsetting derivatives or trading strategies.
The mechanism of delta-hedging derivatives is a well-understood method and fol-
lows the same principle as stated in their ground-breaking paper by Black and Scholes
[18]. Naive delta-hedging however is unlikely to be effective for GWB for life.
Below we outline how one may hedge the GWB under the BSM model, which is
the simplest pricing model. Hedging with more advanced models is similar in principle
but will involve more instruments.
• Each pricing model identifies a market factor of risk. For the BSM model, the
only market factor risk directly considered by the model is the underlying VA
fund index St. This risk can be hedged against easily by taking an offsetting
position in an instrument that has similar characteristics as the VA fund, for
example a portfolio of equity index futures and other asset classes that the VA
fund invests in. The magnitude of this position is given by the delta or the
sensitivity of the GWB value to Rst , the instantaneous return in St. Delta-
hedging provides a first-order insulation and can protect value only for small
magnitudes of Rst . A higher level of protection can be achieved by gamma
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hedging, where one takes a position in another instrument so that the second
order derivative of the overall portfolio value under the BSM model with respect
to Rst is zero. Any instrument which has a non-linear dependence on R
s
t , for
example an option on a proxy for the VA fund, can be used for the purpose.
• Model parameters are obtained by a calibration process using liquid market
instruments that the model should be able to price. In addition to the model
implied risk, valuations also face a Model parameter risk which arises due to er-
rors in calibration of model parameters or the drift in their values over time as
the model is recalibrated. The BSM model has two parameters, return volatil-
ities and interest rates. The model can be calibrated by using, for example,
long term options and bonds. Model parameter risk can be mitigated by taking
offsetting positions in the calibrating instruments so that the overall portfo-
lio value is stable under small changes in the values of model parameters. If
the mis-specification in parameters, is large then this risk cannot be eliminated
completely. Also, if the overall portfolio has a high convexity or concavity with
respect to model parameters then its value will drift over time in a biased man-
ner. 9. There is significant risk due to this in the case of GWB, when the BSM
model is used. For example, the relationship between GWB values and interest
rate, as illustrated in Figure 5-2 is convex.
In the case of GWB ideally instruments that have exposure to volatilities and
interest rates over a long duration should be used for model parameter esti-
mations. A key difficulty with this is that instruments that are sensitive to
volatilities, such as options, are liquid only over short time horizons, typically
less than 2 years.
• Finally, we have the model specification risk, where the model used for pricing
does not take into account all possible risk factors or their interactions. This is
substantially high for the GWB, where dynamics of the various risk factors such
as interest rates, asset returns and their volatilities as well as the correlations
between them are difficult to model accurately. This represents an ambiguity
in model specification, often termed as model risk and is closely connected to
hedging in incomplete markets. A robust towards hedging is required to control
model related risk. Theoretical work in this field is still in its infancy, see Cont
[42].
9This could happen if the assumed model family is not appropriate for the market factor dynamics.
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Hedging GWB also requires insurance companies to manage the fluctuations in
value due to changes in mortality trends. In general, there are few liquid instruments
that are sensitive to mortalities. However, insurance companies also issue life insur-
ance policies or features like GMDB with VAs, which bear an inverse relationship
to longevities as compared to the GWB. Risk management can try to balance the
issuance of various products so as to reduce the company’s overall exposure to popu-
lation mortalities. They can get even better hedging performance, if these securities
with opposing mortality sensitivities can be marketed to the same client.
As analysis in Section 5.4 suggests, the product valuation itself is sensitive to the
choice of pricing model. Hedging strategies recommended by these models will also
be different. We also observed that the liabilities due to the GWB guarantees can
vary depending on how investors take their withdrawals as well as realized mortality
rates in the client population.
All these difficulties indicate that there is a significant level of “unhedgeable” risk
involved in underwriting the GWB.
From an execution point of view, it is also important to consider the effect of
non-linearities that arise due to the step-up feature. To illustrate this point, consider
again the example of hedging the GWB under the BSM model described in Section
5.2. Figure 5.5 shows the variation of the delta of GWB value or its sensitivity to
the return RsT over time on one particular sample path for a cohort aged 60 years
at start and with 50% exposure to equities. Note that this delta is the same as the
magnitude of the offsetting exposure that the company needs to take in a correlated
index to hedge this risk.
We see large discontinuities near contract anniversaries. This is because close to
the contract anniversary, the GWB acts like a knock-in put option if a step-up is
imminent and has a “barrier” like feature.
Remark 5.3. To understand this “barrier” nature of the GWB product first consider
a simplified scenario, when the GWB has only two more years to go and we are close
to the penultimate anniversary. In practice, the insurance company can never know
this apriori, but we only seek to illustrate the problems with delta hedging here. We
also assume that the contract and benefit values are such that a step-up is almost
certain. Note that, after the last but one anniversary the GWB product will be like a
(deep-out-of-the-money) put option. The strike of this put option will however be set
on the coming anniversary in accordance with the step-up rule. Then, just before the
anniversary, if the VA fund appreciates, the strike of the unset put option is pushed
higher - this in effect increases the cost of the GWB product. Thus, just before the last
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Figure 5-5: Variation of hedging exposure with time for delta hedging under the BSM
model.
but one anniversary, the product will have a positive delta with respect to returns on
St. However, once the anniversary has passed and the step-up registered, the product
will behave like an ordinary put option and have a negative delta. As a result, the
delta of the GWB is typically discontinuous near the product epochs when a step-up
is imminent. GWB, in this respect, is not unlike the exotic barrier options, see Carr
[30]. This discontinuity in the “delta” of GWB value poses a challenge for hedging.
The discontinuities at different points in time suggest that hedges are unlikely to
be effective at these points. Also readjusting them will need flipping large positions
and thus entail high transaction costs.
The insurance companies can mitigate this non-linearities at product-epochs to
some extent by spreading out these epochs for different investors over different dates.
This will also make the overall product less sensitive to jump risks or risks due to large
market movements. Another alternative is to use options with maturities coinciding
with GWB epochs as hedging instruments.
On the whole hedging is likely to be at best partially successful in the case of
GWB for life.
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5.6 Summary and Closing Remarks
In this chapter, we examined the GWB for life product in a realistic setting. While,
such products are exciting innovations and can be very useful for individuals and
households in planning their retirements, they pose substantial risks for the companies
that offer them. We observed that
1. On the whole, a fee of 65 basis points appears enough to cover the cost of the
guarantee, though this rests on assumptions about the distribution of investor
profiles.
2. There is insufficient price discrimination and GWB for life can be priced at below
par value for the riskiest of segments i.e., customers with imminent retirement
and choosing an aggressive investment portfolio. The product has to be either
re-engineered or priced differently for different age groups and investment styles
to avoid the risk of adverse selection.
3. Accounting for interest rate volatility and using models that imply fatter tails
for the fund returns can substantially increase the cost of the GWB for the
company.
4. Valuation of GWB has a high level of dependence on model choice. All three
models considered here - BSM, SILN and SISV can be considered in principle as
reasonable models for pricing GWB, especially since there are no comparable
securities of such duration traded in the markets. Choosing one model over
other can change valuation by more than 2% of sales, or for a typical insurance
company selling $10 billion of VAs annually, by about $200 million a year. Note
that the actual value of the product will not be realized for decades. This pricing
ambiguity poses a difficulty for investors. For regulators too, the magnitudes
of financial risk suggested by different models can be substantially different
and correspondingly lead to different requirements of ideal capitalization levels.
Hence, we believe that it is important for regulatory and accounting bodies to
recommend a standardized model for pricing GWB like guarantees.
5. Step-up feature and indexing of fees to the benefit base are effective in making
the overall product value less sensitive to investor behavior.
6. Hedging GWB is challenging because of model risk and many assumptions that
a valuation must make about investor behavior. Also, there are not enough
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liquid instruments that can be used to hedge against all the risk factors that
the GWB is exposed to.
A mitigating factor for insurance companies with respect to price differentiation
is that individuals who choose less aggressive asset mixes are likely to be more risk
averse and hence possibly also more willing to pay a risk-premium for the GWB like
guarantees. The same argument may also be used for investors who buy the GWB for
life guarantees much before their retirement and effectively pay a higher fee compared
to those who buy the same later. However this argument does not apply to investors
who enter such scheme at latter years and are seen to pay a fee much higher than the
fair amount. Moreover, the insuree’s willingness to pay is unlikely to be a determinant
of prices in the long run as the VA product space is highly competitive. Also, we find
that for the most aggressive investors, the “fair value” of the guarantees is in fact
more than the price tag in most cases and this cannot be sustainable.
There are many directions of future research with respect to the GWB to address
or quantify the issues that we described above. In particular, robust strategies to
hedge GWB, in presence of an ambiguity over value will be an interesting line of
research both theoretically as well as practically. Another interesting area of research
will be to consider the impact of a business cycle risk, where high interest rates
and bull markets are followed by bear markets and low interest rates for the GWB.
Product design or restructuring so that it has a more manageable level of risk, while
still being useful to the investors is another useful direction of investigation.
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Chapter 6
Dynamic Consistency and Dynamic
Risk and Asset Management
6.1 Introduction
Many decisions in finance involve solving Sequential Decision Problems (SDPs) under
uncertainty and require contingency planning over a multi-period horizon. In such
problems, the decision making agent is required to apply controls one at a time and
at each step more information that is previously unknown is revealed. SDPs, in
fact, also occur in a wide variety of applications outside the field of finance and are
an important subject matter of the decision and control theory. Examples include
inventory problems, adaptive control for air traffic etc.
A basic conceptual framework used to solve an SDP with uncertainty is the notion
of contingent-planning. A contingent-planning framework has the decision maker
(DM) deciding not only on the current course of action, but also on a “contingent
plan” or a schedule of decisions that will be taken in response to uncertain1 events
or information. In fact, the assertion about the “optimality” of the DM’s immediate
action rests on the assumption of her carrying through the contingent plan. If it
so turns out that as the events unfold, the DM would no longer find the initially
planned course of action optimal (or sometimes even feasible), then this leads to
a consistency issue. SDPs in which the DM can deviate from a planned course of
action are commonly referred to as “dynamically inconsistent” or sometimes “time
inconsistent”.
1But not unanticipated. When the uncertainty is revealed, it should not come as a surprise to
the DM. This means that the sample space of the uncertainty is known to the DM.
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This is referred to as an “inconsistency” because although there is uncertainty in
the system, there is no real “surprise” or unanticipated information. In that sense,
the propensity to deviate is entirely foreseeable by the DM and could have been
avoided. The issue is non-trivial because an arbitrary SDP need not be “dynamically
consistent”. In particular, in finance, as we shall discuss in Sections 6.2 and 6.4
commonly used financial metrics such as variance, Value at Risk (VaR), Conditional
Value at Risk (CVaR), when employed in a multi-period setting without due-care, can
result in dynamically inconsistent SDPs. For finance applications, as these metrics
are often linked to material provisions such as capital or ratings, dynamic consistency
has implications beyond normative or philosophical considerations.
6.1.1 Related Work
The problem of dynamic consistency has been studied in a variety of contexts. For
example, in preference theory, that traditionally deals with an agent’s preferences
between lotteries over random outcomes, the property of dynamic consistency has
been discussed extensively and a good review of some of the key concepts can be
found in Lotito [88]. Strotz [112] gives one of the first examples of dynamic incon-
sistency. Axiomatic frameworks for dynamic consistency of preferences have been
extensively studied (for example, Hammond [64], Weller [118], Cubitt [45], Karni and
Schmeidler [79], Volij [114]). These frameworks reveal that dynamic consistency of
preferences is closely connected to a Bayesian update of probabilities by the agent
and the independence axiom. These properties, with few additional assumptions,
imply that agent’s preferences have a von-Neumann Morgenstern Expected Utility
representation2. Machina [89] pointed out that, an implicit assumption in coming to
these conclusions is that past events that did not happen do not affect the agent’s
future preferences. This assumption is known as “Consequentialism”. An entirely
new axiomatic framework, which showed that non-expected utility preferences can
also be dynamically consistent in the presence of ambiguity was proposed by Ep-
stein and Schneider, [53]. In this framework, the agent has multiple priors about the
uncertainty in the system and seeks to maximize a robust (worst-case) measure of
expected utility. If the priors satisfy a certain property3, then the agent’s preferences
in this setting will also be dynamically consistent. Such preferences have typically
2See however Johnsen and Donaldson [76] for a different treatment.
3The set of priors that the agent considers should be closed under a “pasting” operation of
marginal and conditional probability laws at any time step. This property has been variously
referred to as stability, consistency, rectangularity etc.
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been suggested as a model for ambiguity aversion, see Epstein and Schneider [53],
Sarin and Wakker [107], Ozdenoren and Peck [99].
In game theory, the notion of a sub-game perfect equilibrium, also sometimes
to referred as “credible threats” is somewhat analogous to dynamic consistency. A
sub-game perfect equilibrium implies that players have no incentives to deviate from
their respective optimal strategies. See Fudenberg and Tirol [58], and Gibbons [60]
for further details.
Finally, in the context of finance, considerable work has recently been devoted
to the subject matter of risk-measures. Artzner et al. [4], Follmer and Scheid [56]
introduced a framework for respectively “coherent” and convex measures of risk, to
characterize sound decision rules for deciding whether an uncertain financial position
should be deemed acceptable or not. There has been substantial recent activity in the
literature focused that seeks to extend this notion to a multi-period setting. See for
example, Reidel, [102], Artzner et al. [5], Roorda and Schumacher [106], Frittelli and
Scandolo [57], Wang [116]. Korkmaz [81] provides a survey of the work in this field.
Since risk measures are in essence inverted preferences, it is not surprising that there
are many parallels between the notions of dynamic consistency in the context of risk
measures and the same in the context of preferences. There are also two bi-furcations
in the literature in so far as the treatment of risk - measures is concerned. The more
common “coherent risk measures”, approach as followed by Reidel [102], Artzner et al.
[5] define risk measures to be functionals on random variables or processes and then
propose criteria for dynamic consistency in terms of these functionals. They show
that the dynamically consistent risk measures are equivalent to a robust (worst-case)
expectation under a family of priors that satisfy the same rectangularity condition as
was stated in the context of preferences under ambiguity by Epstein and Schneider
[53]. In contrast, Weber [117] proposes a new paradigm of “distribution-invariant
risk measures” where risk measures are treated as functionals on distributions or
probability laws. Notice the similarity with the preference theory which is concerned
with ranking of “lotteries” or distributions. Weber [117] defines a notion of dynamic
consistency in this context and shows that it is, under additional technical restrictions,
equivalent to an expected utility based criterion.
6.1.2 Contributions
Although the notions of dynamic consistency in various contexts are analogous, they
are not strictly identical. An interesting link that connects all the notions of dynamic
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consistencies, is that they in some sense legitimize the use of backward induction or
the Bellman principle of optimality for dynamic programs, see Bertsekas, [14]. In
this chapter, we examine the problem of dynamic consistency in the context of SDPs,
i.e., we are interested in dynamic consistency of “strategies” or “plans”. See Sarin
and Wakker, [107] and Hazen, [65] for a similar point of view. Moreover, we will
motivate our discussion and framework in the context of applications in finance. In
this chapter, we will assume, that there is no ambiguity, i.e., the uncertainty in the
problem is anticipated and its distributional properties are known to the DM. Our
key contributions are:
1. We show that many natural extensions of standard one-period decision prob-
lems in finance to a multi-period setting can lead to dynamically inconsistent
SDPs. We also highlight how dynamic consistency for risk measures does not
necessarily translate to dynamic consistency for the implied strategies, when
they are used as strictly an acceptability criteria.
2. Applicability of Bellman’s dynamic programming principle or backward induc-
tion is sometimes considered to be an equivalent assertion of Dynamic Consis-
tency, see Boda and Filar [19], Sarin and Wakker[107]. We provide examples to
illustrate that dynamic consistency is actually a weaker property. Also, even for
SDPs that can be solved by backward induction, the objective V need not have
a dynamic programming representation. However, we show that in this case,
the resultant strategies can also be recovered as solutions to an SDP with a sur-
rogate objective function V˜ that is sum-decomposable across time and mutually
exclusive events and thus has a dynamic programming representation.
3. For financial applications, we suggest ways to address some of the dynamic
inconsistency related issues. In particular, we propose a new dynamically con-
sistent objective function for risk management. We also point out cases, with
concrete examples, where using a pre-commitment solution (or taking a non-
consequentialist approach) becomes appropriate.
6.1.3 Chapter Layout
In Section 6.2, we illustrate the issue of dynamic inconsistency in the context of
finance problems. In Section 6.3, we describe a formal model for an SDP and explore
the connection between the notions of dynamic consistency, backward induction and
dynamic programming. We also provide an equivalent representation for dynamically
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consistent objectives. In Section 6.4, we further discuss how dynamic inconsistency
can be mitigated for some SDPs that arise in finance. We conclude with a summary
and suggestions for future work in Section 6.5.
We now motivate the issue of dynamic inconsistency in SDPs with specific exam-
ples of problems in the finance domain.
6.2 Examples of Dynamically Inconsistent Formu-
lations
We first provide a non-technical definition of the notion of dynamic inconsistency.
We say that the formulation is dynamically inconsistent if there exist some chain A
of events with the following property. Suppose a DM solves an SDP at time 0 and
as a result obtains a plan, which gives her amongst other things a course of action
to be followed in the case event A happens, say at time t > 0. Now suppose at
time t > 0, the event A actually happens. The DM updates her SDP to reflect this
new information (e.g., by updating probabilities of future outcomes by their values
conditional on A.) and resolves the updated SDP and finds that the course of action
planned at time 0 to be taken in event A happening is no longer feasible or optimal
for the updated SDP.
We will provide a more formal definition in Section 6.3, but for the current dis-
cussion and examples in this section, this intuitive notion of dynamic inconsistency
should suffice.
Most financial problems involve investment and consumption strategies, subject to
certain risk-averseness constraints. A typical static or one-period problem, in general
may-be written as
max
y
f(W,P) ;
s.t. W = y′ · z ,
φ(W,P) ≤ α ,
s.t. y ∈ Y .
Here, for example, z could denote returns in a stock (that are random) and P, the
distribution of these returns. y the amount that the investor can invest in the stock
subject to fixed constraints represented by the set Y. Thus, W is the resulting payoff
of the strategy. The investor’s goal is to optimize a “performance -metric” functional
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f(·, ·) on the random variable W given the probability distribution P on z. The
investor must take care that the functional φ(W,P) which represents a risk-metric
does not exceed a pre-specified level α. For example, in the standard risk-reward
trade-off proposed by Markowitz [90], we have f(·, ·) ≡ E[W ] and φ(W,P) ≡ var(W ),
where both the mean and variance are taken with respect to the probability law P on
random return z.
Now, a “natural” extension of this one-period problem, in a multi-period setting
with T periods, where the DM is only interested in end-of-horizon wealth WT is
max
{ys:0≤s<T}
f(W,P) ;
s.t. W =
T−1∑
i=0
y′t · zt+1 ,
φ(W,P) ≤ α,
{y0, y1, . . . , yT} ∈ Y ,
yt is adapted. (6.1)
P now denotes the probability law for the discrete time process z1, z2, . . . zT . Also,
the optimal solution yt is now a policy adapted to the filtration on the zt process.
(6.1) is representative of a typical SDP in finance.
For most common risk metrics, including dynamic risk measures, the formulation
in (6.1) is dynamically inconsistent.
We illustrate this with the expectation operator under the probability law, a trivial
risk measure, but one that is valid as both a coherent dynamic risk measure as well
as a distribution invariant dynamic risk measure. For concreteness, we consider the
following two-stage problem and suppose there are two possible outcomes for z1: u
and d with equal probabilities 1
2
at t = 1.
max
{yo,y1}
E[exp(−W2)]
s.t. W2 =
1∑
i=0
y′t · zt+1,
E[−W ] ≤ α,
yt is adapted. (6.2)
Suppose, the optimal strategy S is such that the constraint E[−W ] = α is tight with
E[−W |x1 = u] = α −∆ and E[−W |x1 = d] = α + ∆, ∆ > 0. Then if the DM tries
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to solve (6.1) again, using the Bayes rule updated probabilities at t = 1 in the event
z1 = d, the she will find this strategy to be actually infeasible. Such inconsistency
will arise, in general with any risk measure including variance, VaR, CVaR, other
commonly used static risk measures. As, we elaborate in Section 6.3, the reason
for this can be traced to a “coupling” of mutually exclusive sub-strategies that the
risk-measure constraint causes.
Remark 6.1. So-called dynamic risk measures can lead to dynamically inconsistent
strategies for SDPs because for both coherent and distribution invariant risk-measures,
dynamic consistency of risk measures is defined in a sense similar to dynamic con-
sistency of preferences over time (see Reidel[102], Artzner et al [5] and Weber [117]
for details). These conditions do not turn out to be strong enough for dynamic con-
sistency in the context of SDP strategies. For example, Reidel [102] defines dynamic
consistency for coherent risk measures so as to ensure acceptance and rejection con-
sistency, i.e., if a random variable will be accepted (respectively rejected) at t + 1 in
all possible states of the world, then it should also be acceptable at time t. Dynamic
consistency requirements for distribution invariant risk measures as defined in [117]
are also identical and are equivalent to the following property - if a family of dis-
tributions is acceptable(rejectable), then any convex combination of the same is also
acceptable(rejectable). This is a version of the “sure thing” principle and ensures
consistency only going back in time. For SDP formulations based on dynamic risk
measure constraints, to ensure that an optimal strategy is at-least not rendered infea-
sible, one also needs to guarantee that a strategy that is acceptable at t, will also be
“acceptable” at t+ 1, in all states of the world.
The inconsistency issues in the problem (6.1), might appear obvious, but neverthe-
less are important and often overlooked. For example, Basak and Shapiro [12] solve a
version of the SDP (6.1), using VaR as the risk metric and draw conclusions based on
the optimal strategy, without recognising the essential dynamic inconsistency of the
original formulation. See Cuoco He and Issaenko [46] for further details. An implicit
assumption that can justify solving such an SDP, is that the DM would pre-commit
to the initially deviced strategy. As we discussion in Section 6.4, this assumption is
justifiable only in specific contexts. In practice, as stressed in Cuoco, He and Issaenko
[46] VaR and CVaR metrics are meant and used by institutions to manage risk in a
static context. Nonetheless, it will be useful to have corresponding risk metrics in a
dynamic setting.
A possible, resolution to the dynamic inconsistency is to avoid any risk-metric
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based constraints, and instead consider an alternate formulation where we add a
penalty term involving the risk measure to the performance metric objective4, i.e.,
we use a risk-adjusted performance metric as our objective functional.
max
{ys:1≤s≤T}
f(W,P)− λφ(W,P)α ;
s.t. W =
T∑
i=0
y′t · zt+1 ,
{y1, y2, . . . , yT} ∈ Y ,
yt is adapted . (6.3)
If one holds the level of penalty term constant over time, it can be verified that
the version in (6.3) is dynamically consistent and the “Lagrangian” transformation
does remove the inconsistency arising in the specific case of (6.2). Unfortunately,
this approach does not work, if the performance metric is derived from any of the
commonly used non-trivial risk-metrics such as variance, VaR and CVaR.
Consider, for example, the Lagrangian version of the multi-period mean-variance
problem. Markowitz [90] proposed the one period mean-variance framework for port-
folio selection in 1950. It provides an intuitive and tractable way for risk management.
The multi-period version is easily formulated as
max E[WT ]− λ
2
var[WT ] ;
s.t. WT =
T∑
t=1
y′t · xt+1 . (6.4)
(6.4) can also be considered as a quadratic utility maximization problem.
This formulation is in general dynamically inconsistent. We illustrate this through
a very simple two-period example.
Example 6.1. Dynamic inconsistency from Variance based objectives
Consider the following simple 2 period mean- variance optimization problem. Sup-
pose the investment opportunity set consists 2 assets and there are no short-selling
constraints. Asset 1 is riskless and offers no returns. Asset 2 offers a return r1 in
period 1 and r2 in period 2. We assume z1 and z2 are independent and are either u or
d, each with equal probability (1
2
). Suppose y∗0 denotes the optimal time 0 investment
in the risky asset while y∗(z1) denotes the same for time 2. Note that y∗(z1) can
4This can also be viewed as a Lagrangian transformation of the original problem.
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depend on the new information available at time 1, that is the risky asset return for
the period. It should follow that period t wealth Wt is given by
W1 = W0 + y
∗
0 · z1 ;
W2 = W1 + y
∗
1(z1) · z2
= W0 + y
∗
0 · z1 + y∗1(z1) · z2 .
Thus, our problem is to
max
y∗0 ,y
∗
1
E[W2]− λ
2
var(W2) ≡ max
y∗0
(
max
y∗1
E[W2]− λ
2
var(W2)
)
.
We note that
W2 = W0 + y
∗
0 · (z1) + y∗1(u) · 1{z1=u} · (y2) + y∗1(d) · 1{z1=d} · (z2) .
It can be verified that the optimal solution to the above problem is
y∗0 =
4(u2 + d2)(u+ d)
λ(u− d)4
y∗1(u) = −
4d(u+ d)
λ(u− d)3 (6.5)
y∗1(d) =
4u(u+ d)
λ(u− d)3 (6.6)
Note that, for the SDP to be consistent then at time step 1, we must choose control
given by (6.5) if the previous period risky return was u and that by (6.6) otherwise.
Let us now solve directly for what optimal investment policy should be at time 1.
Suppose W1 is the wealth at time 1. Then,
W2 = W1 + y
∗
1z2 .
It can be easily verified that the objective E[W2]− λ2 var(W2) is optimized by setting
y∗1 =
2(u+ d)
λ(u− d)2 . (6.7)
and is independent of the wealth W1. The value given by (6.7) is different from
that implied by (6.5) or (6.6). Thus, multi-period mean-variance optimization is
dynamically inconsistent.
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Unlike (6.2), dynamic inconsistency in the SDP in (6.4) occurs because the objec-
tive Vt itself becomes coupling due to the presence of the variance term. Note,
Vt
4
= E[WT |Ft]− λ
2
var(WT |Ft)
Hence, Vt−1 = E[Vt|Ft−1]− λ
2
var(E[WT |Ft]|Ft−1)
where we have used the standard notation Ft, to denote information known at time
t. The component var(E[WT |Ft]|Ft−1) couples together sub-strategies corresponding
to mutually exclusive events, and as we discuss in Section 6.3 makes the problem
dynamically inconsistent. It is interesting to note that versions of the basic multi-
period mean variance problem in (6.4) have been widely considered and/or solved
- for example, Chen, Jen and Zionts, [33], Li and Ng, [87], Leippold, Trojani and
Vanini, [85], Bajeux-Besnainou and Portait, [6], Basak and Chabakauri, [11]. Only the
recent paper by Basak and Chabakauri, [11], remarks on the dynamic inconsistency
issue in the underlying problem and seeks to address it by recursively defining the
mean-variance based objective function. However, the reformulated problem is not
truly dynamically consistent, but rather forced to become so by an imposition of the
requirement that optimal policies be obtained by backward induction5.
Li and Ng [87] and Leippold, Trojani and Vanini [85] actually solve a surrogate
problem, that is equivalent to the actual problem at time t = 0. The objective
function
E[WT ]− λ
′
2
E[W 2T ]
in the surrogate problem is dynamically consistent. The assumption implicit in the
solution so obtained is that of “Resolute Choice” or pre-commitment, also discussed
in Section 6.4.
Apart from normative issues, a dynamically inconsistent SDP also poses computa-
tional challenges. This is because the backward induction method, a natural “divide
and conquer” style algorithm for SDPs, cannot be used to solve a dynamically incon-
sistent SDPs. As a result even when the DM is willing to “pre-commit”, the optimal
strategy cannot be derived using backward induction.
We illustrate this link using another commonly used risk measure, the CVaR, as
an objective. CVaR ( also known as Tail Conditional Expectation, TCE) is a coherent
risk measure and satisfies certain desirable properties for a static or one-period risk
5This is equivalent to the assumption of ‘Sophisticated Choice’, that we elaborate in Section 6.4.
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metric, see Brown, [25]. CVaR is usually used in risk management in a static sense
by enforcing a constraint of the form that CVaR at a given (say 5 %) level of a
portfolio under management should stay above a recommended level. In a dynamic
setting, using a constraint that involves CVaR in an SDP will lead to the same issues
as we observed for (6.2). CVaR, however, cannot be incorporated as a penalty term
in the SDP objective either without making it dynamaically inconsistent. We again
illustrate the problems with using CVaR with a simple 2- period setting.
Example 6.2. Dynamic inconsitency from Variance based objectives Con-
sider a two period SDP with two assets one risk-free and the other risky. The agent
is free to borrow or lend and the interest rate is zero. Returns on the risky asset in
the two periods, denoted by z1 and z2, are independent and identically distributed with
the following density function f(z) :
f(z) =
{
4 . . .− 1
8
≤ z ≤ 0 ,
1
4
. . . 0 < z ≤ 2 .
The DM’s objective is to choose y0 and y1, amounts to be invested in the risky security
in periods one and two so as to maximize CVaR0.5(W2). Her SDP is given by:
max
y0,y1
CVaR0.5(W2) ;
s.t. W2 = y0 · z1 + y1 · z2 ,
|y0|, |y1| ≤ 2 .
To make the problem bounded, we have imposed a limit on the size of the position in
the risky asset that the DM can take in either period. Recall that CVaRα(W ) is defined
as E[W |W < F−1W (α)], where FW (·) denotes the cumulative density function or CDF
of W . In our example thus, the CVaR0.5 of one period return, for an investment Y
is −Y
8
, if 0 < Y ≤ 2 and −|Y | if −2 ≤ Y ≤ 0. Thus at time t = 1, as CVaR0.5
is linear, the optimal decision is to not invest irrespective of the outcome z1. By
backward induction then, the optimal decision at time 0 should also be not to invest
at all in the risky security, Thus the optimal value of CVaR0.5, obtained by backward
induction is 0. However, it is easy to construct a contingent plan that beats this
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objective. Consider the following strategy:
y0 = 2
y1 =
{
0 . . . z1 ≥ 0 ,
1 . . . z1 < 0 ,
Thus,
W2 = 2 · z1 + 1{z1<0} · z2 .
For this strategy, after somewhat tedious calculations, it can be verified that P(W2 ≤
15
16
) = 1
2
and CVaR0.5(W2) > 0. Thus backward induction fails to produce the optimal
strategy for SDPs involving CVaR.
Using similar arguments, it can be shown that Value at Risk (VaR), another risk-
metric, which is more commonly used than CVaR, also suffers from the same problem
in a dynamic setting. A somewhat complex example to illustrate this is given by Boda
and Filar [19]. While, VaR and CVaR are mostly used by financial institutions to
report short-term or myopic (typically daily) risk exposures and maybe appropriate
in this context, it is clear that a long term risk-management strategy targeting VaR,
CVaR or variance is fraught with fundamental conceptual difficulties.
To recap, so-called dynamic risk measures cannot be used as an acceptability
criterion for strategies in an SDP context. Also, if the objective function comprises
common risk-metrics such as variance, VaR and CVaR, the resultant SDP again
becomes dynamically inconsistent. Our goal for the remainder of this chapter is
to characterize objective functions that will lead to a consistent SDP. For this, we
describe a formal framework for SDPs in the next section.
6.3 Conditions for Dynamic Consistency
Over the horizon of an SDP, the DM actually solves a series of sub-problems. If an
SDP is dynamically inconsistent, then this inconsistency maybe traced to either
• An explicit change in the problem itself OR
• An implied change, through the update of probability laws.
We mainly focus on the case, where there is no explicit change to the problem,
as this can also be interpreted as a change of taste. We find that when explicit
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change is ruled out, the property of dynamic consistency is strongly connected but
not strictly equivalent to the SDP being a dynamic program. We first establish a
formal framework to describe SDPs.
6.3.1 Framework
We consider a discrete time framework with periods 1, 2, . . . , T . Decisions are made at
times 0, 1, . . . , T . Decision at time t is made after observing the information released
at time t. Mathematically, the revelation of information is modeled by a random
process adapted to a filtration Ft. Although information is new, it is not “unantici-
pated”, i.e., the sample-space or the set of all possible outcomes for the information
process is known to the DM. Also, the DM has a probability distribution on the set of
all possible outcomes. We now elaborate on each component of the formal framework.
• Randomness
– Randomness or Information in the system is denoted by the discrete pro-
cess zt, with 1 ≤ t ≤ T .
– We use Zs:t to denote the sub-sequence (zs, zs+1, . . . zt), with Z = Z1:T .
– Ft and Ωt denote the filtrations and sample spaces associated with Z1:t
respectively.
– For simplicity, it is assumed that Ω
4
= ΩT is finite and |Ω| = N . Also,
we enforce an order among outcomes to simplify notation. Thus Ω is an
ordered set {Z1, Z2, . . . , ZN}. For any subset A of Ω, the elements in A
are considered as per their relative order in Ω.
• Probability law
– The probability law considered by the agent at time t is denoted by Pt.
Since Ω is assumed to finite, Pt is specified if pit
4
= Pt(Z = Zi) is specified
∀i : 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
– If A is any event then the conditional probability law, which we denote by
AP is defined in the standard way:
Ap
i =
{
pi
P(A) , Z
i ∈ A
0 , Zi /∈ A
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Probability Update rules: Probability laws themselves evolve over time as
they are updated as new information is revealed. However, an update rule that
will yield Pt, given Pt−1 and zt is specified a-priori. The most common way to
do this is using Bayesian updates. This means
Pt+1(Zi) =
Pt(Zi, Z1:t)∑N
j=1 Pt(Zj, Z1:t)
=
Pt−1(Zi, Z1:t)∑N
j=1 Pt−1(Zj, Z1:t)
=
P0(Zi, Z1:t)∑N
j=1 P0(Zj, Z1:t)
.
Thus,
Pt ≡ Z1:tP0 (6.8)
Remark 6.2. Bayesian updates implicitly assume the principle of Consequen-
tialism (see Machina [89], Hammond [64]), which basically states that the out-
comes that cannot occur should not influence decisions or preferences. In our
setting this is equivalent to assigning zero probabilities to the events ruled out
by zt. An alternative is the non-consequentialist approach, that Machina [89]
argues can be considered as appropriate in some settings. Under the non-
consequentialist approach, probability laws are effectively never updated. As dy-
namic consistency follows trivially in this case, we consider only the Bayesian
update rule for probabilities.
• Controls
– At time t a control yt is applied after observing zt.
– yt is chosen from (a possibly infinite) domain Yt that is non-stochastic.
– Ys:t denotes the sequence (ys, ys+1, . . . , yt) with Y
4
= Y0:T .
– yt must be Ft measureable. For notational ease, we will define Y i as the
complete control sequence applied corresponding to the sample path Zi.
• Strategy
– A strategy S is a sequence of mappings from Ωt to Yt for t = 0, 1, . . . , T .
Thus, a strategy gives a recipe for applying controls adapted to Ft.
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– A strategy can be partitioned along both time and event space. Given
indices j, k and an event A ∈ Fj, a sub-strategy ASj :k is a sequence of
mappings from Ωt ∩ A to Yt for t = j, j + 1, . . . , k that agrees with S on
its domain.
– Given individual strategies S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , and an event A ∈ Ft and its comple-
ment Ac, one can construct a compound strategy {S 10 :t−1 , AS 2t :T ∪ AcS 3t :T},
in the obvious way.
– S (Z1 :t) denotes the entire control sequence response to Z1:t, i.e., the se-
quence of controls (S (·), S (Z1 :1 ), . . . , S (Z1 :t)).
– Si :j |A, will be used to denote a partial strategy, which is essentially a se-
quence of mappings from Ωt ∩ A to Yt for t = i, i + 1 . . . , j. Again, the
default value for j will be T and A must be Fi measureable.
• Objective function: At any time t, the agents objective function is given by
V (Z1, Y 1, p1t , Z
2, Y 2, p2t , . . . , Z
N , Y N , pNt |Z1:t, Y0:t−1) (6.9)
or more compactly denoted as
V (Ω, S ,Pt |Z1 :t ,Y0 :t−1 )
The “conditioning” notation in (6.9) and (6.10) is used as a short-hand to denote
the constraint that S0 :t−1 is no longer under control and is pinned to Y0:t−1 and
that the law Pt has been updated to reflect the occurrence of Z1:t. Also,
– We constrain the Objective function V to remain the same in nature over
time. This avoids the agent from having time-varying tastes, which can
trivially lead to dynamic inconsistency.
– Without loss of generality, we require that outcomes Zi and corresponding
decisions Y i, that have been assigned pit = 0 probability, cannot influence
V (· · · ) and may be dropped without any consequence.
Remark 6.3. The model presented above has the following restrictions:
• The domain of allowed control variates does not “evolve” or change stochasti-
cally and is assumed to be fixed. (i.e., there are no stochastically changing con-
straints). A general SDP may include a constraint of the form f(Z, Y,Pt) < b.
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We do not consider this case here as we seek to characterize structural proper-
ties of V for dynamic consistency. Also, as we saw in examples in Section 6.2,
such constraints typically lead to dynamic inconsistency. Our-set up is actually
general enough to include “deterministic” constraints of the nature f(Z, Y ) < b,
provided they are non-coupling or “rectangular” in nature. By this we mean that
the same constraint cannot involve two controls that have a zero probability of
being applied together. We use the more restricted setting to retain focus on the
key properties.
• The control variables yt cannot influence the evolution of uncertainty Z in our
model. This condition can be restrictive in some cases. In Dynamic Choice and
Preference theory for example, the agent’s decision problem is posed as that of
a choice between two distributions of outcomes. The proposed framework, in
general will be unsuitable to model problems of this nature6.
• The reference to an explicit information process Z may appear superfluous as
one can redefine the SDP with probability laws defined on a standardized sample
space. However, we prefer this formulation involving Z to highlight that it has a
physical significance in our setting and is used to refer to the finest measureable
sample-space. Also, it serves to easily identify information known at time t.
We now provide a formal definition of dynamic consistency in our setting.
Definition 6.1. We say a solution strategy S ∗ is an optimal dynamically consistent
policy if
• It optimizes V (Ω, S ,P0 ).
• and remains optimal at all t, no matter what the outcome so far i.e., Z1:t has
been and thus also maximizes V (Ω, S ,Pt |Z1 :t , S ∗(Z1 :t−1 )) for all t and Z1:t.
We say that the SDP formulation is dynamically consistent if all strategies that are
optimal at time 0 are also dynamically consistent as defined above for any specification
of initial probability law P0.
This definition of dynamic consistency formalizes the notion that once the DM
has solved her problem at time 0 and found an optimal strategy, she will not have
6Such a decision between lotteries maybe modeled by using an elevated uncertainty dimension.
But, in order to ensure equivalence, certain additional linearity-like properties must be imposed on
the pseudo-probabilities. See for example the Simple Reduction axiom in Lotito, [88].
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any incentive to deviate from the same. This requirement is in a similar spirit as
the notion of a sub-game perfect equilibrium in game theory. The following thought
experiment makes the analogy clearer:
• Suppose, different DMs are in charge of exercising controls at different stages of
the SDP. Figure 6-1 illustrates this schematic for a two period problem, where
there are two possible random outcomes, u and d at each stage.
Figure 6-1: Illustration of Co-ordination between DMs for Dynamic Consistency
• We refer to the DM which exercises the control at time 0 as the principal DM
or DM0. DM0 devices the optimal strategy or plan for the SDP. She then
exercises the control y0 to be applied at time 0 and instructs the DMs in charge
of implementing the subsequent controls (DM1u and DM1d, in the example of
Figure 6-1.), trusting them to follow her instructions.
• When new information is revealed, the DM that becomes active (DM1u if Z1 =
u and DM1d if Z1 = d in the example) solves her own version of the SDP
that is derived by appropriately updating the principal agent’s SDP. Dynamic
consistency then means that this DM will not have any incentive to deviate
from the principal agent’s instructions.
For dynamic consistency, then the objectives of different DMs must be aligned.
Note that, in this version of dynamic consistency, the principal DM, DM0 is allowed
to communicate “instructions” to the future DMs and co-ordinate their actions. We
can also define the following stronger notion of dynamic consistency, which does not
allow for such co-ordination.
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Definition 6.2. The SDP formulation is “strongly dynamically consistent” if the fol-
lowing property holds: Let S ∗ be an optimal strategy for the problem at time 0. Let
S ′t :T |Z1 :t , be an arbitrary optimal partial-strategy maximizing V (Ω, S ,Pt |Z1 :t , S ∗(Z1 :t−1 )).
Then the compound strategy {S ∗0 :t−1 ,Z c1 :t S ∗t :T ∪S ′t :T |Z1 :t} is also optimal for the problem
at time 0. Morevoer this holds for any values of t > 0 and Z1:t.
Strong dynamic consistency implies (ordinary or regular) dynamic consistency.
In the thought experiment, if the SDP is strongly dynamically consistent, then even
when the principal DM, i.e., DM0 cannot leave any instructions to the future DMs
about what controls they should apply, these DMs would choose the right controls on
their own accord, obtained by solving their version of the SDP. The following two-
period example illustrates that one can have SDPs that are dynamically consistent
without being strongly dynamically consistent.
Example 6.3. Suppose DM at t for t = 0, 1 solves the SDP,
Vt = −Et[(|Y1| − Z1)2] + vart(Y1).
Where, the sample space for Z1 is {1,−1} and Y0,Y1 = [−1, 1]. This formulation,
while dynamically consistent is not strongly dynamically consistent7.
Remark 6.4. For a strongly dynamically consistent formulation, at any stage, it is
sufficient to find any optimal sub-strategy and roll it back to construct an optimal
dynamically consistent strategy. Thus backward induction works in a straightforward
manner. For a formulation that is dynamically consistent but not strongly dynamically
consistent, backward induction can be used to solve for the optimal strategy, provided
one finds and considers all the optimal sub-strategies discovered during the process of
rolling back. The distinction between the two becomes moot if uniqueness of optimal
strategies can be guaranteed at all stages, i.e., there is no degeneracy.
6.3.2 Examples of Dynamically Consistent Formulations
Before, formally proceeding with an investigation of properties for dynamic consis-
tency, we examine the type of SDPs that are known to be actually dynamic consistent.
Two commonly used formulations that lead to dynamically consistent plans are:
7Note that in this example, any optimal partial strategy at t = 1 is part of some optimal strategy.
However not all combinations of optimal partial strategies are optimal.
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• Expected Utility formulation: In the framework described here, the DM’s objec-
tive function takes the form:
V (Z1, Y 1, p1t , Z
2, Y 2, p2t , . . . , Z
N , Y N , pNt ) =
N∑
i=1
pitU(Z
i, Y i) (6.10)
for some function U(·). Note that the Bayesian update of probabilities is crucial
for the Expected Utility formulation to be consistent. Weller [118] formally
shows this in the context of preference theory.
• Worst Case/ Best Case formulation: Here, the agent’s objective function takes
the form:
V (Z1, Y 1, p1t , Z
2, Y 2, p2t , . . . , Z
N , Y N , pNt ) = min
i:pit>0
U(Zi, Y i) ; (6.11)
V (Z1, Y 1, p1t , Z
2, Y 2, p2t , . . . , Z
N , Y N , pNt ) = max
i:pit>0
U(Zi, Y i) (6.12)
These formulations will be in fact dynamically consistent for any probability
update rule that continues to assign non-zero probabilities to events that are
not ruled out by zt.
Interestingly, while worst-case (or best-case) objective based measures lead to
dynamically consistent formulations, objectives which seek to maximize the 2nd
worst-case (or 2nd best-case) do not. These formulations suffer from the same
issues as problems with VaR based metrics in dynamic settings.
In some sense, the worst-case or best-case formulations are not too different
from the expected utility formulations and can be viewed as limiting cases of
the same. For example, the worst-case formulation in (6.11) will lead the same
actions as an SDP with the objective
V (Z1, Y 1, p1t , Z
2, Y 2, p2t , . . . , Z
N , Y N , pNt ) = lim
m→−∞
(
N∑
i=1
pit(U(Z
i, Y i))m
) 1
m
which is similar to the formulation in (6.10).
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6.3.3 Structural Properties of the Objective for Dynamic
Consistency
As probability laws are updated according to the Bayes rule, it is the nature of the
objective function V that will determine if the SDP is dynamically consistent. We
find that the key property for V is separability which is defined as follows:
Definition 6.3. Strong Separability: The SDP is strongly separable if the fol-
lowing condition if it satisfies the following condition: Fix Z1:t and Y0:t−1. Then the
optimizing partial sub-strategy S ∗t |Z1 :t ,Y0 :t−1 is independent of p
i, Zi, i /∈ {Z1:t}.
An SDP satisfying the strong separability condition can be solved by backward
induction and hence will be strongly dynamically consistent. Thus strong separability
is a sufficient condition for strong dynamic consistency. However, as the following
example illustrates, it is not a necessary condition.
Example 6.4. Suppose the DM seeks to optimize the following objective at time 0.
V = −E[(Y1 − Z1)2] + |Y0| · var(Y1) .
where, the sample space for Z1 is {1,−1} and Y0,Y1 = [−1, 1] This formulation
is not strongly separable as for y0 < 0 the optimal control y1 that should be applied
in the event Z1 = 1 is not independent of the control that should be applied when
Z1 = −1. The SDP however is strongly dynamically consistent.
Strong separability is a stronger condition than strong dynamic consistency as the
latter will hold under the following weaker condition:
Suppose the partial strategy S†0:t−1 is known to be optimal. Then optimizing sub-
strategy S ∗
t |Z1 :t ,S†0 :t−1 (Z1 :t )
is independent of pi, Zi, i /∈ {Z1:t}.
Thus for dynamic consistency, independence between optimizing sub-strategies corre-
sponding to two mutually exclusive events need only hold for optimal control paths.
This makes a characterization of dynamically consistent SDPs difficult, as the
above condition is difficult to verify in practice. However, as we now show, a converse
characterization which shows that all strongly dynamically consistent SDPs are in
some sense equivalent to SDPs that have strongly separable objective functions is
possible. In fact, any dynamically consistent strategy can be thought of as arising
from an SDP that can be solved by a dynamic program.
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6.3.4 Dynamic Consistency and Decomposability
Generalization of the exact structure of the objective functions that lead to Dynamic
consistency is difficult8. The following theorem however shows that nevertheless there
exists a canonical representation for objective functions that lead to strongly dynam-
ically consistent SDPs under Bayesian updates.
Theorem 6.1. Let an SDP with the objective V (· · · ) lead to strongly dynamically con-
sistent SDPs under Bayes rules for probability updates. Then, the strategies generated
by V (· · · ) are identical to those generated by optimizing an SDP with the objective
function V˜ which has the specific canonical form described below:
Let |Ωt| = Nt and Zi1:t, 1 ≤ i ≤ Nt denote the singleton elements of Ωt. Also define
Ωit
4
= Ω ∩ {Zi1:t}. Then,
V (Ω, S ,P0 ) ≡ V˜ (Ω, S ,P0) =
T∑
t=0
Nt∑
i=1
Vt(Z
i
1:t, Y
i
0:t,Ω
i
t, ΩitP0) . (6.13)
Moreover,
max
S1 :T
V˜ (Ω, {y0, S1 :T}) = max
S1 :T
V (Ω, {y0, S1 :T}) .
and hence the two SDPs attain the same optimal value.
Proof. Before we proceed with the proof, note that the above decomposable rep-
resentation follows the familiar dynamic programming setting. Xt = {Z1:t, Y0:t−1}
can be interpreted as the “state” (or history) of the system at time t and Ut =
{Z1:t∩Ω, Z1:tP0}, as the future or prospects. Thus we have a recursive value function
definition for the objective function as.
JT (XT , yT ) = VT (Z1:T , Y1:T ,P0(Z1:T ))
Jt(Xt, Ut) = max
yt
(
gt(Xt, yt, Ut) +
Nt+1∑
i=1
Jt+1(X
i
t+1, U
i
t+1)
)
(6.14)
for some functions VT (·) and gt(·).
We prove the theorem using a direct construction and induction on T . Recall
Ωjt
St :T denotes a substrategy derived from S . It is easy to see that the theorem holds
for T = 1, with V˜ = V . Suppose that the theorem holds for T = k for some k > 1.
8For example, any monotonic transformation of the objective function will preserve Dynamic
Consistency.
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We will show that it holds when T = k + 1. Consider the functions V¯ (· · · ) and
V †(· · · ) defined as
V †(Ω, S0:T−1,P0)
4
= max
S ′T
V (Ω, {S0:T−1 S ′T},P0) ;
V¯ (Ω, S ,P0)
4
= V †(Ω, S0:T−1,P0) −
NT∑
i=1
max
S ′T
V (ΩiT , {S0:T−1 S ′T}, ΩiTP0)
+
NT∑
i=1
V (ΩiT , S , ΩiTP0)
= V †(Ω, S0:T−1,P0) −
NT∑
i=1
max
S ′T |Zi
V (ΩiT , {S0:T−1(Zi0:T−1) S ′T |Zi}, ΩiTP0)
+
NT∑
i=1
V (ΩiT , {S0:T−1(Zi0:T−1) ST |Zi}, ΩiTP0) . (6.15)
It then follows that
max
{S ′T }
V¯ (Ω, {S0:T−1 S ′T},P0) = max{S ′T }V (Ω, {S0:T−1 S
′
T},P0)
= V †(Ω, S0:T−1,P0) . (6.16)
Hence, if one uses the objective V¯ in the SDP instead of V , then the set of optimal
partial strategies S ∗0 :T−1 does not change. If S
∗
0 :T−1 denotes any such partial strategy,
then, from (6.15), {S ∗0 :T−1 SAT } is optimal for the modified SDP if and only if SAT solves
max
ST
V (ΩiT , {S ∗0 :T−1ST}, ΩiTP0)
for all i. Because of the Bayesian update rule (6.8), and as outcomes with zero
probabilities do not impact V , this is exactly the same condition as each partition
component ΩiTS
A
T of S
A
T solving
max
ST |Zi
V (Ω, {S ∗0 :T−1 ST |Z i},PT |Zi1:T , S ∗0 :T−1 (Zi1:T−1))
for all i. Hence the composite strategy {S ∗0 :T−1 SAT } is also optimal for the original
SDP because of strong dynamic consistency.
Thus SDPs with objectives V and V¯ have the same set of optimal policies and
take identical values at optimality.
Now if in (6.15), we replace V †(Ω, S0:T−1,P0) by another function, say, V †1 (Ω, S0:T−1,P0)
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such that they have common optimal partial strategies S0:T−1 and the same optimal
value, then it follows that the SDP obtained with the objective function
V˜ (Ω, S,P0)
4
= V †1 (Ω, S0:T−1,P0) −
NT∑
i=1
max
S ′T
V (ΩiT , {S0:T−1 S ′T}, ΩiTP0)
+
NT∑
i=1
V (ΩiT , S , ΩiTP0) (6.17)
will also have the same set of optimal strategies and the same optimal value.
Now, note that the SDP with objective function
V †(Ω, S0:T−1,P0) = max
S ′T
V (Ω, {S0:T−1 S ′T},P0)
is itself a strongly dynamically consistent SDP with T−1 = k stages. From the induc-
tion hypothesis, then there exists a function V †1 (· · · ) such that V †1 (· · · ) and V †(· · · )
have the same set of optimal strategies and the same optimality value. Further, V˜1(·)
has the sum decomposable representation
V †1 (Ω, S0:T−1,P0) =
T−1∑
t=0
Nt∑
i=1
V †t (Z
i
1:t, Y
i
0:t,Ω
i
t, ΩitP0) ;
and
max
{S1 :T−1 }
V †1 (Ω, {y0 S1:T−1},P0) = max{S1:T−1}V (Ω, {y0 S1 :T−1},P0) . (6.18)
Using V †1 (· · · ) in (6.17), we get the following equivalent objective for the objective
V˜ of the modified SDP
V˜ (Ω, S,P0) =
T−1∑
t=0
Nt∑
i=1
V †t (Z
i
1:t, Y
i
0:t,Ω
i
t, ΩitP0) −
NT∑
i=1
max
{S ′T}
V (ΩiT , {S0 :T−1 S ′T}, ΩiTP0)
+
NT∑
i=1
V (ΩiT , {S0:T−1S ′T}, ΩiTP0)
=
T−1∑
t=0
Nt∑
i=1
V †t (Z
i
1:t, Y
i
0:t,Ω
i
t, ΩitP0)−
NT∑
i=1
max
Y iT
V (Zi1:T , Y
i
1:T−1, Y
i
T , ΩiTP0)
+
NT∑
i=1
V (Zi1:T , Y
i
1:T , ΩiTP0) ,
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which is of the desired form.
Also, from (6.16), (6.17) and (6.18), it follows that
max
S1 :T
V˜ (Ω, {y0, S1 :T}) = max
S1 :T
V (Ω, {y0, S1 :T} ).
The formulation in (6.14) is strongly separable.
We have thus established that every dynamically consistent optimal strategy can
be thought of as to arise from a strongly separable formulation. Moreover, the for-
mulation has a sum decomposable representation as described in the statement of the
theorem.
The above result shows that there exists an interesting relationship between
strongly dynamically consistent formulations and formulations that can be solved
using Bellman’s principle and dynamic programming. Dynamic programming is ba-
sically an algorithmic trick that is used in deterministic problems as well, such as the
shortest path problem when the problem is decomposable.
The essential requirement for strong dynamic consistency over time is then that
optimal controls corresponding to mutually exclusive events can be obtained inde-
pendently of each other, thus negating the need for a “co-ordination” amongst DMs
at different stages. Note that in all the examples presented in Section 6.2 which suf-
fered from dynamic inconsistency, the principal DM needed to co-ordinate strategies
of the future DMs, even when these strategies would never be simultaneously exe-
cuted on any sample path. This happened because either the objective or some of
the constraints were “coupling”.
6.4 Dynamic Consistency and Dynamic Risk and
Asset Management
In the last section, we examined the problem of dynamic consistency for a general
SDP and the relationship between dynamic consistency and objective functions. The
dynamic inconsistency of commonly used financial metrics - variance, VaR, CVaR,
Sharpe Ratio, when used as or part of objective functions can thus be easily traced to
the fact that they are “non-separable” across disjoint events. Distribution invariant
dynamic Risk-measures are representable as expected value of shortfall risk and these
lead to dynamically consistent objectives. Dynamic coherent risk measures that are
not of the expected value type have been proposed by Hardy and Wirch [103], Roorda
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and Schumacher [105], Artzner et. al [5]. An example is the iterated CVaR (iCVaR).
These risk-measures do not have a simple representation however and can only be
defined recursively. The definition thus depends on the number of time-steps or
discretization level used.Note that the iterated VaR measure proposed in Cheridito
and Stadje [35] has similar drawbacks besides being not coherent. Expected utility
or expected shortfall then appear to be the most reasonable choices of performance
metrics if dynamic consistency of strategies is desired.
We propose another alternative - Use expectations with respect to a probability
law distorted in a dynamically consistent fashion e.g.,
V =
N∑
i=1
(pi)αU(Zi, Y i).
If α < 1, then effectively, this distorted measure will re-emphasize tail or extreme
events. The function U(·) maybe chosen so as to ensure that tail events with negative
risk are de-emphasized, e.g, by making it a shortfall function. It can be verified rela-
tively easily that this objective will lead to dynamically consistent SDPs with Bayesian
updates. Note, however this objective function is not “distribution-invariant” w.r.t.
to U(Zi, Y i) treated as a random variable. This does not create any difficulty in our
setting as each state has a distinct identity. Such a risk measure may also be defined
for an intermediate evaluation, on partial sequences Z1:t and Y0:t. Note the similarity
with and differences from the distortion idea introduced by Choquet, [37].
Practically speaking, however, that use of VaR and variance and Sharpe-ratio in
or as performance metrics is widespread in practice. We now consider how dynamic
inconsistency issues that may result from their use maybe dealt with. One approach
would be to use them in a static sense as indicated in Cuoco, He and Issaenko [46].
However, this would not help in modeling risks related to terminal positions.
We again use the DMs at different time and stages viewpoint in the following
discussion to emphasize the compromises that need to be made when faced with
dynamically inconsistent SDPs. Dynamic inconsistency essentially means that it is
impossible to satisfy all these DMs simultaneously and in all eventualities.
There are three possible courses of action when dealing with dynamic inconsis-
tency, (see Lotito, [88], Machina, [89], McClennen, [92]).
Myopic Choice: Ignore the fact that the SDP is dynamically inconsistent. Re-solve
the problem every time period and implement only the current strategy found
to be optimal for the period of interest. This is essentially the idea behind
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Rolling Horizon optimization and is often used in engineering. This is probably
most undesirable as the resulting strategy will be sub-optimal for all the DMs
in our setting.
Sophisticated Choice: Anticipate the dynamic inconsistency and implement cur-
rent controls in a way that compensates for future dynamic inconsistency that
is foreseeable. This effectively amounts to using Backward Induction to solve
the Sequential Decision Problem. In our setting, this is a game-theoretic or a
Nash-equilibrium solution between different DMs at different stages.
Resolute Choice: Forego solving the problem every period and commit to im-
plement the optimal strategy obtained initially in all periods without resolv-
ing the problem in subsequent periods. This is tantamount to taking a non-
consequentialist view point and to never update the pseudo-probability weights
initially assigned even in face of new information. See how γ-people behave as
in [89]. In this case the objective of DM at time 0, the principal agent takes
priority over all other DMs.
In the context of preference theory, Machina [89] presents normative arguments
and examples supporting the rationale for an agent to adopt a non-consequentialist
approach arguing that events that did not or cannot happen represent risk that has
been borne and must continue to be accounted for. We give a concrete and real life
example here adoption of such a non-consequentialist approach can be objectively
justified.
When is ignoring New Information appropriate?
The question whether to use a consequentialist(Bayesian) or non-consequentialist(none)
approach for probability updates depends on the actual objective that the SDP is a
model of. To illustrate let us take the example of an asset manager with a high turn-
over portfolio. The manager’s performance will be eventually judged by analysts by
a measurement of the Sharpe-ratio of her returns over several well-defined trading
horizons. The manager, who is aware of this criterion then should naturally seek to
optimize this Sharpe-ratio and can device a dynamic asset allocation strategy with
‘Sharpe-Ratio’ as the objective at the beginning of a trading horizon. While a legit-
imate modeling objective, it is relatively easy to check that the Sharpe-ratio which
is the ratio of expected annual return and its standard deviation is a non-separable
objective and hence will lead to dynamic inconsistency with Bayesian updates. The
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manager can use a surrogate objective that is dynamically consistent, but that will
be sub-optimal.
Suppose we also assume that the manager does not perceive liquidity or bankrupt-
cies related risk to be significant and thus can expect to be in business for a large
period and that the market performance over different trading horizons is indepen-
dent and identically distributed. We argue that in this case, it is appropriate for the
manager to take up as her objective, Sharpe-ratio of the return at the end of the
horizon, with a non-consequential approach for updating probabilities. Informally,
this resolute choice strategy chooses that distribution of end-of-period returns that
has the maximum Sharpe-ratio amongst all the feasible distributions. With large
number of independent samples, this will give the manager the optimal performance
metric.9
In this context, both Sophisticated Choice and Myopic Choice Strategies, insofar
as they are distinct from Resolute Choice will be “sub-optimal”. While the non-
consequentialist approach used here may also be interpreted as accounting for risk
already borne in the sense of [89], in essence what justifies this policy is the fact that
1. the objective is measured over well-defined time horizons and
2. there will be repeated trials of the same strategy
We believe that these two factors are key to validating a non-consequentialist or
disciplined approach of being committed to the original plan even in light of new
information, as the strategy is targeting a distribution profile.
Note that if returns corresponding to different trading periods were used to mea-
sure the manager’s performance then the measured Sharpe-ratio is likely to be much
worse than the blocks that were optimized for. 10 Also, we have only resolved the
issue of what problem the asset manager should seek to solve. Solving for optimal
dynamic strategy for a non-separable objective is a computationally challenging task
but not the subject-matter of discussion here.
Such a non-consequentialist approach cannot be considered appropriate however
for all dynamically inconsistent SDPs. Consider the modeling objective for risk man-
agement, which is to guard a firm against events that are likely to be catastrophic or
of end-game nature. Through risk management while recognizing that eliminating a
9Strictly speaking, the manager should seek to maximize the asymptotic statistical estimator of
Sharpe-ratio.
10This would mean that for an investor seeking to invest in the firm, the time of entry or exit into
the fund may now become relevant to its performance! This is more a criticism of the performance
metric used.
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severe risk scenario might be too expensive or impossible, the DM seeks to limit the
possibility of the same to a reasonable level. If such an undesirable event does occur,
it is likely to change the playing field for the DM completely. Thus the criterion of
repeated trials of a strategy fall through.
To illustrate this idea in the context of dynamic risk management, using VaR
limits, consider a hypothetical case of a day-trader devicing a strategy to maximize
returns over a horizon of T periods. The risk that the manager wants to guard herself
against is that of a large downward swing in the end-of-the day net value11. To keep
things simple, we assume that the manager can trade only once during a period in N
different assets. The period t gross return vector is denoted by Rt. Let Wt denote the
net value of the funds holdings at time t, while Xt the holdings in individual assets.
We assume no transaction costs. This problem is typically posed as
max
Xt:0≤t≤T−1
E[WT ] ;
s.t. Wt = X
′
t−1Rt +Wt−1, 1 ≤ t ≤ T ,
VaRα(Wt) > W0(1− β) . (6.19)
Here VaRα(X) denotes the α percentile in the distribution of X, i.e., if FX(·) denotes
the CDF of X then VaRα(X) = infx{x : FX(x) ≥ α}. β denotes the maximum draw-
down and α a level of risk the manager is comfortable taking and is related to her
risk-averseness. The VaR related constraint, as it is coupling, will lead to dynamically
inconsistent solutions under Bayesian updates. Further, as we argued earlier taking
a non-consequentialist approach in this scenario is inappropriate. Also, as VaR, is
dynamically inconsistent as an objective, dualizing the constraint or penalizing it will
not solve the issue as well. A possible way to tackle this problem is to consider the
equivalent problem (6.21)
max
Xt:1≤t≤T
E[WT ] ;
s.t. Wt = X
′
t−1Rt +Wt−1, 1 ≤ t ≤ T ,
Pr(WT < W0(1− β)) < α . (6.20)
and converting this constraint to a penalty as in a Lagrangian approach. The new
11For example, this might lead to a margin call
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problem can be posed as
max
Xt:1≤t≤T
E[WT ]− λE[1WT<W0(1−β)]
s.t. Wt = X
′
t−1Rt +Wt−1, 1 ≤ t ≤ T . (6.21)
This formulation though dynamically consistent is not equivalent to the original,
but poses the manager’s problem much more transparently. The formulation raises
the question about what an appropriate value of multiplier λ should be. In principle,
answering this question should be no more difficult than choosing “sensible” values
of α. Indeed, if one had a target level of α available, then λ can be appropriately
tuned to attain those or better risks of draw-downs at optimum12. The penalty based
formulation also offers a much more straightforward interpretation. In this case it
should be simply interpreted as a trade-off between cost of excessive large draw-down
e.g., say a margin call or risk to credit perception, for a marginal increase in expected
gains. Note that, if risk related to intermediate positions is of concern, then it can
be addressed in a similar way.
Ideally, one would like to switch to a Dynamically Consistent Objective and for-
mulation whenever possible. Managers or DMs often do not control the performance
metrics on which they will be measured. It is in general difficult to promote or evan-
gelize a new industry standard because of legacy reasons. For example, expected
utility framework has been around for years but has never been a popular measure
to rate managers on asset or risk management.
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied the issue of dynamic inconsistency for general Sequential
Decision Problems(SDPs). The issue is of particular importance in finance as many of
the commonly used performance as well as acceptability criteria, can lead to dynamic
inconsistency unless employed carefully. We provided several simple but illustrative
examples for the same.
We then studied the general SDP framework and investigated the conditions that
an objective function must satisfy in order to lead to a dynamically consistent for-
mulation. In this context, we noted that dynamic consistency is almost equivalent
to correctness of dynamic programming implied solutions. We also showed that any
12The strategy implemented in that case will be the same as the optimal pre-commitment strategy
for (6.19).
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dynamically consistent strategy can be thought of as arising from an objective that is
sum-decomposable over time and mutually exclusive events. Based on these insights,
we also proposed an alternate class of performance metrics based on shortfall expec-
tation with respect to probabilites distorted by a suitable power factor. These can be
used to emphasize tail events, the same rationale behind the VaR and CVaR metrics,
while being dynamically consistent.
We then discussed how a DM faced with dynamically inconsistent SDPs may
cope with this inconsistency. In certain cases, it may be reasonable for the DM to
take a non-consequentialist approach and follow a pre-committed strategy. Some
dynamically inconsistent formulations can be made consistent by rephrasing.
Many interesting directions are possible in this line of research. On the framework
side, corresponding conditions for dynamic consistency for an infinite sample space
would be an important extension of results. Another extension possible will be to
consider the effect of ambiguity in probability distributions over the set of states, as
in practice the probability distribution is almost never known precisely and the SDP
goal is to find that strategy that works reasonably well for all classes of probabil-
ity distributions in a family. If dynamic consistency, is a desirable property in this
setting, then it will be interesting to see, what additional conditions on the SDP fram-
ing (besides separability across mutually exclusive events) are needed to guarantee
dynamic consistency.
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Chapter 7
Summary and Closing Remarks
We examined three different topics in financial modeling. The topics, though diverse,
together illustrate the power as well as limitations of modeling, which is at the heart of
Operations Research and separates it from pure mathematics and computer science.
For Employee Stock Options, we noted that, by not considering an employee’s
stock option portfolio holistically, traditional models can leave out a significant de-
terminant of employee’s exercise policies and thus indirectly its cost to the employer.
Augmenting the models to incorporate this effect allows us to get an insight on the
nature of this impact. As we studied in Chapter 2, the impact is in general to make
the cost of a portfolio smaller than the sum of its parts. The models also show that
issuance of new ESOs, if unanticipated by the employee, can have the surprising ef-
fect of changing the costs associated with the unexercised ESOs that the employee
possesses. Though useful to generate these insights, the model is not very useful from
an implementation viewpoint.
A different approach, based on risk-management and portfolio optimization pre-
sented in Chapter 3, allowed us to jointly model exercise behavior of multiple ESOs
for an employee, while being amenable to computation. The risk-management based
model agrees at a basic level with traditional models in prioritizing options for exer-
cises and is based on an intuitive criterion of ranking options on the basis of a pseudo
Sharpe ratio. This suggests another related model for exercise behavior, which while
making option exercises independent, allows us to get closed-form bounds on their
cost to the company.
An interesting and useful direction of research in this context will be to explore
how exercise behavior predicted by these models compares to empirically observed
behavior and quantifying their impact on pricing. Further refinement of models and
strategies to hedge out the cost of ESO at the onset are other possible research
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directions.
We then analysed the GWB for life options in Chapters 4 and 5. Though, in wide
use in the Variable Annuity (VA) space, a systematic understanding of this implied
feature has only recently begun in the literature. We proposed and analysed a contin-
uous time version of this product, with simplifying assumptions on residual mortality
rates of the investor population in Chapter 4. The model, though cannot be used for
pricing such schemes in real-life, provided useful insights in the key determinants and
risk-factors for valuations. What is troubling for the GWB series of products, is that
the models typically used for pricing securities would tend to disagree significantly
on valuations as we saw in Chapter 5. The combination of this price ambiguity as
well as several un-hedgeable factors such as investor behavior, imply that even with
“hedging”, GWB for life products will entail significant risk. Also, we observed that
the product has insufficient price discrimination and is subject to adverse selection.
Our findings suggest that regulators and investors must lay down standards for
valuation of complex securities like GWB. It will be useful to have a sound and
practically useable framework to describe the risk in option pricing due to model
ambiguity. More specific to the GWB, interesting directions of research include how
one can possibly re-design the product to make it less prone to adverse selection as
well as adverse dynamic behavior by investors so that it is not “gamed”. Another
possible direction is applying revenue management ideas to this product and find the
right pricing premium for GWB given an individuals risk-averseness to financial and
longevity risks.
The issue of dynamic inconsistency, as discussed in Chapter 6 seems almost per-
vasive in finance. It appears that criteria beyond expected utilities, will either be
intractable or run into issues related to dynamic inconsistencies. We presented an
alternative family of criteria in terms of expectations with respect to distorted state
probabilities. These objectives emphasize extreme events while preserving dynamic
consistency. The dynamic consistency issue is more severe when dealing with “chance
guarantees”. In essence, chance guarantees are by and large inconsistent in a dynamic
setting, unless accompanied by a description of circumstances in which they will hold
or fail.
It will be interesting to extend and examine the results presented to settings with
infinite and uncountable sample-space. Effective risk and performance metrics in a
dynamic setting that are easy to use and implement in practice will be a great tool
in financial modeling but seem difficult to find.
From a broader perspective, although a general evaluation of modeling frame-
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works is difficult, the problems considered in this thesis highlight the importance of
“commonly accepted good modeling principles” - they should incorporate key de-
terminants of the problem, be solveable for real life use and be theoretically sound.
Often, for complex examples, it is difficult to find a single model that will account
for all nuances and complexities of the real-life problems and be still computationally
solveable. We believe a robust framework that will allow a decision maker to simulta-
neously consider actionable recommendations from a family of models and choose the
most desireable one, so as to minimize unpleasant surprises, will be useful in most ap-
plication settings. Development and analysis of the efficacy of such a “Robust Model
Optimization” framework in concrete settings will be an exciting and useful research
avenue in the field.
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Appendix A
Relative Order of ESO Exercises
In this appendix, we illustrate a simple example, where the order of exercise as stated
in Lemma 2.5 can be violated for a ‘consumption’ type utility model. The Employee’s
exercise problem is formulated in the same spirit as the model suggested in [75]. More
concretely, the exercise policy is obtained as a solution to the following optimization
problem.
max E
[
T∑
t=1
U(t, Pt)
]
Pt =
N∑
i=1
xi,t(St −Ki)+ (A.1)
xi,t is Ft −measurable.
T∑
t=0
xi,t = αi . . . 1 ≤ i ≤ N
xi,t = 0 if t < Vi or t > Ti (A.2)
Now consider, the following simple instance of this problem, where the employee has
two types of ESOs, i.e., N = 2, with strikes K1 = 70, K2 = 90.Both options are
already vested and have common expiry T = 1. The grant size α1, α2 are each
100. The current stock price S0 = 100 and the employee believes that the stock
price at T = 1 could be either 80 or 120 with equal probability 1
2
. Also, we take
U(0, P ) = U(1, P ) = ln(10 + P ). The employee’s exercise problem for this case can
be written as
max ln(30x1 + 10x2 + 10) +
1
2
ln(10 + (100− x1)10) + 1
2
ln(10 + (100− x1)50 + (100− x2)30)
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The optimal solution to this problem is x1 = 33.47, x2 = 100. Thus, in this
case all options with the highere strike i.e., strike 90, are in fact exercised before the
options with a lower strike 70 are exhausted.
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Appendix B
Supplementary Results for
Chapter 3
We will find it useful to employ the following property of normal distributions. The
property can be verified numerically, but for completion we provide a proof.
Lemma B.1. The function g(x)
4
= Φ(x)
N(x)
+ x is increasing in x.
Proof. Consider
g′(x) = 1−
(
Φ(x)
N(x)
)2
−
(
Φ(x)
N(x)
)
xΦ(x)
=
1
N2(x)
(
N2(x)− xN(x)Φ(x)− Φ2(x))
=
1
N2(x)
p(x) where,
p(x)
4
= N2(x)− xN(x)Φ(x)− Φ2(x) . (B.1)
⇒ p′(x) = N(x)Φ(x) + xΦ2(x) + x2N(x)Φ(x) (B.2)
= Φ(x)h(x), where,
h(x)
4
= N(x) + xΦ(x) + x2N(x) . (B.3)
⇒ h′(x) = 2Φ(x) + 2xN(x) (B.4)
⇒ h′′(x) = 2N(x) > 0 . (B.5)
Now from (B.4) and (B.3) respectively, limx→−∞ h′(x) = 0 and limx→−∞ h(x) = 0.
Hence h(x) ≥ 0 and consequently p′(x) ≥ 0 using the definition in (B.3). Once again
we have limx→−∞ p(x) = 0. Thus p(x) ≥ 0 or equivalently g′(x) ≥ 0 ∀x using (B.1).
This completes the proof.
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Lemma B.2. The function C
σSδ
is increasing in S.
Proof. Note that,
C
Sδ
= 1− Ke
−rTN(d− σ√T )
SN(d)
= 1− e 12σ2T e
−σ√TdN(d− σ√T )
N(d)
where d as before is given by d =
ln S
K
σ
√
T
+ ( r
σ
+ σ
2
)
√
T . Since d is an increasing function
of S, it suffices to show that f(d) = e
−σ√TdN(d−σ√T )
N(d)
is decreasing in d to prove the
lemma. Now
f ′(d) =
e−σ
√
Td
(N(d))2
(
N(d)Φ(d− σ
√
T )− σ
√
TN(d)N(d− σ
√
T )−N(d− σ
√
T )Φ(d)
)
=
e−σ
√
TdN(d− σ√T )
N(d)
((
Φ(d− σ√T )
N(d− σ√T ) + (d− σ
√
T )
)
−
(
Φ(d)
N(d)
+ d
))
Here Φ(x) denotes the normal density function. Hence, to show that f(d) is
decreasing it suffices to show that the function g(x)
4
= Φ(x)
N(x)
+ x is increasing in x.
This was proved in Lemma B.1 in Appendix B
Corollary B.1. The delta-barrier function B(S,K, τ) = C−E
σSδ
achieves its peak at
S = K.
Proof. From Lemma 3.2, we know that B(S,K, τ) is decreasing in S for S > K. For
S < K, B(S,K, τ) = C
σSδ
and this function was shown to be increasing in S in Lemma
B.2. Hence it follows that the delta-barrier achieves its maxima at S = K.
Corollary B.2. The lower bound function to Cν, Cν− = (C − νσSδ)+ is increasing
in S.
Proof. We only consider the case when S is such that C − νσSδ ≥ 0, as the other
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case is trivial. Consider S ′ > S. By Lemma B.2
C(S ′, K, τ)
σS ′δ(S ′, K, τ)
≥ C(S,K, τ)
σSδ(S,K, τ)
⇒ C(S
′, K, τ)− νσS ′δ(S ′, K, τ)
σS ′δ(S ′, K, τ)
≥ C(S,K, τ)− νσSδ(S,K, τ)
σSδ(S,K, τ)
⇒ C(S ′, K, τ)− νσS ′δ(S ′, K, τ) > C(S,K, τ)− νσSδ(S,K, τ)
. . . since, ( C(S,K, τ)− νσSδ(S,K, τ) > 0
and S ′δ(S ′, K, τ) > Sδ(S,K, τ) > 0 )
Corollary B.3. At T ′ = T − TN , where T ′ is defined as in the proof of Lemma 3.4,
C − νσSδ > 0 ⇐⇒ S > K .
Proof. The property follows directly from Lemma B.2 and the fact that at T ′, C
σSδ
= ν
for S = K.
Lemma B.3. For T ′ = T − TN , where T’ is as defined in the proof of Lemma 3.4,
E[e−rT ′(CT ′ − νσST ′δT ′)+]
= C0 − νσS0δ0
+Ke−rTN2
(
d(S0, K, T )− σ
√
T ,−d(S0, K, T ′) + σ
√
T ′,−
√
T ′
T
)
−(1− ν)S0N2
(
d(S0, K, T ),−d(S0, K, T ′),−
√
T ′
T
)
.
where, d(S,K, T ) =
ln( S
K
)
σ
√
T
+ ( r
σ
+ σ
2
)
√
T and N2(x, y, ρ) = Pr(X ≤ x, Y ≤ y), where
X, Y are two jointly normal random variables, with variances 1 and correlation ρ.
Proof. We know by definition that at , C(K,K, T − T ′) = νσKδ, at S = K. Using
191
the result proved in Corollary B.3 then,
E[e−rT ′(CT ′ − νσST ′δT ′)+] = E[e−rT ′(CT ′ − νσST ′δT ′);ST ′ ≥ K]
= E[e−rT ′(CT ′ − νσST ′δT ′)] + E[e−rT ′(νσST ′δT ′ − CT ′);ST ′ < K]
= C0 − νσS0δ0 + E[e−rT ′e−rTNKN(d− σ
√
TN);ST ′ < K]
−(1− νσ)E[e−rT ′ST ′N(d);ST ′ < K]
= C0 − νσS0δ0 +Ke−rTE[N(d− σ
√
TN);ST ′ < K]
−(1− νσ)E[e−rT ′ST ′N(d);ST ′ < K] (B.6)
where, we use d = d(ST ′ , K, TN).Now,
Let us define z0, z1 as follows,
z0
4
=
ln(
ST ′
S0
)
σ
√
T ′
− ( r
σ
− σ
2
)
√
T ′
z1
4
=
ln( ST
ST ′
)
σ
√
TN
− ( r
σ
− σ
2
)
√
TN
Thus,
ST = S0e
(r− 1
2
σ2)T eσ
√
T ′z0+σ
√
TNz1 .
E[N(d− σ
√
TN);ST ′ < K]
= Pr(ST > K,ST ′ < K)
= Pr(σ
√
T ′z0 + σ
√
TNz1 > −lnS0
K
− (r − 1
2
σ2)T, z0 ≤ −d(S0, K, T ′) + σ
√
T ′)
= Pr
(
−
√
T ′
T
z0 −
√
TN
T
z1 < d(S0, K, T )− σ
√
T , z0 ≤ −d(S0, K, T ′) + σ
√
T ′
)
= N2
(
d(S0, K, T )− σ
√
T ,−d(S0, K, T ′) + σ
√
T ′,−
√
T ′
T
)
192
Now,
E[e−rT ′ST ′N(d);ST ′ < K]
=
∫ −d(S0,K,T ′)+σ√T ′
−∞
e−rT
′
S0e
(r− 1
2
σ2)T ′+σ
√
T ′z0 ×
N
(
lnS0
K
σ
√
TN
+
√
T ′√
TN
z0 + (
r
σ
− σ
2
)
T ′√
TN
+ (
r
σ
+
σ
2
)
√
TN
)
Φ(z0)dz0
= S0
∫ −d(S0,K,T ′)+σ√T ′
−∞
N
(
lnS0
K
σ
√
T ′
+
√
T ′√
TN
z0 + (
r
σ
− σ
2
)
T ′√
TN
+ (
r
σ
+
σ
2
)
√
TN
)
Φ(z0 − σ
√
T ′)dz0
= S0
∫ −d(S0,K,T ′)
−∞
N
(
lnS0
K
σ
√
TN
+
√
T ′√
TN
z + (
r
σ
+
σ
2
)
T ′√
TN
+ (
r
σ
+
σ
2
)
√
TN
)
Φ(z)dz
= S0
∫ −d(S0,K,T ′)
−∞
N
(
lnS0
K
σ
√
TN
+
√
T ′√
TN
z + (
r
σ
+
σ
2
)
T√
TN
)
Φ(z)dz
= S0
∫ −d(S0,K,T ′)
−∞
Pr
(
Z −
√
T ′√
TN
z ≤ ln
S0
K
σ
√
TN
+ (
r
σ
+
σ
2
)
T√
TN
)
Φ(z)dz
= S0
∫ −d(S0,K,T ′)
−∞
Pr
(√
TN√
T
Z −
√
T ′√
T
z ≤ ln
S0
K
σ
√
T
+ (
r
σ
+
σ
2
)
√
T
)
Φ(z)dz
= S0N2
(
d(S0, K, T ),−d(S0, K, T ′),−
√
T ′
T
)
Hence, from (B.6),
E[e−rT ′(CT ′ − νσST ′δT ′)+]
= C0 − νσS0δ0
+Ke−rTN2
(
d(S0, K, T )− σ
√
T ,−d(S0, K, T ′) + σ
√
T ′,−
√
T ′
T
)
−(1− νσ)S0N2
(
d(S0, K, T ),−d(S0, K, T ′),−
√
T ′
T
)
. (B.7)
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Appendix C
Illustration of GWB Product
Evolution
Table 4.5 shows the evolution of a GWB contract over the life of an individual in a
hypothetical scenario for the model described in Section 4.2 of Chapter 4. We take
the GWB parameters as follows - guaranteed withdrawal rate q = 6%, minimum
waiting period W = 3 years, retirement age AR = 65 years, and fee rate h = 0.65%.
In this example, the investor opened a VA account with GWB for life feature at the
age of 60 with an investment of 100,000. The investor could not take any withdrawals
before reaching age 65 or for a waiting period of 3 years whichever is later, which is
the first 5 years in this case. At each anniversary, the benefit base is stepped up
to the contract value if it falls below the same. The investor is guaranteed to be
able to withdraw upto 6% every year beginning the 6th anniversary. Withdrawals are
deducted from her VA account until it drops to zero, after which, the shortfall is met
by the company. If the withdrawals during any year exceed this amount then the
benefit base is reset. Fees amounting to 65 basis points of the benefit base are paid
(separately) to the insurance company by the investor every year.
In our example, the investor’s benefit base stepped up at contract anniversaries
1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 9. During year 8, the investor took a withdrawal that exceeded the
contract limit and this caused the benefit base to reset. The withdrawal was less
than the year’s gain in contract value and hence did not incur a surrender charge.
The investor’s contract value dropped to 0 at the 25th anniversary. The insurance
company bore the shortfall in the guaranteed withdrawal level, which was 513 in year
25 and 6921 in year 26. The investor died during year 27. At the end of this year, the
company would have returned the residual contract value (NIL in our case) to the
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investor’s beneficiaries. Figure C-1 depicts how the Contract Value Cn and Benefit
Base Bn evolve with time for this particular example.
Figure C-1: Evolution of the GWB state variables with time for the example in Table
C.1
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Appendix D
Whittaker Functions and some
basic properties
The function WhM(k,m, z) can be defined in terms of hypergeometric function (see
Mathworld [91]) as
WhM(k,m, z) = exp(−z
2
)zm+
1
2 1F1(
1
2
−m+ k, 1 + 2m, z) .
1F1(a, b, z) denotes a confluent hypergeometric function of the first kind. It has a
power series representation
1F1(a, b, z) = 1 +
a
b
z +
a(a+ 1)
b(b+ 1)
z2
2!
+ . . . (D.1)
and an integral representation
1F1(a, b, z) =
Γ(b)
Γ(b− a)Γ(a)
∫ 1
0
exp(z.t)ta−1(1− t)b−a−1dt .
Note that,
d1F1(a, b, z)
dz
=
a
b
+
a(a+ 1)
b(b+ 1)
z +
a(a+ 1)(a+ 2)
b(b+ 1)(b+ 2)
z2
2!
+ . . .
=
a
b
1F1(a+ 1, b+ 1, z) .
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Proposition D.1. Let
f1(x)
4
= x−ke−
a
2xWhM
(
k,m,
a
x
)
,
where a > 0. Then,
lim
x→0+
f1(x) = a
−k Γ(1 + 2m)
Γ(1
2
− k +m) ; (D.2)
f ′1(x) = −
(
1
2
+ k +m
)
x−(k+1)e−
a
2xWhM
(
k + 1,m,
a
x
)
. (D.3)
Proof.
lim
x→0+
f1(x) = lim
x→0+
a−k
(a
x
) 1
2
+k+m
e−
a
x 1F1(
1
2
− k +m, 1 + 2m, a
x
)
= a−k lim
z→∞ z
1
2
+k+me−z1F1(
1
2
− k +m, 1 + 2m, z)
= a−k lim
z→∞ z
1
2
+m+kez
Γ(1 + 2m)
Γ(12 − k +m)Γ(12 + k +m)
·
∫ 1
0
eztt−
1
2
−k+m(1− t)− 12+k+mdt
= a−k
Γ(1 + 2m)
Γ(12 − k +m)Γ(12 + k +m)
·
lim
z→∞
∫ 1
0
e−z(1−t)t−
1
2
−k+m(1− t)− 12+k+mzk+ 12+mdt
= a−k
Γ(1 + 2m)
Γ(12 − k +m)Γ(12 + k +m)
lim
z→∞
∫ 1
0
e−ztt−
1
2
+k+m(1− t)− 12−k+mzk+ 12+mdt
= a−k
Γ(1 + 2m)
Γ(12 − k +m)Γ(12 + k +m)
lim
z→∞
∫ z
0
e−yy−
1
2
+k+m(1− y
z
)−
1
2
−k+mdy
= a−k
Γ(1 + 2m)
Γ(12 − k +m)Γ(12 + k +m)
lim
z→∞
∫ z
0
e−yy−
1
2
+k+mdy
= a−k
Γ(1 + 2m)
Γ(12 − k +m)
.
The property (D.3) was obtained by symbolic differentiation using Maple 9.
The function WhW(k,m, z) has the following integral representation (see Math-
world [91]):
WhW(k,m, z) =
e−
z
2
Γ(1
2
− k +m)
∫ ∞
0
t−
1
2
−k+m
(
1 +
t
z
)− 1
2
+k+m
e−tdt .
(D.4)
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Proposition D.2. Let
f2(x)
4
= x−ke−
a
2xWhW
(
k,m,
a
x
)
,
where a > 0. Then,
lim
x→0+
f2(x) = 0 ; (D.5)
f ′2(x) = x
−(k+1)e−
a
2xWhW
(
k + 1,m,
a
x
)
. (D.6)
Proof.
lim
x→0+
f2(x) = lim
x→0+
a−k
(a
x
)2ke−
a
x
Γ(1
2
− k +m)
∫ ∞
0
t−
1
2
−k+m
(
1 +
tx
a
)− 1
2
+k+m
e−tdt
=
a−k
Γ(1
2
− k +m) limz→∞ z
2ke−z
∫ ∞
0
t−
1
2
−k+m
(
1 +
t
z
)− 1
2
+k+m
e−tdt
=
a−k
Γ(1
2
− k +m)
(
lim
z→∞
z2ke−z
)
·
(
lim
z→∞
∫ ∞
0
t−
1
2
−k+m
(
1 +
t
z
)− 1
2
+k+m
e−tdt
)
= 0 .
The property (D.6) was again obtained by symbolic differentiation using Maple 9.
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Appendix E
Joint distribution of Bt and Ct
Consider the following normalizations of the processs ct and bt defined in (4.26) and
(4.27):
yt =
ct
σ
=
1
σ
ln(Ct) ;
ut =
bt
σ
=
1
σ
ln(Bt) .
Applying Ito’s lemma to (4.3), we get
dyt =
(
r
σ
− 1
2
σ
)
dt+ dZQt ,
i.e., yt = ηt+ Z
Q
t ,
where η =
r
σ
− 1
2
σ .
Then, by Girsanov’s theorem, yt is a Brownian Motion under the measure R whose
Radon-Nikodym derivative is given by
dR
dQ
= exp
(
−1
2
η2t− ηZQt
)
,
i.e.,
dQ
dR
= exp(ηyt − 1
2
η2t) . (E.1)
R is absolutely continuous with Q.
Since yt, is a Brownian motion under R and ut its supremum, using the well-known
refelction principle (see Karatzas and Shreve [78]), we get:
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PR(yt ≤ u− a, ut ≥ u) =

PR(yt ≥ u+ a) . . . , z ≥ 0 ;
P(ut ≥ u)− PR(yt > u− a, ut ≥ u)
= PR(ut ≥ u)− PR(yt > u− a) . . . , z < 0 .
i.e., PR(yt ≤ y, ut ≥ u) =

PR(yt ≥ 2u− y)
= N(2u−y√
t
) . . . , y ≤ u ;
P(ut ≥ u)− PR(yt > y, ut ≥ u)
= PR(ut ≥ u)− (1− N
(
y√
t
)
)
. . . , y > u .
Taking derivatives, we get:
fRyt|ut≥u(y)P
R(ut ≥ u) =
{
1√
t
Φ(2u−y√
t
) . . . , y ≤ u ,
1√
t
Φ( y√
t
) . . . , y ≥ u ; (E.2)
and fRyt,ut(y, u) =
{
2(2u−y)
t
1√
t
Φ(2u−y√
t
) . . . , y ≤ u ,
0 . . . , y ≥ u . (E.3)
Then using the Radon-Nikodym derivative defined in (E.1) and doing a change of
measure to Q, we get:
fQyt|ut≥u(y)P
Q(ut ≥ u) =

1√
t
Φ
(
2u−y√
t
)
exp
(
ηy − 12η2t
)
. . . , y ≤ u ,
1√
t
Φ
(
y√
t
)
exp
(
ηy − 12η2t
)
. . . , y > u ;
(E.4)
and fQyt,ut(y, u) =

2(2u−y)
t
1√
t
Φ
(
2u−y√
t
)
exp
(
ηy − 12η2t
)
. . . , y ≤ u ,
0 . . . , y > u .
(E.5)
Using (E.5), we directly get,
fQct,bt(z,m) =

2(2m−z)
σ2t
1
σ
√
t
Φ
(
2m−z
σ
√
t
)
· exp ( ησz − 12η2t) . . . , z ≤ m ;
0 . . . , z > m .
This is the relation in (4.28), noting ν = ση.
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Also, using (E.4),
PQ(ut ≥ u) =
∫ u
−∞
1√
t
Φ
(
2u− y√
t
)
exp
(
ηy − 1
2
η2t
)
dy
+
∫ ∞
u
1√
t
Φ
(
y√
t
)
exp
(
ηy − 1
2
η2t
)
dy
= exp(2ηu)
∫ u
−∞
1√
t
Φ
(
y − 2u− ηt√
t
)
dy +
∫ ∞
u
1√
t
Φ
(
y − ηt√
t
)
dy
= exp(2ηu)N
(−u− ηt√
t
)
+ 1−N
(
u− ηt√
t
)
.
Hence, fQut(u) =
1√
t
Φ
(
u− ηt√
t
)
+ exp(2ηu) · Φ
(−u− ηt√
t
)
− 2ηexp(2ηu)N
(−u− ηt√
t
)
= 2 · 1√
t
Φ
(
u− ηt√
t
)
− 2ηexp(2ηu) ·N
(−u− ηt√
t
)
. (E.6)
Hence,
fQbt (m) = 2 ·
1
σ
√
t
Φ
(
m− σηt
σ
√
t
)
− 2η
σ
exp
(
2ηm
σ
)
N
(−m− σηt
σ
√
t
)
.
This is the same as in (4.29), as ν = ησ.
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Appendix F
Mortality Table
Table F.1: ERISA Section 4050 mortality rates for ages 49 and above (year
2008). Average residual life for each age is computed using the De-Moivre’s
approximation.
Age Mortality Rate (from table) Implied Hazard Rate
Average Residual Life (De-
Moivre’s approximation)
49 0.0013 0.0013 34.85
50 0.0014 0.0014 33.89
51 0.0015 0.0015 32.94
52 0.0017 0.0017 31.99
53 0.0020 0.0020 31.04
54 0.0022 0.0022 30.10
55 0.0025 0.0025 29.17
56 0.0029 0.0029 28.24
57 0.0034 0.0034 27.32
58 0.0039 0.0039 26.41
59 0.0044 0.0044 25.51
60 0.0050 0.0050 24.63
61 0.0058 0.0058 23.75
62 0.0066 0.0066 22.88
63 0.0076 0.0076 22.03
64 0.0086 0.0086 21.20
65 0.0097 0.0097 20.38
66 0.0110 0.0111 19.57
67 0.0122 0.0123 18.78
68 0.0132 0.0133 18.01
69 0.0144 0.0145 17.24
70 0.0154 0.0155 16.49
71 0.0167 0.0168 15.74
72 0.0183 0.0185 15.00
73 0.0200 0.0202 14.27
74 0.0220 0.0222 13.55
75 0.0243 0.0246 12.84
76 0.0269 0.0273 12.15
77 0.0306 0.0311 11.47
78 0.0346 0.0352 10.82
Continued on next page
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Table F.1 – continued from previous page
Age Mortality Rate (from table) Implied Hazard Rate
Average Residual Life (De-
Moivre’s approximation)
79 0.0391 0.0399 10.19
80 0.0441 0.0451 9.58
81 0.0497 0.0509 9.00
82 0.0558 0.0574 8.44
83 0.0615 0.0635 7.91
84 0.0684 0.0709 7.40
85 0.0757 0.0787 6.91
86 0.0840 0.0877 6.43
87 0.0949 0.0997 5.98
88 0.1063 0.1124 5.55
89 0.1188 0.1265 5.16
90 0.1328 0.1425 4.78
91 0.1461 0.1579 4.44
92 0.1622 0.1770 4.12
93 0.1791 0.1974 3.82
94 0.1954 0.2174 3.55
95 0.2151 0.2422 3.30
96 0.2327 0.2648 3.07
97 0.2530 0.2917 2.85
98 0.2745 0.3209 2.66
99 0.2929 0.3466 2.49
100 0.3116 0.3734 2.32
101 0.3388 0.4136 2.16
102 0.3588 0.4445 2.02
103 0.3807 0.4792 1.90
104 0.4044 0.5182 1.78
105 0.4279 0.5584 1.68
106 0.4491 0.5962 1.60
107 0.4660 0.6274 1.55
108 0.4786 0.6512 1.50
109 0.4881 0.6697 1.47
110 0.4948 0.6828 1.45
111 0.4987 0.6906 1.44
112 0.5000 0.6931 1.44
113 0.5000 0.6931 1.43
114 0.5000 0.6931 1.42
115 0.5000 0.6931 1.40
116 0.5000 0.6931 1.35
117 0.5000 0.6931 1.26
118 0.5000 0.6931 1.08
119 0.5000 0.6931 0.72
120 1.0000 Inf 0.00
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Appendix G
Computational Methods for
Chapter 5
In this Appendix, we provide a brief description of the computational methods used
to value GWB under the different asset return models specified in Section 5.2 of
Chapter 5.
G.1 BSM Model
For numerical computations, for each n, we evaluate the values of ln(x) and gn(x) as
defined in (5.7) and (5.8) respectively, at M + 1 evenly spaced points in the interval
[0, 1] with M = 300. We then evaluate the integrals in (5.10) and (5.11) using
simple linear interpolation. Because asset returns have lognormal distributions, these
integrals can be evaluated easily. We describe in detail the procedure for evaluating
the function ln(·). An almost identical procedure with appropriate modifications
based on (5.11) is used for evaluating gn(·).
Let xi, 0 ≤ i ≤M denote the M + 1 points on the grid, with x0 = 0 and xM = 1.
For 0 ≤ i ≤ M + 1, let li,n 4= ln(xi) denote the values that the function ln(·) takes
on the grid-points. Suppose these values are available for some n. We first find the
linear interpolation coefficients Ali,n, B
l
i,n; 0 ≤ i ≤M as follows:
Ali,n =
li+1,n − li,n
xi+1 − xi ;
Bli,n = li,n .
We use the following linear approximation for evaluating ln(x) at an arbitrary point
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x:
ln(x) ≈ Alj,n(x− xj) +Blj,n , (G.1)
where j is such that xj ≤ x < xj+1.
Using the approximation in (G.1) in (5.10), we get
ln−1(x) = e−(λ
A
n+rn) ·
{
x ·
∫ ln( qnx )
−∞
(qn
x
− ez
)
· Φ (z;µn, σn) dz
+
∫ ln( 1+qnx )
ln( qnx )
ln (xe
z − qn) · Φ (z;µn, σn) dz
+ x · ln(1) ·
∫ ∞
ln( 1+qnx )
(
ez − qn
x
)
· Φ (z;µn, σn) dz
}
≈ e−(λAn+rn) ·
{∫ ln( qnx )
−∞
(qn − xez) · Φ (z;µn, σn) dz
+
M∑
i=1
∫ ln(xi+qnx )
ln
(
xi−1+qn
x
) (Ali−1(xez − qn) +Bli−1) · Φ (z;µn, σn) dz
+ ln(1) ·
∫ ∞
ln( 1+qnx )
(xez − qn) · Φ (z;µn, σn) dz
}
. (G.2)
Now, ∫ y
−∞
Φ(z;µn, σn)dz = N
(
y − µn
σn
)
= N
(
y
σn
− rn
σn
+
σn
2
)
and∫ ∞
y
exp(z)Φ(z;µn, σn)dz = exp
(
µn +
1
2
σ2n
)
N
(−y
σn
+
r
σn
+
σn
2
)
= ern · N
(−y
σn
+
rn
σn
+
σn
2
)
.
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Then, from (G.2),
ln−1(x) ≈ e−λ
A
n ·
{
qne
−rn ·N
(−ln x
qn
σn
− rn
σn
+
σn
2
)
− x ·N
(−ln x
qn
σn
− rn
σn
− σn
2
)
+ x ·
M∑
i=1
Ali−1 ·
(
N
(
ln x
qn+xi−1
σn
+
rn
σn
+
σn
2
)
−N
(
ln x
qn+xi
σn
+
rn
σn
+
σn
2
))
+ e−rn
M∑
i=1
(Bli−1 −Ali−1qn) ·
(
N
(
ln x
qn+xi−1
σn
+
rn
σn
− σn
2
)
−N
(
ln x
qn+xi
σn
+
rn
σn
− σn
2
))
+ lM+1,n ·
(
x ·N
(
ln x
qn+1
σn
+
rn
σn
+
σn
2
)
− qne−rn ·N
(
ln x
qn+1
σn
+
rn
σn
− σn
2
))}
.
(G.3)
From the boundary conditions in (5.12), the values of Aln and B
l
n for n = N are
known to be 0. Thus (G.3) can be used to successively evaluate ln(x) by backward
substitution.
For computational work, we use the BSM model with constant values of rn and
σn in (5.10) (and (5.11)). Also, the values of x at which (G.3) is evaluated are fixed
as the points xi, 0 ≤ i ≤ M on the grid. This allows us some further computational
speed-ups as many quantities in (G.3) can then be computed only once and stored
for use in successive iterations.
A similar formula can be obtained for evaluating gn(x). The method can also be
appropriately modified for valuing GWB under the alternate withdrawal strategy of
Section 5.3.
Finally, note that because moments of the normal distribution are available in a
closed form, in general, we can use any polynomial interpolation method for ln(·) and
gn(·) and still avoid evaluating any integrals numerically.
G.2 SILN Model
For the SILN model, we use the product dynamics as given by (5.1) (and (5.17) in
case of the alternate withdrawal strategy of Section 5.3) and Monte Carlo simulations
(with 10000 sample paths) for valuing GWB. We simulate only the randomness due
to the market risk factors. Mortality factors are accounted for directly in the spirit
of (5.4).
For simulations, we need to generate the risk-free rate rn and the excess return of
the VA fund over rn for each year. The excess return being log-normal and indepen-
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dent of rn in the SILN model can be generated in a straightforward way.
The generation of risk-free rate samples, from the two factor Gaussian process
is more involved. From the specification of the short-rate model as given in (5.13),
it is clear that we have two state variables at any time t, x1,t and x2,t. Under the
Gaussian model, as we shall show shortly, the state variables x1,T , x2,T and the factor
yT
4
=
∫ T
0
rsds, which corresponds to the effective interest rate for the period (0, T ] are
jointly normal. This then allows us to discretely sample the interest rate process and
use a time step as large as the epoch interval in our simulations and speeds up the
computations considerably. It is well known (see, for example, Oksendal [98]) that
the stochastic differential equation in (5.13) has the solution:
x1,t = x1,0exp(−κ1t) + σ1
∫ t
0
exp(−κ1(t− s))dZ1s ;
x2,t = x2,0exp(−κ2t) + σ2
∫ t
0
exp(−κ2(t− s))dZ2s . (G.4)
It then follows that,
yT =
∫ T
0
rtdt =
∫
0T
x1,tdt+
∫
0T
x2,tdt+
∫ T
0
b(t)dt
= x1,0
∫ T
0
exp(−κ1t)dt+ σ1
∫ T
0
∫ t
0
exp(−κ1(t− s))dZ1sdt
+ x2,0
∫ T
0
exp(−κ2t)dt+ σ2
∫ T
0
∫ t
0
exp(−κ2(t− s))dZ2sdt+B(T )
= x1,0f(κ1, T ) + σ1
∫ T
0
f(κ1, T − s)dZ1s
+ x2,0f(κ2, T ) + σ2
∫ T
0
f(κ2, T − s)dZ2s +B(T ) ; (G.5)
where,
B(T ) =
∫ T
0
b(t)dt ;
f(κ, t)
4
=
1− exp(−κt)
κ
.
From (G.4) and (G.5), it follows that x1,T , x2,T and yT should be jointly normal.
Further, using Ito isommetry,
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var(x1,T ) = σ
2
1
∫ t
0
exp(−2κ1(t− s))ds
= σ21f(2κ1, T ) ;
var(x1,T ) = σ
2
1f(2κ2, T ) ;
var(yT ) = σ
2
1
∫ T
0
(f(κ1, T − s))2 ds+ σ22
∫ T
0
(f(κ2, T − s))2 ds
+ 2σ1σ2ρ
∫ T
0
f(κ1, T − s) · f(κ2, T − s)ds
=
σ21
κ21
(T − 2f(κ1, T ) + f(2κ1, T )) + σ
2
2
κ22
(T − 2f(κ2, T ) + f(2κ2, T ))
+ 2
σ1σ2ρ
κ1κ2
(T − f(κ1, T )− f(κ2, T ) + f(κ1 + κ2, T )) .
We can similarly find the covariances between the state variables and the effective
discount term as
cov(x1,T , x2,T ) = σ1σ2ρf(κ1 + κ2, T ) ;
cov(x1,T , yT ) =
σ21
κ1
(f(κ1, T )− f(2κ1, T )) + σ1σ2ρ
κ2
(f(κ1, T )− f(κ1 + κ2, T )) ;
cov(x2,T , yT ) =
σ1σ2ρ
κ1
(f(κ2, T )− f(κ1 + κ2, T )) + σ
2
2
κ2
(f(κ2, T )− f(2κ2, T )) .
The expressions in (G.6) and (G.6) can be used to directly generate a sample of
the state variable (x1,n+1, x2,n+1) and the one year risk-free rate rn+1 from (x1,n, x2,n).
Finally, the function b(t) is adjusted so that the forward rates implied by the
short rate model match the market forward rates. Let γ0(t) denote the time t market
forward rate. Then, we must have
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
γ0(s)ds
)
= EQ[exp(−yt)] .
Using (G.5) and (G.6) and the fact that yT is Gaussian, we get
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exp
(
−
∫ t
0
γ0(s)ds
)
= exp
(
−x1,0f(κ1, t)− x2,0f(κ2, t)−B(t) + 1
2
var(yt)
)
.
Hence, b(t) = γ0(t) +
d
dt
(
−x1,0f(κ1, t)− x2,0f(κ2, T ) + 1
2
var(yt)
)
= γ0(t)− x1,0exp(−κ1t)− x2,0exp(−κ2t)
+
1
2
(
σ21 · (f(κ1, t))2 + σ22 · (f(κ2, t))2 + 2σ1σ2ρ · f(κ1, t)f(κ2, t)
)
.
G.3 SISV Model
Unlike the BSM and SILN models, the SISV model does not offer computational
short-cuts. Like the SILN model, we use Monte Carlo simulations, again with 10,000
sample paths, to value GWB liabilities and revenue streams. We again simulate only
the randomness coming from market factors, as the mortality related randomness can
be directly incorporated in the pricing formulae. We discretely sample the interest
rate process using the procedure described in Section G.2 for the SILN model.
To generate the excess VA fund returns, we first generate excess equity returns
for one year using a discretized version of (5.15) with a small time step ∆ = 1
250
years. This also gives us a sample of the other state variable in the system, i.e.,
Vn, or the instantaneous variance at the n
th anniversary. The one year excess bond
return is obtained by directly sampling from a log-normal distribution with volatility
σb. The one year excess portfolio return, i.e., ln(R
s
n)− rn is then obtained by taking
a weighted combination of the excess equity and the excess bond returns, with the
weights selected in accordance with the composition chosen by the investor.
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